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ABSTR AC T. A large body of literature in administrative law discusses presidential control of
executive agencies through centralized review of regulations in the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), part of the White House's Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). Largely overlooked in this literature is how the President's budget acts as a source of
agency policy control -in particular, how the White House exercises control through OMB's
authority to prepare the budget, oversee agencies' execution of the budget, and create and
implement management initiatives through the budget process. This Article identifies seven
levers associated with OMB's work on budget preparation, budget execution, and management
and shows how these levers can control agency policymaking. These levers have some salutary
aspects, especially in their valuable coordination work throughout the administrative state, but
they also raise a series of accountability concerns related to opacity, the extensive discretion
afforded to civil servants and lower-level political appointees, and the potential for substantive
policy (and political) choices to be obscured by technocratic-sounding work. The Article
concludes with a reform agenda, mapping out ways that the President, 0MB, Congress, and civil
society should respond to these accountability problems. Future analyses of OIRA's authority
should incorporate discussion of the complementary power of OMB to use the budget as a
source of agency policy control.
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THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET AS A SOURCE OF AGENCY POLICY CONTROL
INTRODUCTION
One of the secrets only the initiated know is that those who labor here [at the
Office ofManagement and Budget]for long do so because the numbers are the
keys to the doors of eveiything. Spending for the arts, the sciences, foreign
policy and defense, health and welfare, education, agriculture, the
environment, everything-and revenues from every source-all are reflected,
recorded, and battled over - in numbers. And the sums of the numbers
produce fiscal and monetary policy. If it matters-there are numbers that
define it. And ifyou are responsible for advising the president about numbers,
you are - de facto - in the stream of every policy decision made by the federal
government.
- Paul O'Neill, Former Deputy Director of OMB.'
Scholarship on administrative law is replete with analysis of presidential
control of executive agencies through centralized review of regulations in the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), part of the White
House's Office of Management and Budget (OMB). While the literature is
sharply divided as to whether OIRA's control is salutary or dangerous,' the
literature largely shares an underlying framework within which the subject
matter is discussed: it tends to focus on regulations as the primary policy lever
through which OMB affects agencies' policy choices.'
1. Bernard H. Martin, Office of Management and Budget, in GETTING IT DONE: A GUIDE FOR
GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVES 72 (Mark A. Abramson et al. eds., 2013).
2. For the view that this control promotes efficiency, accountability, and some positive form of
the unitary executive, see, for example, Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 830 (2003); Christopher C.
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 1075, 1081-82 (1986); John D. Graham et al., Managing the Regulatory State: The
Experience of the Bush Administration, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 953, 995-97 (2oo6); Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2289 (2001); and Richard H.
Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995).
For the view that this control destroys accountability, oversteps the bounds of legality, and
delays necessary agency action, see, for example, PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE:
How EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENs AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 158 (2oo9); Lisa Heinzerling,
Inside EPA: A Former Insider's Reflections on the Relationship Between the Obama EPA and the
Obama White House, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325, 364-69 (2014); Alan B. Morrison, OMB
Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way To Write a Regulation, 99 HARv. L.
REV. 1059, 1o64-69 (1986); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing Centralized White House
Regulatory Review, I MICH. J. ENVTL. &ADMIN. L. 209 (2012); and Peter L. Strauss, Overseer,
or "the Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 732-38
(2007).
3. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A
Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 64 (20o6) (limiting
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This portrayal of OMB as an institution for asserting presidential control
over the administrative state is incomplete. Reviewing regulations is not the
only policy lever OMB has to control executive agencies' policy choices. In fact,
it may not even be the main one. The budget itself- the core reason for OMB's
existence 4 - is a key tool for controlling agencies.s Yet the mechanisms of
control through the executive budget process remain little discussed and
insufficiently understood.
This Article seeks to expand the view of centralized control of the
administrative state by describing, categorizing, and analyzing the operations
surrounding the President's budget. It maps out the legal documents that
govern this work-some statutes, but primarily documents produced by OMB
and the White House more generally-as well as the OMB offices and
personnel behind this work. These sources help to explain the mechanisms and
processes by which OMB uses the budget to get "in the stream of every policy
decision made by the federal government." 6
The Article advances three kinds of arguments: descriptive, normative, and
prescriptive. The core descriptive claim is that understanding OMB's budget
operations is fundamental to understanding centralized control of agencies'
decision making because OMB's work on the budget has important
policymaking effects. This insight provides a new perspective on the federal
discussion to "the involvement of OIRA and other White House offices in EPA rule-making,
as opposed to other types of policy-making"); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political"
Oversight ofAgency Decision Making, io8 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1131 (2010) (limiting discussion
to agency rulemaking); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on
Agency Policy-Making, 8o IOWA L. REv. 1, 4 (1994) (clarifying that in "examin[ing]
presidential influence on agency policy . . . the Article focuses almost exclusively on
economic, health, and safety regulation").
4. See LARRY BERMAN, THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1921-
1979, at 3-4 (1979) (describing OMB's creation as the Bureau of the Budget in 1921).
S. See, e.g., DONALD F. KETTL, DEFICIT POLITICs: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE IN AMERICAN
PoLITICs 169 (2d ed. 2003) ("Leverage over money, of course, has given OMB enormous
power over the details of policy."); IRENE S. RUBIN, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC BUDGETING:
GETTING AND SPENDING, BORROWING AND BALANCING 11 (7th ed. 2014) (describing OMB's
job as, in part, "trying to accomplish the policy goals of the president through the budget");
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance ofPower in the Administrative State,
89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 5o6 (1989) ("[T]he overall policy-shaping effect of the OMB's
budgetary power is significant."); Martha Joynt Kumar, Getting Ready for Day One: Taking
Advantage of the Opportunities and Minimizing the Hazards of a Presidential Transition, PUB.
ADMIN. REv., July-Aug. 20o8, at 603, 61o ("The budget is the bottom line for presidential
policy . . . ."); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the
White House, 8o COLUM. L. REv. 943, 963 (1980) (stating that, even before OIRA came into
existence, OMB "exercise[d] control over agency budgets, and frequently over their policies
as well").
6. Martin, supra note i, at 72.
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budget process. Much writing on the budget process focuses solely on
legislative procedures and general fiscal policy, attending very little to the
executive's role.7 When the administrative law literature discusses the budget,
it tends to do so through the lens of institutional battles between Congress and
the President rather than by examining the budget as a method through which
the White House can control agencies' policymaking.8 When the literature
does discuss the intra-executive role of the budget, it tends to focus on blunt
tools and discrete moments in time: the President's ability to propose the
funding levels and associated policy choices that Congress acts on,9 to
7. See, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN
CONGRESS 101-02, 676 (1966) (discussing the Bureau of Budget, OMB's predecessor,
briefly, without exploration of the President's role); FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 454 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds., 2008)
(discussing OMB on 19 scattered pages and the President not at all); AARON WILDAVSKY,
THE NEW POLITICS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 464, 467 (1988) (discussing OMB, the
Bureau of the Budget, and the President in only a few pages). Some exceptions to this
overwhelming focus on Congress exist. Allen Schick's extremely useful book on the federal
budget contains a chapter titled "The President's Budget." See ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL
BUDGET: POLITICS, POLICY, PROCESS 84-117 (3 d ed. 2007). But while it captures important
dynamics, it largely focuses on executive-legislative relations and treats OMB as a single unit
without further disaggregating OMB's role. Id. An important historical exception to the
focus on Congress is LouIs FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER (1975). But Fisher
focuses on only one aspect of this power -budget execution (one of three powers related to
presidential spending I discuss in this Article) - and requires significant updating forty years
later, as a small, emerging body of work in political science is starting to recognize. See, e.g.,
JOHN HUDAK, PRESIDENTIAL PORK: WHITE HOUSE INFLUENCE OVER THE DISTRIBUTION OF
FEDERAL GRANTS 3 (2014) ("This book challenges the common claims that spending power
and the drive for electoral success are predominantly congressional phenomena.");
Christopher R. Berry et al., The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 1o4 AM.
POL. SC. REV. 783, 783 (2010) (describing the distributive politics literature's "almost
exclusive[]" focus on Congress, rather than the President). The recent political science
literature's attempt to broaden the discipline's focus on the budget process to include a more
fulsome view of presidential power is valuable. However, it tends to focus on quantitative
analysis and abstracts the operation of presidential power. See, e.g., HUDAK, supra, at 157-67
(showing that the distribution of federal competitive grants aligns with the President's
political interests and presenting anecdotal reports of how OMB might aid in this work);
Berry et al., supra, at 785-88 (explaining how the President can generally use the budget
process to direct the distribution of federal grants). By contrast, this Article elucidates the
legal mechanisms and intra-executive structures that effectuate this power.
8. See, e.g., PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
COMMENTS 677-85 (ith ed. 2011).
9. See, e.g., MICHELLE D. CHRISTENSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42633, THE EXECUTIVE
BUDGET PROCESS: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2012) (describing the budget as "one of the President's
most important policy tools" because, although "it is not legally binding, the President's
budget initiates the congressional budget process and provides Congress with
recommended spending levels for agency programs, projects, and activities funded through
the annual appropriations acts").
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"recommend budget cuts for agencies that fail to follow administration
preferences (and budget increases for those that comply),"o and ultimately to
veto appropriations legislation not to his liking."
This Article expands this view of the intra-executive budget process,
arguing instead that OMB's budget work serves as a regularized and pervasive
form of agency control. For each component of the budget process in the
executive branch-the preparation of the President's budget, the execution of
the budget that Congress eventually passes and the President signs, and the
implementation of presidential management initiatives that are embedded in
the budget -this Article identifies and names levers that function as a form of
policy control. In preparing the budget, OMB uses the form-and-content lever to
tell agencies what to put in their budget requests to OMB in the first instance,
the approval lever to require that the substance of agency budget requests passes
muster with OMB, and the confidentiality lever to direct agencies to remain
silent about any policy preference that may differ from what the President's
budget ultimately presents to Congress." In executing the budget, OMB uses
the specification lever to define how agencies may spend their appropriated
money and the monitoring lever to ensure that agencies' ongoing work is
acceptable." And in overseeing management initiatives, OMB uses the
Presidential Management Agenda lever to develop agency-specific versions of
those initiatives, and the budget-nexus lever to ensure that the initiatives are
realized throughout the budget process.' Collectively, these levers reach widely
and deeply into agency policy choices.
In identifying and examining these levers, this Article focuses not on the
appropriations process but instead on the periods leading up to the annual
submission of the President's budget to Congress and following the passage of
the budget."s This is not to say that the congressional appropriations process is
1o. LISA SCHULTZ BRESSMAN ET AL., THE REGULATORY STATE 66o (2d ed. 2013); see also SHANE,
supra note 2, at 144 ("An agency's failure to attend respectfully to the President's concerns
may elicit punishment in the preparation of the agency's future budget.").
ii. See, e.g., Berry et al., supra note 7, at 785 ("To the extent that presidents make any
appearance whatsoever" in the empirical literature on distributive politics, "they typically are
characterized as veto players."); Kagan, supra note 2, at 2259 & n.38 (discussing the veto
power generally and as used during the Clinton presidency).
12. See infra Section II.A.
13. See infra Section II.B.
14. See infra Section II.C.
15. While in recent years continuing resolutions have largely replaced annual budgets, the
widespread use of continuing resolutions does not change the fundamental aspects of
OMIB's authority. See infra notes 195, 213-219 and accompanying text.
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irrelevant. Rather, OMB's power is rooted more in the system of executive
authority that has developed around the budget cycle than in the ultimate
appropriation.
As a central part of describing and analyzing this power, the Article surfaces
the role of the Resource Management Offices (RMOs), a critically important
but understudied part of OMB. The five RMOs collectively contain more than
four times as many staff members as OIRA." Working directly with budget
and policy officials in each agency, the RMO staff play a large role in
overseeing- indeed, at times in directing-the work of agencies throughout
the administrative state because they have primary responsibility for pulling
the aforementioned levers associated with budget preparation, budget
execution, and management initiatives. 8 Yet despite the broad scope of their
16. Of course, Congress, as the branch with the power of the purse, plays an essential role in
determining the federal government's budget. See FENNO, supra note 7, at xiii; see also U.S.
CONsT. art I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of
appropriations made by law."). That said, "[i]t is easy to exaggerate the power of the
purse," given the many complexities around using that power to control agency action.
Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the Positive Theory of "Congressional Dominance," 12 LEGIS.
STUD. Q.475, 486-88 (1987) (observing that "[t]he budget is simply not a very dependable
control mechanism" for Congress because "[i]f the [congressional] committee throws
money at [a non-compliant agency to get it to change its course], it is essentially rewarding
the agency for lack of compliance," but "[i] f the committee slashes the agency's budget as a
punishment . . . it is simultaneously denying the agency the very resources it needs to
comply with the committee's wishes," and because agencies hold and may not share
information Congress needs to target its financial incentives appropriately); see also
BREssMAN ET AL., supra note lo, at 7o8-o9 (noting that while "agencies are likely to adjust
their policies to legislative preferences in response to a threat of a budget cut . .. agencies are
free to determine whether the threat is credible"); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates and
American Public Law, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 2-6 (2012) (discussing generally the many hurdles
any legislation must survive to become law); Kagan, supra note 2, at 2259 n.38 (noting the
difficulty of getting the "authorizing and appropriations committees of both houses to
discover and agree on an effective budgetary sanction" for noncompliant agencies). Given
these complexities, understanding the control functions of the intra-executive budget
process is all the more important.
17. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET
11 (2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/organization/fy2ox6
omb budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/EW76-DTR8].
18. See infra Part II. Extensive as these levers are, they do not capture the full scope of the
RMOs' authority because these offices also play a role beyond the budget process in
managing agencies' interactions with Congress through legislative coordination and
clearance. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB
CIRCULAR No. A-19, LEGISLATIVE COORDINATION AND CLEARANCE (1979) [hereinafter OMB
CIRCULAR No. A-19], http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars-aoi9 [http://perma.cc
/QE4L-6697]; SHELLEY LYNNE TOMKIN, INSIDE OMB: POLITICS AND PROCESS IN THE
PRESIDENT'S BUDGET OFFICE 18-22 (1998). While this Article is devoted to the RMOs' work
through the budget process, future work should expand upon this other role.
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authority, a recent search of Westlaw's database of law reviews and journals
identified only seven references to the RMOs, 9 in contrast to over a thousand
articles discussing OIRA during that same time period.' Given the
omnipresence of the RMOs in agency oversight and direction, the inattention
19. WESTLAw, http://www.westlaw.com [http://perma.cc/YC75-76A8] (follow "Secondary
Sources" hyperlink; follow "Law Reviews & Journals" hyperlink; then search for "Resource
Management Offices;" using the facet labeled "Date," click on "Date Range" and insert
"01/01/1995" and "12/31/2015") (last visited Feb. 11, 2016). See Curtis W. Copeland, The Role
ofthe Office ofInformation and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1o & n.1, 120 (20o6) (mentioning consultation between OIRA and RMOs); Nestor M.
Davidson & Ethan J. Leib, Regleprudence-At OIRA and Beyond, 103 GEo. L.J. 259, 276 (2015)
(referencing RMOs as part of a description of 0MB); Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and
Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 357, 4o6 (2oo) (mentioning RMOs in passing); Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi,
Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1178, 1200 (2012)
(mentioning RMOs as a tool for presidential coordination); Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-
Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARv. L. REV. 1755, 1799-18oo (2013) (referencing
RMOs as part of a broader discussion of civil servants in OIRA); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARv. L. REv.
1838, 1845 (2013) (discussing OIRA's collaboration with the RMOs on regulations that
affect the budget). January 1, 1995 is a sensible start date for such a search because
President Clinton's OMB Director reorganized the RMOs and gave them that name in 1994.
See Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the
President, & Alice M. Rivlin, Deputy Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the
President, to All OMB Staff, No. 94-16, Making OMB More Effective in Serving the
Presidency: Changes in OMB as a Result of the OMB 2000 Review 2, 4-5 (Mar. 1, 1994),
http://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/files/original/6caf3ofc8de86be3746e386ci997e84.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SEU2-BAZ3].
20. WESTLAw, http://www.westlaw.com [http://perma.cc/YC75-76A8] (follow "Secondary
Sources" hyperlink; follow "Law Reviews & Journals" hyperlink; then search for "Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs;" using the facet labeled "Date," click on "Date Range"
and insert "01/01/1995" and "12/31/2015") (last visited Feb. ii, 2016). Records identifying the
first 1,ooo articles are on file with the author.
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in the literature to the RMOs is remarkable.' OIRA is important, but that does
not mean that the rest of OMB is not worthy of study.'
Three key points about centralized executive control emerge from this
study of the RMOs. First, the RMOs provide a direct line into agencies. Each
agency has identifiable RMO staff responsible for its work and a regular mode
of communication with that staff.23 The RMOs therefore can serve as a conduit
for policy and political direction from the President, the White House policy
councils and other White House political advisors, and the OMB Director. If
there is a message to be conveyed to agencies, the RMOs are a good way to
convey it. The RMOs therefore work to ensure conformity with the President's
policy program and political interests.4 In this sense, the RMOs' work through
the budget process reflects presidential, or at least White House, control of the
administrative state.
Second, the RMOs are not simply a conduit of information from the top
down. They also serve as a source of deep and valuable knowledge of agency
programs and practices, and busy senior political officials can accept their
judgment calls as final.' Thus, the RMOs' work also reflects the power of the
RMO staff members to play a large role in determining what presidential
control of the administrative state will look like.
21. The lack of attention to the RMOs in the legal literature is particularly striking in light of
the consideration that political scientists have given to the broader OMB beyond OIRA. See
generally, e.g., BERMAN, supra note 4; FREDERICK C. MOSHER, A TALE OF Two AGENCIES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE AND THE OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (1984); TOMKIN, supra note 18; Hugh Heclo, OMB and Neutral
Competence, in THE MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 131 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 1999); Terry M.
Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEw DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLIrrics 235 (John E.
Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985). I draw on these accounts and others in my analysis.
Still, none of these studies identifies or analyzes how OMB's budget work systematically
operates as a form of agency policy control. The contribution of this Article, then, is to
detail, categorize, and frame OMB's budget work as a system of agency policy control; to
put this work in conversation with the analysis of OIRA that has preoccupied the field; and
to assess this work in the context of administrative law values.
22. See, e.g., Sally Katzen, A Reality Check on an Empirical Study: Comments on "Inside the
Administrative State," 105 MICH. L. REv. 1497, 1498 (2007) (urging, as a former
administrator of OIRA, that scholarship attend to other aspects of OMB's work in order to
fully understand presidential control); see also TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 95 (noting that in
the 1980s, "OIRA and its surrounding controversies sometimes became equated with [all of
OMB] in the public mind").
23. See infra notes 63-71, 247 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 390-394 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Jeffrey Mervis, An Invisible Hand Behind Plan To Realign U.S. Science Education, 341
SCIENCE 338, 339-40 (2013) (describing an RMO official as "a good example of how a career
civil servant can help shape policy at the White House" and quoting an advocate saying "we
should be glad that she uses her powers for good, and not evil").
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Third, the RMOs reach many decisions about agency action on their own,
since much agency oversight does not require elevation." This does not mean
that RMO staff members advance their own political preferences; the staff
prides itself on being apolitical and working as hard for one administration as
it does for the next.' Given the extremely high caliber of the RMO staff,'
decisions the RMOs make with and for agencies may be "better," at least
against some metrics, than decisions the agencies would reach on their own. At
the same time, it is clear that a subset of RMO decisions have policy import; 9
that institutional and interpersonal dynamics mean that agencies will not
always elevate these decisions outside the RMOs;3o and that RMO staff may
not always be aware that they are making policy-inflected decisions, rather
than neutral and technocratic ones.1
In this sense, whether the RMOs' work is a form of presidential control is
less clear. At times, the RMOs' work may instead reflect OMB control, or
RMO-intuited versions of presidential control as applied to particular
situations, with case-specific value judgments obscured. Accordingly, this
Article is titled "The President's Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control,"
without further identifying the actor with the ultimate control.
My portrayal of the RMOs' work necessarily paints with a broad brush. I
offer a sketch of how OMB's policy levers generally secure agency compliance,
even if, as in any human institution, the dynamics will not hold true in every
instance." While this account leaves much open for future work, it provides an
analytic framework for understanding the policy control OMB can exercise
through the budget process.
26. See infra notes 142-149, 252-261 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Robin Bravender & Emily Yehle, Wonks in Embattled Regulatory Office Are
Mysterious-but 'Not Nefarious,' GREENWIRE (Feb. 18, 2014) http://www.eenews.net/stories
/1059994711 [http://perma.cc/G7C2-RHVP] (describing "an oft-told joke" within OMB to
illustrate the office's goal to serve the institution of the presidency rather than any one
President or political party: "Aliens invade Earth, everyone has fled the Capitol and the
White House is a wasteland. But by the time the alien's spaceship lands, three people with a
clipboard approach. 'We're from OMB,' they say, 'and we're here to help with the
transition.'").
28. See infra notes 72, 325-326 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 74, 140-149 and accompanying text; cf Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 97 (1985) (noting that
every statutory specification intended to constrain administrators' policy discretion
nonetheless requires other discretionary choices that continue to reflect administrators'
policy determinations).
3o. See infra notes 146-149, 253-255 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 142-145, 257-258, 428-429 and accompanying text.
32. See infa notes 107-1o8 and accompanying text.
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Parts I and II elaborate on this descriptive argument. Part I places the
RMOs in the context of the larger OMB and explains how the RMOs' work is
integrally related to agency policymaking. This Part also compares the scope of
the RMOs' authority with OIRA's, showing that, in some ways, the RMOs
extend more deeply and broadly throughout the administrative state than
OIRA does. Part II then details how OMB's budget process puts the office "in
the stream of every policy decision made by the federal government,"" by
describing how each lever operates in practice.
Part III turns to the Article's normative argument. This Part evaluates
OMB's levers and, more generally, the role of the RMOs in the budget process,
concluding that they have both benefits and drawbacks. One benefit is that the
RMOs' work, unlike OIRA's, is undoubtedly legal. Indeed, the questions about
the legality of OIRA's work that have dogged that office may explain why
much more attention has been paid to OIRA than the RMOs.' There is also
little doubt that the RMOs play an important role in coordinating the
sprawling administrative state. In doing so, the RMOs further core
administrative law values of efficiency, effectiveness, and to some extent,
accountability.
On the negative side, however, three aspects of the RMOs' work
collectively weaken their accountability. First, the RMOs' work is far too
opaque. The lack of transparency surrounding the RMOs' interactions with
agencies and third parties makes it difficult for the public and for Congress to
monitor their actions. Second, the structure of the RMOs' work empowers
OMB's civil servants relative to politically appointed agency officials and
obscures ultimate responsibility for agency decisions. Third, because the
RMOs' work seems dry and technical from the outside -the kind of work
associated with the bean-counter, green-eyeshade stereotype of budget
bureaucrats -its substantive nature and potential for partisan politicization are
ignored.
Part IV sets forth my prescriptive argument, although my suggestions are
meant to start a conversation rather than to present a perfect package of
solutions. I first consider how actors inside the executive branch, namely the
President and OMB itself, should respond to the RMOs' weak accountability. I
argue that Presidents should issue executive orders governing the RMOs'
work, thereby claiming ownership of it, just as they issue executive orders
governing OIRA's work, thereby setting forth their regulatory philosophies. I
propose a variety of transparency requirements that could be embedded in such
33. Martin, supra note i, at 72.
34. See infra note 296 and accompanying text.
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an executive order and assess their pros and cons. Additionally, I suggest ways
that OMB could make its own work more transparent and participatory.
I then turn to actors outside the executive branch, namely Congress and
civil society organizations. I consider how Congress could attempt to increase
the RMOs' accountability through additional oversight. I also consider ways
that civil society organizations could increase their monitoring of the RMOs'
work and expand their efforts to influence its work.
The Article concludes with a cautionary note for OIRA's critics, who have
sometimes suggested that 0IRA's role in regulatory review ought to be
eliminated. Because OIRA's work could be accomplished through the RMOs,
which are less transparent and accountable, reform-not elimination-is the
better option. More generally, future analysis of OIRA's interactions with
agencies should include consideration of the RMOs' complementary power.
1. THE ROLE OF BUDGET OVERSIGHT IN OMB
As recent shutdowns dramatically illustrate," the federal budget is
indispensable to the government's work. The budget also serves as a statement
of national priorities. OMB plays a critical role in developing this statement
and overseeing its implementation through three related activities: preparing
the budget, executing the budget, and working on management initiatives tied
to the budget.
This Part explains the importance of OMB's budget work, laying the
groundwork for the more detailed analysis in Part II of the budgetary levers
OMB can use to influence agency policymaking. Section L.A maps out OMB's
basic structure, showing that management and budget are integrally related to
policy choices. Section I.B introduces the RMOs as central to OMB's control of
agencies' policy choices through the budget process. This Section explains in
broad strokes the work of these offices and their policymaking effect. Section
I.C situates OMB's work in the context of executive branch oversight. It
compares these OMB offices to OIRA because OIRA's power is much better
understood in the literature. Drawing on this descriptive work, I argue that the
scope of the RMOs' work is in some ways even greater than OIRA's.
3s. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
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A. The Office ofManagement and Budget -and Policy
OMB dates back to the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which created
OMB's predecessor, the Bureau of the Budget." The Act was intended to
rationalize the uncoordinated process in which individual federal agencies
presented their budget requests seriatim to Congress with no big-picture,
national view." The Act located the Bureau, colloquially known as the BOB, in
the Treasury Department but created a Director and Assistant Director who
reported directly to the President . Originally these positions were simply the
President's own confidential appointees; only later would they come to require
Senate confirmation.39
In 1939, during President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Administration, the
BOB's role of providing staff assistance to the President was formalized when
the BOB was moved out of the Treasury Department and into the newly
created Executive Office of the President (EOP).4 o Although the BOB focused
on the national budget at a macro-level and on reducing government waste on
a micro-level,"1 its work soon expanded to providing broader policy advice to
the President on all sorts of matters." In 1970, as part of a reorganization plan
put forth by President Nixon, the BOB's name was changed to the Office of
Management and Budget.'
Today's OMB is an office of around 435 full-time employees," making it
the largest unit in the EOP.4 s More than ninety percent of OMB's employees
are career civil servants, 6 further distinguishing it from most other EOP
36. See Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-13, 42 Stat. 20 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.).
37. See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 3-4.
38. See Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 S 207.
39. See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 4.
40. See id. at 13.
41. See id. at 7-8.
42. See id. at 23-104.
43. See id. at 112.
44. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 17, at 11.
45. DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., SOURCEBOOK OF
UNITED STATES ExECUTIVE AGENCIES 25-26 tbl.i, 27-28 (2012) [hereinafter ACUS 2012
SOURCEBOOK].
46. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, The Staff of the Office of
Management and Budget, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/OMBstaff
[http://perma.cc/6XD8-ULQZ].
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offices, which tend to be staffed more heavily by political appointees.47 Of the
approximately forty political appointees in OMB, very few are Senate-
confirmed: only the Director, Deputy Director, Deputy Director for
Management, Administrator of OIRA, and heads of two other offices.4
OMB is often said to be divided into an "M" side (for management) and a
"B" side (for budget).' In principle, the "M" side consists of several offices
created by statute that oversee matters such as federal financial management,
procurement, e-government, and information technology.so OIRA is one of
these offices." The "M" side also includes a non-statutory office overseeing
performance and personnel management in the agencies.s2 In principle, the "B"
side consists of five RMOs, organized by agency and program area, which
oversee budget development and execution for the agencies under their
purview. It also includes a separate Budget Review Division, which coordinates
the President's budget as a whole and analyzes budget policy and trends at an
aggregate level." The organizational chart below maps out this world, where
the "M" units are the Statutory Offices (on the right), along with the
Performance and Personnel Management unit (one of the OMB-wide support
offices on the left), and the "B" units are the RMOs (at the bottom) along with
the Budget Review Division (one of the OMB-Wide Support Offices on the
left).
47. See ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 45, at 23.
48. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAvIs & JERRY W. MANSFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RL309 5 9,
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE PosITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND CoMMrTEEs
HANDLING NOMINATIONS 13, 36 (2013).
4g. See, e.g., DONALD F. KETTL, THE NEXT GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WHY OUR
INSTITUTIONS FAIL Us AND How To FIx THEM 88 (2009); TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 199-
200.
So. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 20-21; Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the
President, The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission [http://perma.cc/RQX4-PRRP].
Si. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 20-21; Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 5o.
52. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Management, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/management [http://perma.cc/EPW2-WQ5G].
53. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 12-17; Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 5o.
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In reality, however, the story is more complicated. OIRA's work on
regulatory and information policy cannot fairly be described as management-
related. Rather, these are policy functions. The current White House seems to
acknowledge this by presenting OIRA's work in a distinct tab on OMB's
website, separate from the two tabs on management and budget.ss In addition,
another important aspect of OMB's job is to centralize agencies' views on




ss. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 52 (explaining that "[t]he management side of
OMB oversees and coordinates the Federal procurement policy, performance and personnel
management, information technology (e-Government) and financial management" and
leaving OIRA off the list of "OMB's Management Offices"); Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
Exec. Office of the President, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, WHITE HousE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira [http://perma.cc/EMQ7-NEKJ] (describing OIRA's
work as involving "the review of Executive Branch regulations" and "coordination of federal
privacy policy," among other matters).
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legislation and their interactions with Congress; the current website again
provides a separate tab for this policy-laden task."6
For their part, the RMOs deal with far more than the agency budgets they
oversee. As the rest of this Article demonstrates, their authority over budget
preparation, budget execution, and related management initiatives gives them
a wide purchase over agency policy decisions.' Dividing OMB into a
management side and a budget side thus obscures the role of policy in the
office."
In some ways, the process of obscuring the role of policy in OMB began
with President Nixon's 1970 reorganization plan. In renaming the BOB the
Office of Management and Budget, President Nixon also created what became
the Domestic Policy Council, explaining that "the Domestic Council will be
primarily concerned with what we do; the Office of Management and Budget
will be primarily concerned with how we do it and how well we do it."s" This
plan to keep policy out of OMB was impossible from the start .60 But while it is
generally understood that the job of the White House policy councils is to
coordinate the President's policy,61 it is less widely discussed that this, too, is
the task of the budget side of OMB. To the extent that it is understood at an
abstract level, the mechanisms by which OMB's budget side does this work
remain underexplored. Accordingly, the rest of this Article turns to
demonstrating how OMB's budget side does this work.
56. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Legislative Information,
WHITEHOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ombAegislative-affairs [http://perma.cc/6PCN
-NQ6W] (describing OMB's role in "coordinat[ing]" the administration's work with
Congress "to ensure consistency"); see also OMB CiRcuLAI No. A-19, supra note 18, at ¶ 3
(explaining that OMB's work on "legislative coordination and clearance" is designed in part
to develop and present a unified "Administration[] position on legislation").
57. See infra Part II.
5S. See Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta & Alice M. Rivlin to All OMB Staff, supra note i9,
at 4-5 (noting that the RMOs would "integrate OMB's 'M' and 'B' so we can perform both
responsibilities more effectively," and stating that new hires for the new RMOs would be
"policy analysts").
s9. BERMAN, supra note 4, at 1o8.
6o. See id. at 5 (calling "the policy-administration dichotomy naive"); id. at 113 (explaining that
almost no one inside OMB after the reorganization thought that policy could be kept
separate from budget and management).
61. See, e.g., Paul Weinstein, Jr., White House Policy Councils, in GETTING IT DONE, supra note 1,
at 58, 60 (explaining that three White House policy councils -the National Security Council
(NSC), the National Economic Council, and the Domestic Policy Council-are "the
principal units responsible for the coordination of presidential-level policy development").
6z. See sources cited supra note 5-
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B. The Resource Management Offices
As Figure I indicates, the RMOs are central to OMB's operation. In 1994,
the RMOs were introduced in their current form as part of an internal OMB
reorganization.6 ' The RMOs grew out of longstanding budget-focused
"program divisions," which even in their narrower focus were "the 'heart and
soul' of the institution" dating back at least to the World War II era.
Together, the RMOs oversee the entire administrative state - cabinet
departments, other executive agencies, and independent agencies - in five
groups organized by subject matter: Natural Resource Programs; Education,
Income Maintenance, and Labor Programs; Health Programs; General
Government Programs; and National Security Programs.6 s
Almost half of OMB's 435 employees work in the RMOs.6 6 At the helm of
each RMO is a political appointee called a Program Associate Director or
PAD.6 ' But unlike the heads of OIRA, the Office of Federal Financial
Management, and the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the PADs are not
Senate-confirmed. The RMOs are further organized into distinct divisions,
each run by a career member of the Senior Executive Service, called a Deputy
Associate Director, or DAD. 6 ' Each division is then split into branches run by a
career official called a branch chief.' The remainder of the staff members
within each branch are program examiners, with primary oversight
63. See Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta & Alice M. Rivlin to All OMB Staff, supra note 19,
at 2.
64. ToMKIN, supra note 18, at 12; see also SELDEN BIGGS & LELIA B. HELMS, THE PRAcrICE OF
AMERICAN PUBuc POLICYMAKING 341 (20o6) ("The Resource Management Offices (RMOs)
lie at the heart of OMB's role in budgeting and policy production.").
65. See supra Figure i. Previous administrations have organized these categories slightly
differently. President George W. Bush's OMB combined the RMO for Education, Income
Maintenance, and Labor Programs with the RMO for Health Programs to form the RMO
for Human Resource Programs, leaving four RMOs in total. See OFFICE OF THE FED.
REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL 88, 97 (2002).
President Clinton's OMB had five RMOs but combined health programs with personnel-
related programs to have one RMO called Health and Personnel, leaving education, income-
maintenance, and labor programs in their own RMO called Human Resources. See OFFICE
OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVEs & RECORDS ADMIN., U.S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL 91,
98 (1995). These differences in organization did not change the basic structure of the
RMOs' work.
66. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 17, at 11.
67. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 12.
68. See DAVIS & MANSFIELD, supra note 48, at 13.
69. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 12-13.
70. See id. at 13.
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responsibility over part of a large agency, several smaller agencies, or some
combination thereof.' In keeping with the high expectations for RMO staff in
general, program examiners tend to be highly credentialed.' They are also
often (although not always) relatively junior in their careers.'
The RMOs have broad authority over the agencies they oversee. As the
Director and Deputy Director of OMB explained in describing the 1994
transformation of the program divisions into the RMOs, the RMOs would
"better integrate our budget analysis, management review and policy
development roles," assessing how well agency programs work and making
program and policy plans for the future."4 This open-ended portfolio covers
almost anything agencies could conceivably want to do.
The core of the RMOs' work tracks three distinct parts of the budget
process: budget preparation, during which the RMOs work with the agencies
under their authority to guide the development of their budget proposals;
budget execution, during which the RMOs ensure that agencies implement the
budget in accordance with legislative requirements and the President's
priorities; and management implementation, which requires the RMOs to ensure
that agencies implement various management requirements as the new budget
is prepared and the previous budget is executed." These three aspects of the
budget process structure the relationship between the RMOs and agencies and
give the RMOs a great deal of authority over agency action.
A recent publication providing advice for new political appointees
underscores the importance of the RMOs: "There is one certainty in
Washington: You will be dealing with the Office of Management and Budget
throughout your tenure as an agency head. Nearly every major issue you will
face will pass through OMB."' 6 While " [y]ou will have to work with OMB in a
variety of areas," including regulatory review, "the budget process is the main
arena of engagement," and "[y]our lead OMB policy official for most budget
and program policy matters will be the program associate director (PAD) with
71. See id.
72. See Gordon Adams, The Office ofManagement and Budget: The President's Policy Tool, in THE
NATioNAL SECURITY ENTERPRISE: NAVIGATING THE LABYRINTH 55, 61 (Roger Z. George &
Harvey Rishikof eds., 2011).
73. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 13, 23-24.
74. Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta & Alice M. Rivlin to All OMB Staff, supra note 19, at 2,
4-5; see also Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Program Examiner:
Resource Management Offices, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/program
examiner [http://perma.cc/56G4-5KAX] (describing expansive work under the program
examiners' purview).
7s. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note So. See generally infra Part II.
76. Martin, supra note i, at 70.
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jurisdiction over your agency."' And as one former PAD explains, "You sit at
the pure epicenter of policy. You're in a position to make a difference. And
eventually, everything will come across your desk."" Given the importance of
the RMOs to agency decision making, their work requires more attention.
C. Comparing Power Centers for Review ofBudgets and Regulations
Before turning to the levers the RMOs use to control agency policymaking
through the budget process, it is worth underscoring the influence of those
offices as compared to OIRA, which provides a more familiar frame of
reference.
As is well known in the academic literature and to Washington insiders,
OIRA's role in regulatory review gives it significant authority over agency
policymaking. Every President since Reagan has required executive agencies
to submit significant regulatory actions to OIRA for approval and to conform
those regulations to various cost-benefit principles as justified in a Regulatory
Impact Statement.so Because OIRA ultimately determines whether a regulatory
action is significant, in practice OIRA at least initially investigates a large
portion of regulatory actions."' OIRA's review can result in a regulation being
significantly delayed, never being published at all, or being published in a
77. Id. at 70-71.
78. Adams, supra note 72, at 58.
79. OIRA also has other roles, but the literature tends to focus on "regulatory oversight and
cost-benefit analysis" and "virtually never discuss[es]" OIRA's other responsibilities. Stuart
Shapiro, OIRA Inside and Out, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 146 (2011). But see, e.g., Nina A.
Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responding to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 447, 485-89 (2014) (discussing an emerging body of scholarship on OIRA's
review of guidance documents). For a discussion of some of OIRA's other roles in relation
to its limited oversight over independent agencies, see infra note 94.
so. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1982). Versions of cost-benefit analysis and
centralized regulatory review date back to President Johnson, before OIRA was created, but
the scope of OIRA's review under President Reagan was unprecedented. See Jim Tozzi,
OIRA's Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding
OIRA's Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REv. 37, 39-62 (2011) (detailing the scope of regulatory
review under Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter).
Si. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1850-53.
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dramatically different form." For this reason, OIRA is routinely referred to as
"the most important government office you've never heard of."8 3
The RMOs, even less well known, are equally deserving of this superlative.
Indeed, in some ways, the RMOs are more influential than OIRA: (1) they
penetrate deeper into agency practice; and (2) they have broader purview over
the executive establishment. This influence is a function of both their
institutional attributes and the nature of their work.
The RMOs are able to push deeper into agency practice for two reasons.
First, they have more staff with which to do so. OIRA is an office of around
forty-five people,8 divided, like the RMOs, into different branches that each
oversees a subset of agencies."s The RMOs collectively have more than four
times as many staff members, and three of the RMOs are each larger than
OIRA itself.86 With a greater number of staff members assigned to each
agency, the RMOs have more capacity to engage with agency work.7
82. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 349 ("It is a matter of some consequence . . . when
OIRA does not allow such rules to issue, or requires substantial changes before they
issue."); Steinzor, supra note 2, at 268-73 (providing an example of when OIRA delayed a
proposed EPA rule because it required the EPA to "undertake an elaborate cost-benefit
analysis to justify [the rule]").
83. Robert R.M. Verchick, Politics and Progress: Will the White House Stall Its
Own Climate Change Plans?, HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (July 25, 2013, 6:oo PM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-a-environment/313513-politics-and-progress
-will-the-white-house-stall-its-own-climate-change-plans [http://perma.cc/UUY3-VS3F];
see also Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARv. L. REv. 994, 994 (201) ("The Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the most powerful federal agency that most
people have never heard of."); Jim Abrams, House Balks at Bush Order for New Powers,
WASH. PosT (July 3, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.comf/wp-dyn/content/article/2007
/07/03/AR2007070301245.html [http://perma.cc/CJ36-7PBX] (calling OIRA an "obscure
White House office" that "has quietly grown into the most powerful regulatory agency in
Washington"); OIRA lol: The Most Powerful Government Office You've Never Heard Of CTR.
FOR PROGREssivE REFORM (2013), http://www.progressivereform.org/oiraioi.cfm [http://
perma.cc/VF7X-366QJ (stating that OIRA is "one of the most important offices in the entire
federal government, and at the same time, largely unknown"); John Walke, Monitoring
Abuses by White House Office, NAT'L RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL: SWITCHBOARD (June
11, 2013), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jwalke/this week-the-senate-committee.html
[http://perma.cc/7Z2M-TB25] (calling the OIRA Administrator "one of the most important
White House positions you've never heard of").
84. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 17, at 11; Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1845.
85. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1845 (describing OIRA's organizational structure, in which
each division is overseen by a career branch chief and staffed primarily by civil servants
called "desk officers" who specialize in different areas).
86. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 17, at ni (showing that in FY 2014, the RMO for
National Security Programs had fifty-one full-time equivalent positions; the RMO for
General Government Programs had forty-eight; the RMO for Natural Resource Programs
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Second, the RMOs are more deeply involved because the core of their work
is proactive, rather than reactive. OIRA largely responds to what agencies bring
to it.8 Although President George W. Bush's OIRA Administrator introduced
the practice of prompting agencies to consider promulgating a particular
regulation, OIRA rarely uses this tool.8, In contrast, the RMOs are proactive
by, for example, telling agencies the kinds of policy choices they expect to see
in agencies' budget submissions, in keeping with OMB Directors' budget
instructions,9 o and detailing how agencies may spend the money allocated to
them.9 ' By instigating agency action rather than merely responding to it, the
RMOs have the capacity to affect a greater variety of agency work.
Relatedly, the RMOs extend oversight more broadly throughout the
executive establishment than OIRA does. Most importantly, while
independent agencies need not submit their regulations to OIRA for review,92
had forty-six; the RMO for Health Programs had forty; and the RMO for Education,
Income Maintenance, and Labor Programs had twenty-seven).
87. Compare John D. Graham & James W. Broughel, Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency
Evasion of OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, i HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y: FEDERALIST
30, 35-36, 49-50 (2014) (lamenting OIRA's limited staffing and heavy workload), with infra
Section II.B.2 (describing regular, ongoing monitoring work of RMOs).
88. See Graham & Broughel, supra note 87, at 49-50 (suggesting that OIRA's engagement of
agencies earlier in the policy development process would be useful but is "unrealistic" in
light of its limited capacity); Nou, supra note 19, at 1817 (noting that OIRA has "likely
shifted resources toward transactional, back-end regulatory review, and away from other
early-stage coordination mechanisms"); Steinzor, supra note 2, at 279 (noting that OIRA
"does not recognize as legitimate" the proactive work of "finding lasting policy solutions to
cross-cutting regulatory problems").
ag. See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 19, at 131-32 (identifying thirteen "prompt letters" sent by
OIRA between 2001 and 2003, but noting a sharp decline by 2005 and suggesting that OIRA
may have reverted back to its traditional role as a "reactive force in the rulemaking
process").
go. See infra Section II.A.1 (describing budget instructions to agencies).
gi. See infra note 150 (describing how the RMos define agency action through "passback" of
OMB's budget decisions); infra notes 195-219 (describing how the RMOs must "apportion"
the money that Congress has appropriated before agencies can spend it).
92. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §§ 3(b), 6, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (excluding "independent
regulatory agencies" from the obligation to submit proposed regulations to OIRA); see also
Exec. Order No. 13,579 5§ i(a)-(b), 3 C.F.R. 256 (2012) (suggesting that "independent
regulatory agencies" generally "should promote [the] goal" of creating "a regulatory system
that protects 'public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic
growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation'"); Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1839
n.3 (noting that "[t]he so-called independent agencies are not subject to OIRA review"). In
this context, the term "independent regulatory agency" refers to the statutory definition in
the Paperwork Review Act, which defines the term with reference to a number of such
agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Securities and
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they must participate in the annual budget cycle under RMO oversight." The
absence of authority over independent agencies through regulatory review
poses an important constraint on OIRA, so important that some commentators
have called "being or becoming an 'independent' agency" a potential "tactic"
for agencies to use in order to avoid OIRA oversight.94  Conversely,
independent agencies are subject to RMO oversight 5 (although there are some
variations in how independent agency budgets are constructed and
submitted 6 ). The RMOs thus provide a powerful tool for presidential control
over independent agencies that OIRA does not offer. 9 7
The RMOs may also hold particular sway over a subset of traditional
executive agencies over which OIRA has less control: those agencies that do
more of their work through spending programs than through regulation.
Exchange Commission, "and any other similar agency designated by statute as a Federal
independent regulatory agency or commission." 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (2012).
93. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 5, at 5o6 n.231 (noting that "no blanket exemption for the
independents thus far exists" with respect to OMB's budget oversight); Peter L. Strauss,
The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation ofPowers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L.
REV- 573, 588 & n.6o (1984) (discussing previous congressional decisions to include
independent agencies generally in the Budget and Accounting Act's requirement to submit
to the President's budget control).
94. Mendelson & Wiener, supra note 79, at 505-07. To be sure, independent agencies come
under OIRA's purview in several other ways. For example, they are not exempt from the
general requirements to submit an annual plan outlining the regulations they anticipate
issuing that year, see Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 92, 5 4(c), and to review
periodically their existing regulations to determine which, if any, are no longer needed, see
Exec. Order No. 13,579, supra note 92, § 2. But neither of these gives OIRA a significant
hook over independent agencies' regulatory policymaking. See Graham & Broughel, supra
note 87, at 52 (noting that independent agencies "have a clear way around OIRA review").
Independent agencies also fall within the general obligation to submit requests for OIRA to
approve efforts to collect information from the public under the Paperwork Reduction Act.
See 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) (2012). But there are multiple avenues for all agencies, independent
and executive branch alike, to obtain information from the public without going through
this review. See Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory
Affairs, to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies & Indep. Regulatory Agencies, Information
Collection Under the Paperwork Reduction Act 2-3 (Apr. 7, 2010), http://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/PRAPrimer-o4o72010.pdf [http://
perma.cc/HQ3V-WHXG] (describing ways agencies can collect information that would not
trigger the requirement to submit a request to OIRA).
95. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
g6. See infra notes 162-173 and accompanying text (discussing budget bypass authority and self-
funded agencies).
97. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEx. L. REv. 15, 42-43 (2olo) ("If agencies must rely on OMB for budget requests,
the President has a huge lever of power over the agency, whether or not the head of the
agency is removable at will.").
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While regulatory programs "employ regulatory action to achieve program and
agency goals,",8 spending programs use federal money to achieve their goals.
Pervasive throughout the administrative state, spending programs include
competitive grant programs, block or formula grant programs, capital assets
and service acquisition programs, credit programs, direct federal programs,
and research and development programs.99 At least some agencies that
primarily operate spending programs tend to regulate less frequently' and
under less expansive statutory authority,"o' giving OIRA fewer opportunities to
98. BERYL A. RADIN, CHALLENGING THE PERFORMANCE MOVEMENT: ACCOUNTABILITY,
COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 46 (20o6).
g. These six categories are delineated by OMB, which classified all federal programs into one
of seven categories during the George W. Bush Administration. The seventh category,
without any more fine-grained distinctions, was regulatory. Id. at 45-46.
100. For example, the Department of Education (ED) and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) largely manage spending rather than regulatory programs.
These agencies command $97 billion and $43 billion in FY 2015 budgetary authority,
respectively. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR
2016 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: TABLE 29-1-FEDERAL BUDGET
BY AGENCY AND ACCOUNT 122, 199 [hereinafter FY16 BUDGET], http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets/29_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/89KD-W2BH].
However, ED's work fills only four volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations, see 34
C.F.R. vols. 1-4 (2014), and HUD's work fills only five volumes, see 24 C.F.R. vols. 1-5
(2014). Further, according to OIRA's statistics, OIRA reviewed only twenty-nine ED
regulations and twenty HUD regulations in 2013 and 2014, and as of June 29, 2015, only one
ED regulation and six HUD regulations were pending review. See Historical Reports, OFFICE
OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport
[http://perma.cc/JUT8-TGLM]. In contrast, the EPA does more of its work through
regulation than through spending programs, with FYis budget authority of only $8 billion.
See FY6 BUDGET, supra, at 336 tbl.29 -1. However, EPA's work fills thirty-three volumes in
the Code of Federal Regulations. See 40 C.F.R. vols. 1-33 (2014). OIRA reviewed ninety-
three EPA regulations in 2013 and 2014, and as of June 29 2015, fourteen regulations were
pending review, see Historical Reports, supra.
101. For example, instead of the open-ended authority given to the EPA under the Clean Air Act
to promulgate national primary ambient air quality standards that are "requisite to protect
the public health," 42 U.S.C. 5 74o9(b)(1) (2012), or to the FDA under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act to define and set standards for food "[w]henever in the judgment of the
Secretary such action will promote honesty and fair dealing in the interest of consumers," 21
U.S.C. 5 341 (2012), the spending programs run by ED operate under specific statutory
directions that circumscribe agencies' choices, see, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 14o6(a) (2012)
(permitting ED to regulate under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act "only to
the extent that such regulations are necessary to ensure that there is compliance with the
specific requirements" of the Act). See also Derek W. Black, Federalizing Education by
Waiver?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 607, 678 (2015) (contrasting the broad delegation in
environmental and food-safety laws with the narrower delegation in federal education
laws).
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engage with their policymaking. When agencies do regulate under spending
programs, OIRA tends to review their analysis less stringently, separating its
analysis of so-called "transfer regulations" from traditional regulations,o2
reserving its deepest review for the latter.o3 For agencies primarily operating
spending programs, then, the RMOs are a comparatively greater source of
centralized control than OIRA is.
But even as to those agencies for which OIRA's oversight is strongest-
traditional executive branch regulatory agencies such as the EPA and the
FDA- the RMOs play a powerful complementary role. Presidents have long
used budget cuts as a deregulatory strategy to limit the capacity of these
agencies to act,o4 thereby empowering the RMOs that work closely with these
In addition, the Administrative Procedure Act exempts from notice-and-comment
rulemaking matters relating to "public property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts," the
very mechanisms by which spending programs and agencies do their work. 5 U.S.C.
5 553(a)(2) (2012). To be sure, Congress has required the use of notice-and-comment
rulemaking for specific budget programs, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Approaches to Regulatory
Reform in the United States: A Response to the Remarks of Professors Levin and Freeman, 83
WASH. U. L.Q 1893, 1895 (2005) (giving examples), and many agencies have voluntarily
waived the APA exemption, following a 1969 recommendation from the Administrative
Conference of the United States, see Elimination of Certain Exemptions from the APA
Rulemaking Requirements (Recommendation No. 69-8), 38 Fed. Reg. 19,782, 19,784 (July
23, 1973). But not all have done so. See Lubbers, supra, at 1895. Those that have waived have
done so to different degrees. Compare, e.g., Public Participation in Rulemaking, 37 Fed. Reg.
3552 (Feb. 17, 1972) (listing exceptions to waiver for the Department of Veterans Affairs),
with, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2015) (providing no exceptions to waiver for the Department of
Housing and Urban Development). And some that once waived their exemption have
revoked their initial waiver. See, e.g., Revocation of Statement of Policy on Public
Participation in Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,194 (Oct. 28, 2013). The upshot is that some
agency activities in the realm of spending programs that might ordinarily have resulted in
notice-and-comment rulemaking do not do so in practice, thus depriving OIRA of the
opportunity to influence such regulations.
102. Transfer regulations "distribute money and other resources to firms or individuals," while
traditional regulations, such as "rules that restrict factory emissions, mandate safe
workplaces, and require testing before drugs are marketed," "place restrictions on behavior."
Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 53 DuKE L.J. 1o67, 1073
(2003).
103. See, e.g., Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of
Regulatory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush II Administration, 63
ADMIN. L. REv. 179, 181-82 (2011) (reporting the results of a study finding that OIRA spends
less time reviewing transfer regulations than it does traditional regulations); Sunstein, supra
note 19, at 1868-69 (explaining that because transfer regulations "do not require the kind of
cost-benefit analysis, and the kind of justification, that is typically mandatory for rules that
impose high regulatory costs on the private sector," OIRA's role is more "limited" when
reviewing them).
104. See, e.g., ANDREW RUDALEVIDGE, THE NEW IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY: RENEWING PRESIDENTIAL
POWER AFTER WATERGATE 173 (2005) (linking "denying bureaus the funds for regulatory
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agencies throughout the budget process to make decisions about how to
prioritize their resources. Presidents also use existing budget amounts to re-
allocate priorities within agencies, thereby changing policy directions within
agencies.'o In addition, as Part II shows in more depth, the entire budget
process empowers the RMOs to shape agency policy choices regardless of the
eventual appropriations decisions by Congress. Because budgets are critical to
the work of traditional executive branch regulatory agencies, the RMOs play a
significant role in shaping their policy choices, just as OIRA does.
This comparison between OIRA and the RMOs is not intended to
downplay the importance of OIRA's control or to suggest that OIRA is
unworthy of the vast amount of attention it receives. Rather, the goal is to
illustrate the important and underappreciated role that the RMOs play in the
administrative state. Their role needs to be better understood. The next Part
begins this task.
II. OMB'S CONTROL OF AGENCY POLICYMAKING THROUGH THE
BUDGET PROCESS
This Part argues that OMB's budget and management authority provides
the opportunity for significant control over agency policymaking. OMB's role
in budget preparation (Section II.A) and budget execution (Section II.B)
affects how agencies prioritize, justify, and make decisions about the policies
under their purview. So, too, does OMB's related power to develop agency-
specific versions of management initiatives (Section II.C). Collectively, these
aspects of the budget process provide OMB with seven levers to control agency
action. Rooted variously in statutes, OMB circulars,o6 memoranda, or simply
research" to the strategy of centralized review of rulemaking in OIRA, and calling the
former "a more direct route" to "limit[ing] the number of new regulations published");
Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics, 86 TEX.
L. REv. 1741, 1756-59 (2008) (describing how the Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II
Administrations all promoted budget cuts to agencies such as the EPA and the FDA to
support the Presidents' belief that "[t]he era of big government is over").
ics. See, e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 141
(rev. ed. 2012) (discussing the Bush II Administration's proposed shift of enforcement funds
from the federal government to the states); see also Adams, supra note 72, at 59 (describing
White House efforts to promote initiatives relating to technology and research and
development beyond what the relevant agencies themselves wanted); Goodwin Liu, The
Bush Administration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4 DuKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 77,
81 & n.19 (2009) (describing how the Bush II Administration reallocated resources within
the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division to change the focus of civil rights
enforcement).
1o6. An OMB circular is used "to communicate various instructions and information to the
executive departments and establishments . . . when the nature of the subject matter is of
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practice, these levers influence and achieve particular outcomes in agency
policy choices.
The fact that these levers provide OMB the opportunity to control agency
policymaking through the budget process does not mean that OMB always
uses this opportunity to the full extent of its authority or that when it does, its
actions are taken only at its own behest. As to the first caveat, the use of these
levers varies by personnel in agencies and OMB.o' The interaction between
agencies and OMB is sometimes combative (if OMB supersedes what agencies
wish to do), but at other times collaborative (if agencies and OMB work
together to reach consensus about the best way forward) or even collusive (if
agencies ask OMB to give it a particular direction that it would have a hard
time implementing if the instruction did not seem to come from the top)."' As
to the second caveat, the levers available to OMB are embedded in a broader set
of interactions between OMB and other parts of the EOP as well as between
other parts of the EOP and agencies. Accordingly, not everything OMB
conveys to agencies is a product of OMB's own decision, and agencies may at
times hear directly from other White House offices rather than OMB itself.'
This Part acknowledges these nuances while providing a general map of how
the levers operate to strengthen OMB's control. It leaves the task of refining
and building on this initial sketch to future work.
continuing effect," as opposed to when "the subject matter requires single or one-time
action by the departments or establishments or is of a transitory nature." BUREAU OF THE
BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR No. A-i REVISED, BUREAU OF THE
BUDGET's SYSTEM OF CIRCULARS AND BULLETINS TO EXEcUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND
ESTABLISHMENTS (1952), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars-aooi [http://perma
.cc/9ZG2-HYZ4].
107. See, e.g., TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 15 ("The RMOs and program divisions have varied in
their internal cultures, norms, and in some of the procedures they follow."); id. at. 128
("[C]areer staff influence has always varied with the strength, experience, or political clout
of particular PADs, departmental secretaries, other EOP units, or the OMB Directors who
happen to be in office at the time. The less the influence of these top officials, the greater the
potential role for OMB staff.").
1os. See, e.g., id. at 239 (discussing the variation at different times of OMB-agency relationships,
from "'team-oriented' and 'consensual'" to OMB's use of its "authoritative clout to demand"
certain things from agencies, as well as the value to agencies of using OMB as "protective
cover").
iog. See Martin, supra note 1, at 70 (describing OMB's "constant communication" with White
House policy councils); Weinstein, supra note 61, at 64, 68 (describing ways for agencies to
work with White House policy councils to accomplish agencies' missions).
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A. The Mechanisms of Control Through Budget Preparation
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires the President to submit a
detailed budget proposal for the following fiscal year"o to Congress annually
"on or after the first Monday in January but not later than the first Monday in
February.""' OMB does the bulk of this work on behalf of the President."' In
anticipation of the statutory deadline, agencies submit their budget requests to
OMB in early fall."' OMB then spends the next few months considering these
requests, asking agencies to justify them, and often ultimately modifying them
as 0MB consolidates a budget proposal for the whole federal government." 4
OMB has three levers that affect agency policymaking during the budget-
preparation process, regardless of Congress's subsequent action on the budget:
(I) aform-and-content lever, under which OMB sets ex ante requirements for the
budget and policy proposals that agencies must submit for OMB's review; (2)
an approval lever, under which OMB must consent to those budget and policy
requests ex post; and (3) a confidentiality lever, under which OMB restricts what
agencies may disclose about this process.
1. The Form-and-Content Lever
The first lever that OMB can use to control agency policymaking through
budget preparation is the ability to tell agencies what they should put in their
budget requests in the first place (the content) and how they should convey
this information (the form)."s
OMB operationalizes its form-and-content lever through two sets of
documents. The first is OMB Circular A-i, titled The Preparation, Submission,
11o. See 31 U.S.C. 5 1102 (2012) (defining the "fiscal year of the Treasury").
iii. Id. § n1o5(a).
112. See, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 7, at 97 ("Even an active president, such as Bill Clinton, cannot
master all of the details [of the budgeting process]. Every president must focus on the
relatively small number of issues that matter most to him and leave the rest to the affected
agencies or OMB staff.").
113. See id. at 99.
114. See id. (describing the stages of OMB review, including "staff review, during which OMB
examiners review the requests, consult with agency officials, and prepare recommendations"
(emphasis omitted)).
15. See 31 U.S.C. § iio8(b)(i) (2012) (instructing agencies to submit their budget requests
"prepared and submitted in the form prescribed by the President" and instructing agencies
to develop "appropriation requests ... from cost-based budgets in the way and at times
prescribed by the President").
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and Execution of the Budget.n,6 This 900-page document is issued each summer
to federal agencies to guide their budget requests,117 although the circular does
not change dramatically from year to year. Large parts of it are technical and do
not play a substantial role in controlling agency policymaking."s Two parts of
Circular A-n, however, do have a major effect on agency policymaking. One
part requires agencies to keep the substance of the budget process confidential.
As I discuss below, this confidentiality lever means that "[i]t is not uncommon
for someone to find himself publicly saying the opposite of what he thinks
because he lost a battle with OMB."" 9 A second part is the requirement to
embed the administration's various management initiatives in agency budget
requests. 2 o As I explain later, many management initiatives are actually
substantive policy choices without being denoted as such. The requirement to
tie these initiatives to the budget gives OMB an enormous lever to shape how
agencies dedicate their resources.
The other set of documents through which OMB uses the form-and-
content lever are memoranda issued by the OMB Director to provide more
specific guidance to agencies on what their budget submissions should
include.m These memoranda can play a significant role in shaping agency
policymaking.
One way in which these memoranda guide agency action involves the
budgeting method selected to develop the President's budget. In the 1970s, for
example, President Carter's 0MB Director required that agencies use Zero-
116. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRcuLAR No.
A-i, PREPARATION, SUBMISSION, AND EXECUTION OF THE BUDGET (2014), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/ail_current year/aill2014.pdf [http://
perma.cc/M3QW-7MsN] [hereinafter OMB CIRcuLARNO.A-n].
117. See id. § 10.5, at 4.
118. See, e.g., id. § 25.5 (discussing the data required to support requests for vehicles,
information-technology infrastructure, and formula grants to state and local governments);
id. §§ 25.6, 79 (discussing how to enter information into the online budget submission
system); id. § 32.3 (discussing how to account for retirement costs); id. S 51.1-.4 (discussing
how to prepare documentation to support budget requests).
119. John Walsh & Barbara Culliton, Office ofManagement and Budget: Skeptical View ofScientific
Advice, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND NATIONAL POLICY 274, 294 (Thomas J. Kuehn & Alan
L. Porter eds., 1981); see infra Section II.A.4.
12o. See OMB CIRCULARNO. A-11, supra note 116, §5 31.8, 51.1, 51.7, 51.9.
121. See infra Section II.C.
122. See SCHICK, supra note 7, at 96; see also, e.g., Memorandum from Sylvia M. Burwell, Dir.,
Office ofMgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, to the Heads ofDep'ts & Agencies,
No. M-13-14, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Guidance (May 29, 2013), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/3FTA-JXEB]
(providing annual guidance, in this instance for FY 2015).
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Based Budgeting to prepare their budget requests-that is, to prepare each
year's request as if it were starting at zero." More recent budget memoranda
have instead required Incremental Budgeting,' a budget method that assumes
that last year's budget is the starting point for incremental adjustments up or
down."s It is not difficult to see how these distinct approaches affect agencies
differently. Budget scholars have connected Incremental Budgeting to more
gradual and modest change within agencies, while Zero-Based Budgeting
encourages more radical rethinking about agency priorities.126
Directors' budget memoranda can also instruct agencies to justify their
programs in light of particular presidential priorities. The memoranda indicate
that agencies are more likely to be successful in their budget requests to the
extent the agencies can shape their priorities to match those of the President.
This guidance therefore tells agencies where to direct their internal efforts. Not
surprisingly, these initiatives vary significantly according to the preferences of
the current President. President George W. Bush's OMB Director focused on
Bush's priorities after September ii, including homeland defense and national
123. See Jimmy Carter, Zero-Base Budgeting in the Executive Branch Memorandum for the Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Apr. 27, 1977), http://www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74o7 [http://perma.cc/22NR-RJWK] (stating that "[a]t my
request, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget has issued guidelines about
the use of zero-based budgeting in the Executive Branch," and directing agencies "to rely on
OMB for information about this system" because "members of the program and budget
staff [currently the RMOs]" will be designated "as zero-based budgeting representatives"
who "will give you the information you need about establishing the process and using it
effectively"); see also CAROL GuRvrrz, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 77-121 E, ZERO-BASE
BUDGETING (ZBB): SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FEDERAL BUDGET 25-29, 32-50 (1977)
(discussing Carter's use of Zero-Based Budgeting as the governor of Georgia and evaluating
the potential use of the method for the federal government).
124. See, e.g., Memorandum from Brian C. Deese, Deputy Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec.
Office of the President, to the Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies, No. M-14-07, Fiscal Year 2016
Budget Guidance (May 5, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb
/memoranda/2o14/m-14-o7.pdf [http://perma.cc/65UC-QPAS].
ias. See SCIUCK, supra note 7, at 95.
126. See id. That having been said, all budgeting remains rooted in political realities; as a Wall
StreetJournal editorial noted after then-Governor Carter instituted Zero-Based Budgeting in
Georgia, "If the political leadership is determined enough, the federal budget could be cut
even with existing procedures; and if the White House didn't really care, ZBB would be just
another way of shuffling paper." Editorial, Governor Carter's Experiment, WALL STREET J.,
Oct. 12, 1976, at 26. Perhaps for this reason, the occasional congressional effort to require
OMB to use Zero-Based Budgeting in preparing the President's Budget has not been
successful. See, e.g., Zero-Based Budgeting Ensures Responsible Oversight (ZERO) Act of
2015, H.R. 1591, II4 th Cong.; Zero-Based Budgeting Ensures Responsible Oversight
(ZERO) Act of 2013, H.R. 239, 11 3 th Cong.
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security,"" while President Obama's OMB Director has focused on priorities
that Obama established in the wake of the financial crash and the Great
Recession, including domestic matters such as health, education, energy
reform, and fiscal discipline.
Directors' memoranda, sometimes co-signed with other officials in the
White House, can also address a narrower set of agencies to instruct them to
emphasize new presidential priorities in their budget submissions. One recent
example instructed the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Agriculture,
Commerce, and others on preparing budget submissions for particular
programs designed to counter biological threats.' Another instructed a similar
but smaller set of agencies on preparing budget submissions for programs
designed to combat antibiotic resistant bacteria."o Each memorandum
127. See Memorandum from Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec.
Office of the President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, No. M-o3-1o, Planning for
the President's Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request (Apr. 25, 2003), http://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/mo3-1o.html [http://perma.cc/MYH2-BSRF];
Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Acting Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office
of the President, to the Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies, No. M-06-14, Planning for the
President's Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request (Apr. 25, 20o6), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2o6/mo6-14.pdf [http://perma.cc/6HME-Z95V].
128. See Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the
President, to the Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies, No. M-11-30, Fiscal Year 2013 Budget
Guidance (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda
/201/m11-30.pdf [http://perma.cc/2XKP-AGDD]; Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag,
Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, to the Heads of Dep'ts &
Agencies, No. M-1o-19, Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Guidance (June 8, 201o), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_2oo/mio-19.pdf [http://
perma.cc/XJ88-HBJZ]; Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Exec. Office of the President, to the Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies, No. M-o9-2o,
Planning for the President's Fiscal Year 20n Budget and Performance Plans (June
ni, 2009) http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda-fy2oo9
/mo9-2o.pdf [http://perma.cc/6GQU-M2NS] [hereinafter Orszag, Planning for the
President's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget and Performance Plans].
129. See, e.g., Memorandum from Brian Deese, Acting Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec.
Office of the President, & Lisa 0. Monaco, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. &
Counterterrorism, to Deputy Sec'y of State et al., No. M-14-14, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget
Guidance for Countering Biological Threats Resource Priorities (July 18, 2014), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2o14/m-14-14.pdf [http://perma
.cc/ZM46-5F3QJ.
13o. See Memorandum from Brian Deese, Acting Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of
the President, et al. to Deputy Sec'y of State et al., No. M-14-1 3 , Fiscal Year 2016 Budget
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included approximately five single-spaced pages of factual findings and
instructions on exactly what kinds of substantive budget proposals to offer. 131
Budget memoranda can further instruct agencies about the
administration's priorities in the management of their internal affairs. For
example, recent memoranda have directed agencies to catalogue and take
specific steps toward expanding their employee health and wellness programs
and to reform their hiring practices.' These instructions involve inward-
focused rather than outward-focused policymaking but can nonetheless be
significant with respect to opportunity costs (as money and time focused on
these initiatives means less money and time focused elsewhere), the number of
people affected by the policies (as by some estimates, 2.85 million civilians
work in federal agencies'), and potential ripple effects (as internal federal
efforts have sometimes been harbingers of broader social change'").
In sum, OMB's form-and-content lever helps shape where and how
agencies focus their efforts before any money is even requested.
2. The Approval Lever
The form-and-content lever derives its strength from the fact that OMB
must ultimately approve the agencies' budget requests. The approval lever is
thus an ex post complement to the ex ante instructions OMB issues in Circular
A-n and the Directors' budget memoranda. In other words, under the form-
and-content lever, 0MB tells agencies what to include in their budget requests
before agencies draft them, while under the approval lever, 0MB tells agencies
how those initial drafts must be modified before they can be transmitted to
Congress. The approval lever functions both at a broad level, securing overall
131. See id. at Tab A; Memorandum from Brian Deese & Lisa 0. Monaco to Deputy Sec'y of
State et al., supra note 129, at Tab A.
132. See, e.g., Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag to the Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies, supra note
128.
133. See ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 45, at 12.
134. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 5 722 (1943-1948) (abolishing racial segregation in
the military); Ian Urbina, The Shopping List as Policy Tool, N.Y. TiMES (Jan. 25, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2ol4/ol/26/sunday-review/the-shopping-list-as-policy-tool.html
[http://perma.cc/8LHW-BJ7F] (discussing "the power of procurement policy to drive social
change").
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agency compliance with the President's general policy preferences,' 35 and at a
narrow level, governing budget and policy choices in discrete line items., 6
The approval lever is central to OMB's power over agencies. This Section
first describes the way the structure of the RMOs affects the way the approval
lever is operationalized and therefore the relationship between OMB and
agencies; second, it explains how budget numbers work with budget language
to set forth substantive policy; and finally, it discusses variations in the way the
approval lever operates for several subsets of agencies.
a. The RMOs' Pyramid Structure
The pyramid structure of the RMOs affects how the approval lever operates
in practice. The Program Associate Director (PAD), a political appointee,
oversees one or more divisions, each run by a Deputy Associate Director
(DAD) who, in turn, oversees several branches."' Each branch is run by a
branch chief who, in turn, oversees a group of program examiners.', 8 This
structure gives a lot of authority to the program examiners, who provide the
first review of the agency's budget submission, hold hearings on or otherwise
request additional information about the agency's submission, and reach
preliminary conclusions about what should be funded and at what amount." 9
135. See, e.g., Berry et al., supra note 7, at 785 (explaining that "[t]he end product ... is a
proposed budget that closely adheres to the president's policy agenda").
136. See, e.g., BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 102-03 (1997) (discussing presidential use of the budget to change
the Department's enforcement priorities); Berry et al., supra note 7, at 786 (describing how
President George W. Bush "propos[ed] major changes to existing grants and the creation of
altogether new ones" to support his "Faith-Based Initiative"); ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN &
FAMIuEs, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., JUSTIFICATIONS OF ESTIMATES FOR
APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES: FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 27-28, 53, 83-86, 229-30, 279, 345, 379,
407 (2015), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/olab/2o6 acfcj.PDF (http://perma
.cc/YEK3-PVU8] (providing specific program-by-program appropriations language).
137. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
138. See id.
139. See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 9, at 3 (explaining that program examiners provide the first
review and may ask for additional information from agencies, whether informally or
through formal hearings, before making recommendations to senior officials within OMB);
TOMIGN, supra note 18, at 120-25; Jennifer M. Forshey, Game. Set. Budget., 24 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 428, 429-30 (2005) (explaining that "the budget examiner is often the
person asking questions of the agency head about funding priorities and program
performance" and suggesting that "[b]y its very nature, the examiner's relationship with the
agency is adversarial"); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 74 (explaining that the
program examiner "[r]eviews budget submissions; acts as chair of budget hearings; and
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Although a pyramid, it is fairly flat as hierarchies go, with program examiners
typically providing key briefings to senior career and political staff. Program
examiners' knowledge of the programs in question and assessments of the
policy options are thus important to the decision-making process.o4 Program
examiners can also influence agencies' budget and policy proposals even before
the budget justification is submitted, as agencies may shape their proposals in
anticipation of their program examiner's expectations. 4 '
This is not to say that program examiners routinely impose their own
policy preferences on agencies through the budget process; professional norms
and examiners' on-the-job training work against this possibility." The
pyramid structure with its tiers of review and collaboration among all levels of
the hierarchy also militates against the imposition of personal policy
priorities." At the same time, program examiners must use their discretion in
interpreting how to implement what they perceive to be the President's
program,'" and their role as gatekeepers makes them influential. 4 s
presents recommendations thereon to the Deputy Associate Directors and other members of
the Director's Review").
14o. See Adams, supra note 72, at 58 (stating that OMB "has a very flat culture," and "[w)hen
information, a briefing table, an options paper, or the pricing of a presidential initiative is
needed ... [t]he director and associate directors at the top can reach quickly to the examiner
level for the answers"; that "[t]ypically" DADs "will call branch chiefs and examiners
together in a conference room for a quick review of papers, requests, or options, reaching a
conclusion on the spot"; that PADs "will frequently participate in these meetings, speeding
the decision process"; and that "[w]hen the director needs a brief on a particular topic, all
layers of the organization may appear in his or her office with the necessary information,
examiners (the lowest layer) frequently providing the briefing"); Forshey, supra note 139, at
429 (describing, from a program examiner's perspective, the "flat hierarchy and the
responsibility that comes from solely managing an agency budget").
141. See HUDAK, supra note 7, at 171 (discussing agency perception of the importance of
"get[ting] to know OMB staff and understand[ing] their priorities"); SCHICK, supra note 7,
at 99 ("As agencies formulate their budgets, they maintain contact with the OMB examiners
assigned to them. These contacts provide agencies with procedural and policy guidance in
preparing their requests and inform the examiners of agency priorities and concerns.");
Lynn Ross, Can the Federal Budget Be Democratic? OMB's Invisible Hand, in Is THIS ANYWAY
To RUN A DEMOCRATIC GOvERNMENT? 125, 129 (Stephen J. Wayne ed., 2004) (discussing
variation in program examiners' "attitudes toward spending on programs they personally
supported").
142. See Adams, supra note 72, at 61 (describing the professional ethos and training of OMB civil
servants); Forshey, supra note 139, at 429 (describing program examiners' commitment to
the rule of law and to the office of the Presidency).
143. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Walsh & Culliton, supra note 119, at 287 ("[Policy] is not handed down on tablets.
It's very fuzzy. We're told, for instance, that the President wants to hold down civilian
employment. You rarely get signals directly.").
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To be sure, the OMB Director makes the ultimate decision about what to
recommend to the President about each agency's budget request. 4 6 The White
House policy councils and other White House offices may also get involved in
specific budget decisions related to high-profile policy issues. 47 However, the
number of issues open for discussion and debate shrinks as the agency's budget
request moves up the chain of command from the RMOs to the Director. 8
Even fewer issues reach the President for decision. 49
145. See Adams, supra note 72, at 61 (explaining that because OMB program examiners are
"skeptical" about agency proposals and willing "to dig in hard, raise tough questions, and
demand more information" from the agencies they oversee, their "organizational default
position is seen [throughout the government] as 'No'").
146. The OMB Director considers each agency's budget request at a Director's Review meeting,
where program examiners present their recommendations. See TOMIGN, supra note 18, at
127-33 (describing the back-and-forth between RMO staff and the OMB Director during
this process); Adams, supra note 72, at 64-65 (describing how, in the context of national
defense and the Department of Defense, a Director's Review meeting is based on
information gleaned from earlier budget hearings held by examiners); Forshey, supra note
139, at 430 (describing the Director's Review from a program examiner's perspective as an
event in which the examiner must "confidently and concisely communicate the crux of the
issue" and "[m]onths of work culminate in a two-hour decision-making session at which
policy objectives are approved, denied, or shelved"); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note
74 (explaining that the program examiner "presents recommendations [on agency budget
requests] to the Deputy Associate Directors and other members of the Director's Review").
147. See SCHICK, supra note 7, at 99 (noting that after agencies submit their budget requests,
"OMB staff and, on important issues, presidential aides review the requests" (emphasis
added)). Some OMB Directors invite policy council officials to attend Director's Review
meetings, while others do not. See Adams, supra note 72, at 64 & n.14 (stating that a
Director's Review is "a closed meeting between the career OMB staff and senior OMB policy
officials that generally does not include other White House or agency officials" but noting
that "[a]dministrations differ in this regard"). For example, during the Clinton
Administration, OMB occasionally invited senior officials in the NSC to attend the
Director's Review on national security agency budgets. See id. Regardless of who is in
attendance at the Director's Review, the views of the relevant policy council are part of the
background against which budget decisions are made, as are those of other White House
officials, including the Vice President and other units in the EOP. See id. at 59, 67-69
(noting that OMB and the NSC "interact constantly on resource issues" even though "[t]he
NSC does not have a formal role in the OMB budget process" because "virtually every
decision made in the NSC framework has resource implications," but explaining that the
process for OMB-NSC engagement varies across different administrations, and even by
different officials in the same administration, because there is no "consistent,
institutionalized relationship between the two organizations").
148. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 128 ("The less politically visible a program area, the more
discretion afforded to program division staff. Highly complex or technical questions
sometimes would not interest political appointees in OMB, so that lower-level staff had a
greater opportunity to exercise discretion in such subject-matter areas."); John H. Kessel,
The Political Environment of the White House, in THE WHITE HousE WoRID: TRANSITIONS,
ORGANIZATION, AND OFFICE OPERATIONS 72 (Martha Joynt Kumar & Terry Sullivan eds.,
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After "passback" - the formal process by which OMB, typically through the
RMOs, informs the agency about the budget and associated policy choices that
OMB has approved for that agencys - agency officials may appeal to the
Director or even the President for more or differently allocated money."s'
Under some administrations and in some economic circumstances, appeals
tend to be "serious matters and often involve millions or billions of dollars and
major policy choices,""s2 while at other times appeals are more routine. ss
2003) ("Every fall, experienced budget examiners go over each request with the agencies,
and if they approve add it to the budget. By the time the budget reaches the director and the
president, almost all the decisions have been made, although controversial calls are still open
to appeal."); Ross, supra note 141, at 131 ("Not every issue or program is presented during
the director's review. Traditionally, less politically visible programs or highly complex or
technical questions may be decided at the branch or division level, with the PAD providing
tacit approval. Thus, there are still opportunities for examiners to play a central role in
decisions that may affect an agency's budget[] in significant ways."); see also OMB
CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 116, 5 10.5, at 4 (describing, generally, the process of how a
budget request moves from OMB staff to the OMB Director and the President).
149. See SCHICK, supra note 7, at 97-98, 110 (explaining that "political and career staff" in OMB
"handle[] almost all the paperwork, make[] most presidential budget decisions, and put[]
together the budget submitted to Congress," and noting that Presidents are often more
interested in total amounts or large-scale policy issues in the budget than in smaller policy
or operational issues); TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 131 ("Following Director's Review, OMB
Directors generally reach preliminary decisions and determine which issues need to be
transmitted to the White House for presidential decisions."); Adams, supra note 72, at 64;
Kessel, supra note 148, at 72 (describing how few budget decisions reach the President).
iso. See OMB CIRCULAR No. A-i1, supra note 116, § lo.5, at 4 (describing passback); Forshey,
supra note 139, at 430-31 (noting that the program examiner "is responsible for drafting the
passback text"); Ross, supra note 141, at 132 (noting that passback can be "as formal as a
written letter from the director to a department secretary detailing account-by-account
funding levels and specific policy instructions[,] . . . a phone call (usually from a policy
official) providing an overall funding level for the entire agency (a 'top line') [,] or . . .
almost anything in between").
151. See SCHICK, supra note 7, at 99; TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 131; Adams, supra note 72, at 64;
Leon E. Panetta, Politics of the Federal Budget Process, in RIvALs FOR POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS 213 (James A. Thurber ed., 3 d ed. 2oo6) (describing the
tradeoff between "accept[ing] the recommendations of the OMB director to gain his
support on future budget battles" and "challeng[ing] the OMB position by going directly to
the president and risk[ing] the possibility of both denial and future antagonism at the
highest levels"); Ross, supra note 141, at 132 ("Agencies with less political clout usually are
less likely to appeal OMB passback than agencies with considerable political backing.. . .").
152. Martin, supra note 1, at 73; see also MOSHER, supra note 21, at 119 ("Although the role of
BoB/OMB was officially one of advice and not authority, it did, from the very beginning,
make decisions on budgetary and program matters, most of which were in effect final. In
theory, unhappy agency heads could appeal to the president, but in practice such appeals
were usually limited to the most basic disagreements on matters that could be properly
regarded as presidential. During some periods, even these were effectively blocked by the
White House 'guards.' This meant, among other things, that a great many decisions on
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Disagreements about passback are commonly negotiated at the staff level,
although more senior OMB officials may get involved with particular agencies,
on particular issues or at different stages.5 4
The pyramid structure encourages agency officials to choose their budget
battles carefully on the way to obtaining OMB approval. Not everything can be
elevated, and even things that are elevated may not be resolved in the agency's
favor, leaving the agency under the day-to-day oversight of the OMB staff
whose views may have prevailed.
b. The Relationship Between Budget Numbers, Budget Language, and
Substantive Policy
The approval lever affects substantive policy choices because OMB's
approval is not simply about an overall funding amount for each agency or
even each program or function within an agency. Instead, OMB's approval is
linked to policy decisions about executive branch priorities.
lesser matters were in effect delegated down the line within BoB/OMB because they were
not of enough import to be appealed to higher echelons within that organization or within
the aggrieved departments."); Irene Rubin, Budgeting During the Bush Administration, 29
PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 1, 7 (2009) (explaining that, during the Bush presidency, the OMB
Director and the President's other economic advisors "were so persuasive that no cabinet
secretary complained to the president" about his or her agency's budget (quoting Nicholas
Thompson, Meet OMB Director Mitch Daniels: The Most Powerful Man in the Bush
Administration You Have Never Heard Of WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 2001)); Weinstein,
supra note 61, at 64 ("If you want to appeal a budget decision by OMB, you will need a
policy council on your side.").
153. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 132-35 (describing variations in the appeals process during the
Reagan and Bush I Administrations); Forshey, supra note 139, at 431 ("Most often, agencies
do not agree with the policy and funding decisions and, therefore, choose to appeal the
passback."); Ed O'Keefe, "Passback Day" Is a Key Date in the Federal Budget Process, WASH.
PosT (Nov. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/passback-day-is-a-key
-date-in-the-federal-budget-process/201n/1n/22/gIQAuwWxxN_story.html [http://perma.cc
/FTSS-QMB2] (stating that during the Clinton Administration, "two or three Cabinet
secretaries might meet with the president to make a final plea for more money," and quoting
Obama's OMB Director Jacob Lew as saying that "agencies shouldn't expect such flexibility
this year").
154. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 131 ("As with many other procedures and points of
communication within OMB, passback has varied from area to area. One variant might be
for a formal passback from the OMB Director and PAD to the departmental secretary with
the division and branch chiefs filling in details with lower-level staff In many other cases an
examiner might passback to an assistant secretary."); Forshey, supra note 139, at 431 (noting
that the "examiner has to work closely with the agency to understand the nature of the
passback appeal and then summarize it for the [OMB] leadership, who may elect to revise
the passback").
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These policy decisions are first reflected in passback, "which includes the
policy decisions and corresponding appropriations language."'s When
passback directs spending cuts, OMB can give greater or lesser degrees of
policy flexibility to agencies in allocating the cuts depending on how much the
administration favors their work.' 6 Where passback is furthering presidential
priorities, passback language setting forth the administration's policy
preferences can be quite detailed.'
155. Forshey, supra note 139, at 430; see also CHRISTENSEN, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that in
addition to budget numbers, "passback decisions may also include program policy changes
or personnel ceilings"); TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 131 ("The passback papers include policy
guidance in the form of instructions to the agencies as well as general information without
any specific directives for action."). An OMB official recently suggested that passback was
more technical than substantive, telling a reporter, "We usually target passback for more
technical guidance for the budget. For more substantial policy changes, we use more
traditional means of communication, such as policy guidance and memos." Jason Miller,
OMB's IT Passback Loses Its Luster, Changes Its Goals, FED. NEws RADIO (Jan. 31, 2014, 3:30
PM), http://federalnewsradio.com/management/2ol4/oi/ombs-it-passback-loses-its-luster
-changes-its-goals [http://perma.cc/HX7C-L2QF]. The reporter noted that
[t]his comment elicited a lot of surprise by former OMB folks. One former official
said the comment was 'weird' because passback is part of the governance process
and communicates policy decisions made as part of the annual budget process
when all major policy decisions are made. 'What a strange and non-statutory view
of how government works,' the former official said.
Id.
156. BIGGS & HELmS, supra note 64, at 345 ("Generally, OMB lets agencies and programs favored
by an administration retain discretion over how any cutbacks will be apportioned. For those
less favored, passbacks often come with detailed instructions about what may be included in
the final budget.").
157. TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 239 (explaining that during the Clinton Administration,
passback provided flexibility to agencies except as to "presidential priority areas where
the agencies were 'directed' to 'invest' the funding"); Jason Miller, IT Budget Guidance
Muddies OMB's Shared-Service Plans, FED. NEWS RADIO (Dec. 13, 2011, 5:27 PM),
http://federalnewsradio.com/in-depth/2oi/i2/exclusive-it-budget-guidancemuddies-ombs
-shared-service-plans [http://perma.cc/P8PH-9EBB] (describing the "five IT policy areas
OMB highlighted in the IT budget passback"); Jason Miller, OMB Gives Agencies Deadline
To Set Up Digital Services Teams, FED. NEWS RADIO (Jan. 19, 2015, 2:o6 PM), http://
federalnewsradio.com/budget/2015/oi/omb-gives-agencies-deadline-to-set-up-digital-servi
ces-teams [http://perma.cc/7WYP-X547] [hereinafter Miller, OMB Gives Agencies Deadline
To Set Up Digital Services Teams] (discussing "one significant policy decision" in the
passback to agencies on their information technology (IT) budgets, while noting that the IT
passback has (unusually) not "introduce[d] new policy priorities" for several years). As in all
other predecisional budget discussions between OMB and the agencies, passback is
confidential. See infra notes 174-194 and accompanying text. I discuss the passback relevant
to agencies' IT spending here because reporter Jason Miller's "goal for the past decade has
been to scrounge and rummage around the IT community for details on technology policy
changes that will be part of the President's budget request coming in a few weeks" as set
forth in the passback. Miller, OMB Gives Agencies Deadline To Set Up Digital Services Teams,
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The policy decisions are further reflected, after any post-passback appeals,
in the proposed appropriations language in the President's budget that is
ultimately submitted to Congress. This language typically builds on the
previous year's appropriations language but can include additional proposed
substantive limitations on or uses of funds that reflect the administration's
policy goals.s ,
The approval lever thus extends not just to monetary amounts but also to
the specific policies tied to the amounts because budget language supports the
underlying budget numbers at a fine-grained level. These are the policy choices
that the administration - including agency officials themselves - will advocate
for during the subsequent congressional budget process. 59
c. Variations in the Approval Lever
There are some formal variations in how the approval lever functions for
different agencies. For example, program examiners work alongside officials in
the Department of Defense to develop that agency's budget proposals much
more collaboratively and much earlier in the process than with any other
agency.16 o This variation in the budget process does not obviously weaken
OMB's approval lever. After all, even a cooperative process depends on
ultimate OMB approval. Moreover, the early integration of program examiners
supra. These articles provide a window into how passback works more generally to
announce new policy choices or to continue old ones.
i58. See, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 7, at 102 (demonstrating the policy choices reflected in
appropriations language in the President's budget for the "salaries and expenses" account
for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security);
OFFICE MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, APPENDIX, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCALYEAR 2016, at 359 (2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy20l6/assets/appendix.pdf [http://perma.cc/PYX5-LKXB]
(demonstrating policy choices reflected in appropriations language in the President's budget
for the special education program in the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation
Services in ED); OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 116, 5 95.5, at 5 (instructing agencies
as follows: "If you propose new provisions or changes to enacted language (other than
changes in amounts) for individual accounts or administrative and general provisions,
include an explanation and justification either with the budget submission to OMB or
separately to your RMO if the proposal occurs after that time").
159. SCHICK, supra note 7, at 1o8 ("[A] gency officials justify the president's budget, even when it
diverges from their real preferences."); see also infra notes 174-194 and accompanying text
(describing how the confidentiality lever works to further OMB's control over agencies'
policy choices).
160. MARY T. TYszKIEwIcz & STEPHEN DAGGETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30002, A DEFENSE
BUDGET PRIMER 28 n.6o (1998) (explaining that "OMB staff work directly at the Pentagon"
to develop the budget, and noting that "[t]he defense budget is unique in the extent to
which OMB is directly involved throughout the budgeting process").
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presents another avenue to ensure that White House priorities are baked into
the budget request, while information that program examiners have gleaned
during the internal deliberations can influence what OMB subsequently
approves.
Another variation in the operation of the approval lever exists for the subset
of agencies that have "budget bypass authority," either because they can submit
their budget request to Congress at the same time they submit it to the
President,6 , or because the President must present their original proposal to
Congress unchanged.'" The ability to have a direct line to Congress without
161. See Adams, supra note 72, at 64-65 (noting that OMB's earlier and deeper engagement with
the internal Department of Defense budget process "makes it possible for the White House
at an early stage to insert key programs, views, and policies that DOD might not rank highly
into the DOD budget process" and that "OMB can continue to raise alternative budget
options .. . which can lead to pass-back decisions that are based on OMB's knowledge of
options that DOD might have rejected in its internal process").
162. See Memorandum from Jim Jukes, Assistant Dir. for Legislative Reference, Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, Exec. Office of the President, to OMB Policy Officers & DADs, Agencies with
Legislative & Budget "Bypass" Authorities 7, 9-14 (Feb. 20, 2oo), http://www.citizen.org
/documents/OMBDocumenti.pdf [http://perma.cc/8GM6-GE 3Z] (identifying the sixteen
agencies that fall into this category as the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation,
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,
Federal Aviation Administration (within the Department of Transportation), Federal
Election Commission, Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, International Trade
Commission, Legal Services Corporation, Merit Systems Protection Board, National
Transportation Safety Board, Railroad Retirement Board, State Justice Institute, Surface
Transportation Board (within the Department of Transportation), and United States
Institute of Peace); see also ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 45, at 114 (summarizing
list).
163. See Memorandum from Jim Jukes to OMB Policy Officers & DADs, supra note 162, at 7
(identifying the five agencies that fall into this category as the United States Postal Service,
Social Security Administration, Internal Revenue Service Oversight Board, District of
Columbia Courts, Air Traffic Services Subcommittee of the Aviation Management Advisory
Council (with respect to the Federal Aviation Administration's air traffic control system
budget)); see also ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 162, at 114 (summarizing list).
There is no systematic way to describe the agencies in this or the previous category.
This list includes some, but by no means all, of the independent regulatory agencies; some
entities inside executive branch departments; and other kinds of entities, such as an Article I
court and a nonprofit corporation. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7251 (2012) ("There is hereby
established, under Article I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be
known as the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims."); 42 U.S.C. 5 2996b(a)
(2012) ("There is established in the District of Columbia a private nonmembership
nonprofit corporation, which shall be known as the Legal Services Corporation . . . .");
ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 162, at 6, 48-49 (identifying 81 independent agencies
and excluding from this category bureaus inside an executive agency headed by an
administrator with a fixed term, such as the Federal Aviation Administration).
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first obtaining White House approval somewhat weakens the force of the
approval lever,164 but not entirely. The President can still submit his own
proposals for these budget bypass agencies.6 s OMB even instructs such
agencies that "OMB may provide you additional materials supporting the
President's Budget request that you will forward to the Congress with the agency
testimony" and directs agency witnesses to be able to "explain ... the request in
the President's Budget" along with their own. i6 Moreover, having the White
House's support in a budget request can be valuable.'6 7
A third variation in the approval lever may exist for agencies that run
programs rooted in "mandatory spending" authority, rather than discretionary
spending that goes through the annual appropriations process. i* In principle,
the approval lever might be weaker for agencies running programs that are not
subject to the annual appropriations process. OMB, however, still retains
significant oversight of these agencies and programs. The discretionary part of
the agency's budget is still subject to OMB approval, so priority setting (for
example, in the allocation of staff among activities and divisions) continues to
164. Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies),
98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 806 (2013) (noting that bypass procedures "decrease presidential
control over the agencies' agendas by decreasing the information asymmetry between
Congress and the President").
165. See id.; see also Memorandum from Jim Jukes to OMB Policy Officers & DADs, supra note
162, at 3-4.
166. OMB CIRcuLARNo. A-1i, supra note 116, 5 22.2, at 2 (emphasis added).
167. See, e.g., WILDAVSKY, supra note 7, at 94-95 ("Agency people agree that Budget Bureau
support is worth having if you can get it without sacrificing too much in Congress" because
"[g]iven the congressional propensity to cut, what the Budget Bureau proposes for an
agency is likely to be the upper limit" and because "there are multitudes of small items that
Congress would not ordinarily investigate but that might have trouble getting funded if
Bureau approval were lacking."); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future
of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. L. REv. 599, 632-33 (2010) (noting that all agencies,
including those with independent sources of funding, have an interest in presidential
support in budget battles with Congress); Datla & Revesz, supra note 164, at 806 (noting
that presidential support "is a determinant of success in the budget process"); Joseph
White, Presidents, Congress, and Budget Decisions, in RIVALS FOR POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-
CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 190 (James A. Thurber ed., 5th ed. 2013) (discussing
congressional appropriations staffs view that OMB's input is valuable because a bypass
agency's request "is just too expensive" and "[n]o one can use it").
168. Mandatory spending includes such programs as Social Security (run by the Social Security
Administration), Medicare (run by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the
Department of Health and Human Services), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (run by the Food and Nutrition Service in the Department of Agriculture), and
others. See MINDY R. LEVIT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33074, MANDATORY
SPENDING SINCE 1962, at 1 (2015) (explaining that "[m]andatory spending is composed of
budget outlays controlled by laws other than appropriation acts").
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be part of the annual appropriations process.'6 Moreover, the President's
budget may propose changes to mandatory spending, proposals that OMB has
by definition approved. 7 o At least in the current and previous administrations,
OMB has required agencies to submit, as part of their annual budget requests,
a description of any effort to take discretionary action that would increase
mandatory spending, and has strictly limited its approval of these efforts.17 '
Only a small subset of agencies are not affected by OMB's approval lever:
those that are largely self-funded and obtain their budgets from non-
governmental sources rather than the annual appropriations process.'" But
these agencies are exceptions rather than the norm.'73 The approval lever is
generally applicable to and influential in both independent and executive
agencies.
16g. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 273,
351, 377 tbl.29 -1 (2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2ol6
/assets/29_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/U52U-KE7J] (showing the budgets for Food and
Nutrition Service, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid, and Social Security Administration).
170. See OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 116, 5 20, at 4 (defining, as an important budget
term, "CHIMP" as "an acronym for a 'CHange (either a cost or a savings) In a Mandatory
Program' that is proposed or enacted in an appropriations bill rather than in authorizing
legislation"); see also Memorandum from Brian C. Deese to the Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies,
supra note 124, at 2 (stating that "(a]gencies should review their mandatory spending with
the same rigor as their discretionary spending" and "should give close consideration to
mandatory proposals that seek to improve their job training and employment programs").
171. See CLINTON T. BRASS & JIM MONKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41375, OMB CONTROLS ON
AGENCY MANDATORY SPENDING PROGRAMS: "ADMINISTRATIVE PAYGO" AND RELATED
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3-7 (20o) (discussing President George W. Bush's OMB Director's
2005 memorandum, affirmed by President Obama's OMB Director in 2009, setting forth
these requirements, noting that an OMB official indicated that "similar activities had
occurred before," and explaining that the RMOs have oversight over these agency requests).
172. See ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 162, at 12o tbl.i5 (listing the eleven agencies that are
"completely exempt from appropriations" as the Farm Credit Administration, Farm Credit
System Insurance Corporation, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation, Federal Housing Finance Agency, Federal Reserve System, Federal
Prison Industries, Inc. (in the Department of Justice), National Credit Union
Administration, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (in the Securities and
Exchange Commission), Comptroller of the Currency (in the Department of the Treasury),
and Bureau of Engraving and Printing (in the Department of the Treasury)); see also
Memorandum from Jim Jukes to OMB Policy Officers & DADs, supra note 162, at 5
(describing this category as "mainly regulators of financial institutions").
173. There is no shared definition of what constitutes an agency. By any definition and associated
list, however, the number of agencies with budget bypass authority and self-funding status
are in the minority. See ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 162, at 14-15 (discussing
estimates for the total number of agencies, ranging from approximately 250 to over 400).
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3. The Confidentiality Lever
A third lever OMB uses to control agency policymaking through the budget
preparation process is the confidentiality lever: the requirement that agency
officials silence their own differing preferences and, if those preferences
become known, distance themselves from them." 4 The confidentiality lever
seeks first to promote open, vigorous internal debate and then ultimately to
ensure that the administration speaks publicly with one voice.'75 As a result, the
confidentiality lever limits agencies' ability to state publicly their own views of
alternative budget and policy priorities.
The confidentiality lever overlaps with a more general set of clearance
requirements OMB uses for all agency communication with Congress.17 But
the confidentiality lever is broader because it applies to agency disclosures to
anyone outside the executive branch,"7 including the media, interest groups,
academics, and others. The confidentiality lever also overlaps with the
President's constitutional appointment and removal powers because
administrators' relationships with the President and interests in keeping their
jobs also limit disclosure of policy preferences at odds with the President's
program.17 But again, the confidentiality lever is broader because it applies to
independent agency officials"' and to civil servants,so who are not subject to
presidential removal.
174. See OMB CIRCULAR No. A-1i, supra note 116, S 22, at 1 (providing that agency-OMB budget
deliberations must remain confidential and limiting what may be disclosed about the budget
process "to anyone outside the Executive Branch"). This requirement is more stringent than
the Budget Act's limitation on agency interactions with Congress, which provides that, with
very limited exception, agencies may communicate with Congress about their budget
interests "only when requested by either House of Congress." 31 U.S.C. § io8(e) (2012).
175. JUDY SCHNEIDER ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL DESKBOOK: THE PRACTICAL AND COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO CONGRESS § 4.180, at 159 (6th ed. 2012); see also infra notes 334-336 and
accompanying text.
176. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-i9, supra note 18 (requiring agencies to clear testimony before
Congress, among other things, with OMB); see also Sean Reilly, Former Social Security
Chief Happy To Reclaim Free Speech Rights from OMB, FED. TIMEs: FEDLINE (Feb.
26, 2013), http://fedline.federaltimes.cof/2oi3/o2/26/former-social-security-chief-happy
-to-reclaim-first-amendment-rights-from-omb [http://perma.cc/7VQ_-RTLK] (quoting a
former Social Security Administration Commissioner stating that "I don't miss having
everything I say being cleared by a 28-year-old at OMB").
r77. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note to, at 66-74 (observing that political appointees tend
to either modify their views to conform to presidential expectations or resign).
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When agency officials testify before Congress after the President's budget
has been submitted, Circular A-11 instructs that "[w]itnesses will give frank
and complete answers to all questions," "avoid volunteering personal opinions
that reflect positions inconsistent with the President's program or
appropriation request," and "will not provide the agency's request to OMB or
plans for the use of appropriations that exceed the President's request." '
Agency officials may speak only in support of the President's budget, even if
they strenuously argued for different sums of money or different policy
priorities up until the time the President's budget became final."" RMO staff
listen to agency officials testifying before Congress about the budget,' and
efforts to circumvent the confidentiality requirement may have negative
consequences for both officials and their agencies.
The confidentiality requirement applies to written material submitted to
Congress as well as to testimony; the circular requires that agencies submit all
"budget-related materials to OMB for clearance prior to transmittal to
congressional committees, individual Members of the Congress or their staff,
iso. See, e.g., Chambers v. Dep't of Interior, 602 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (sustaining, in
part, the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board to remove the chief of the United
States Park Police on the grounds that she had improperly spoken to a House staffer and the
Washington Post about her dissatisfaction with OMB's budget request for her agency and
remanding the case to the Board to determine whether removal remained a proper penalty).
181. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-i, supra note 116, § 22.2, at 2.
18. See SCHICK, supra note 7, at lo8, 236. Of course, sometimes agency officials speak off the
record about items in the budget with which they disagree. See, e.g., Panetta, supra note 151,
at 214. But sometimes that disagreement is supported by OMB officials as a way "to begin a
drumbeat of interest in the final details of the budget." Id.; cf Adams, supra note 72, at 60
(noting as to OMB staff s own disclosure of budget information, "when budget details are
dispensed ahead of official release times, it is generally a result of a policy decision at the
most senior level in the White House to obtain early or favorable coverage of their policies,
not the result of an intentional disclosure in lower levels of the organization").
183. See Forshey, supra note 139, at 431 (stating that after "ensuring that all agency testimony and
other policy materials are consistent with the Administration's agenda . .. OMB examiners
attend congressional hearings [on the budget] to ensure the agency's message is clear").
184. See, e.g., Steinzor, supra note 2, at 233 ("Agency heads . . . appear unwilling to admit that
their agencies labor under the constraints of scant funding. Whining about money and
its effect on their performance would almost certainly earn the enmity of White House
staffs . . . ."); Lisa Caruso, OMB Director Blistered Army Corps Chief in Memo Before Firing,
GOV'T EXECUTIVE (Mar. 8, 2002), http://www.govexec.con/federal-news/2oo2/o3/omb
-director-blistered-army-corps-chief-in-memo-before-firing/11204 [http://perma.cc/4XLZ
-4 RT9] (describing a memo sent by OMB Director to the White House Chief of Staff,
Deputy Chief of Staff, and a senior political advisor complaining about the congressional
testimony given by the head of the Army Corps of Engineers -stating that the presidential
budget would force the agency to cut 45,000 jobs and cancel existing contracts-and
explaining that the head of the agency was fired shortly thereafter).
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or the media." 8 5 This rule limits even informal communication between
congressional staff and agency staff.'8 6 Further, although the circular requires
agencies to post on their websites all of the material underlying their part of the
budget request to Congress,'8 7 it prevents agencies from posting any material
that they originally submitted to OMB. 8 8
There are exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality. For example, the
Inspector General Reform Act of 2oo8 provides that the President must include
in his budget "any comments" from an Inspector General who concludes that
the budget proposal "would substantially inhibit the Inspector General from
performing the duties of the office."' 8  More generally, the Whistleblower
Protection Act limits adverse employment actions against civil servants who
disclose information that they "reasonably believe[] evidences. . . a gross waste
of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety."' 90 In addition, by practice although not by statute, members
of the House and Senate Armed Services committees have typically asked the
top military officials in the Department of Defense for their "unfunded priority
lists"-that is, a list of desired items that did not make it into the President's
final budget. 91
But these are exceptions that prove the rule,'92 and even these exceptions
can be limited in scope.' In general, agency officials are reluctant to try to
i85. OMB CIRcuLAR No. A-n, supra note u6, § 22.3, at 2.
186. See HUDAK, supra note 7, at 172 (describing interviews with career agency officials who
explained that OMB handles all communication with Congress); SCHICK, supra note 7, at
1o8, 236.
187. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-n, supra note n6, 5 22.6(c), at 4.
188. Id. 5 22.1, at i.
189. 5 U.S.C. app. 5 6(f)( 3 ) (2012).
190. 5 U.S.C.A. 5 23 02(b) (8) (West 2015).
191. See John T. Bennett, 'Unfunded' Lists Reveal Fissures Between HASC Leaders, DEF. NEWS
(Feb. 8, 2014, 7:16 PM), http://archive.defensenews.com/article/2o140218/DEFREGo2
/30218OO23/-Unfunded-Lists-Reveal-Fissures-Between-HASC-Leaders [http://perma.cc
/9MX5-EDC9].
192. For a vivid illustration of an RMO threat to punish an agency official for violating the
confidentiality requirement that went too far, see Robert Brodsky, OMB Staffer To Be
Disciplined for Threats to IG, Gov'T ExEcuTIE (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.govexec.com
/oversight/2olo/03/omb-staffer-to-be-disciplined-for-threats-to-i/3o4 [http://perma.cc
/WEQ6-4PWS] (describing a program examiner who threatened to "make life miserable" in
the event the agency in question complained to Congress about its proposed budget). The
problem was that the agency in question was an Inspector General's office, which has a
statutory exception from the confidentiality requirement. See supra note 189 and
accompanying text; Brodsky, supra (quoting the OMB Director as saying that the program
examiner's threat, "regardless of its underlying motive or rationale, could reasonably have
been perceived as intending to inhibit the . . . inspector general from invoking his statutory
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circumvent the confidentiality lever, even in back channels, for fear of adverse
consequences from 0MB." 4
B. The Mechanisms of Control Through Budget Execution
OMB's role in the budget process does not end when Congress passes and
the President signs the annual appropriations bills (or, in more recent years,
the continuing resolutions to provide funding for a limited period of time after
the fiscal year until the appropriations bills are agreed upon).' 0MB is
intimately involved in budget execution- the way federal agencies carry out
their work under the budgetary authority they have been granted.'96 OMB
authority," and stating that OMB would "increase its training for OMB program examiners
on the 2oo8 IG Reform Act requirements." (emphases added)). The program examiner's
threats would, outside this specific statutory context, apparently not face the same
disapprobation.
193. For example, it can be very difficult to establish that disclosure of a budget dispute falls
within the exception provided under the Whistleblower Protection Act. See Chambers v.
Dep't of Interior, 602 F.3 d 1370, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Chief of the
United States Park Police did not satisfy this standard when she made public her belief that
the agency's budget was insufficient). As for the Unfunded Priorities List, some Defense
Secretaries have objected to or banned the practice completely. See Bennett, supra note 191
(describing rejection of the practice by a former Defense Secretary in the Obama
administration); Megan R. Wilson, K St. Swarms on Pentagon's "Wish Lists," HIU (Apr. 16,
2015), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/business-a-lobbying/239029-k-st-swarms-on
-pentagons-wish-lists [http://perma.cc/B3A4-9KSP] (describing rejection of or distaste for
the practice by former Defense Secretaries in the Bush II and Obama Administrations).
Moreover, even in supplying these lists to their congressional appropriators, the Armed
Services can be careful to indicate their support for the President's budget and to note that
they would support these priorities only if the priorities in the President's budget are funded
first. See, e.g., Document: U.S. Military Fiscal Year 2o16 Unfimded Priorities List, USNI NEWS
(Mar. 31, 2015, 2:22 PM), http://news.usni.org/2o5/03/3i/document-u-s-military-fiscal
-year-2016-unfunded-priorities-list [http://perma.cc/E9QH-EMM2].
194. KETTL, supra note 5, at 139 (discussing potential for agency officials to try to be more honest
with congressional committees about the effects of the President's budget proposal with
which the officials disagree, while noting that "Presidents and their budget officials, of
course, are always on the lookout for such end runs," and that " [t] hose who try it can be
punished in the next budget cycle").
195. See, e.g., JESSICA TOLLESTRUP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42647, CONTINUING RESOLUTIONS:
OVERVIEW OF COMPONENTS AND RECENT PRACTICES 1, 13 (2015) (noting that 1997 was the
most recent year that the twelve regular appropriations bills that fund the government were
all enacted before the end of the fiscal year on October i and that since that time, continuing
resolutions have been enacted on average six times per fiscal year, for an average duration of
almost five months, with full-year continuing resolutions enacted for FY2007, FY2o11, and
FY2ol3).
196. See OMB CIRcULAR No. A-11, supra note 116, § to, at 2-3, 5; see also FISHER, supra note 7
(discussing importance of budget execution to the presidential agenda); Joseph White, The
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affects budget execution through two different levers: the formal specification
lever, through which it "apportions" and otherwise defines how agencies spend
the funds Congress has appropriated, and the informal monitoring lever,
through which it oversees agencies' implementation of their programs.
i. The Specification Lever
While OMB "is much too small to oversee all transactions," nevertheless
"[o]n any particular matter it may intervene to influence the use of federal
dollars."'" The specification lever provides four main tools for 0MB influence:
it must (i) apportion agency spending; (2) approve requests to transfer or
reprogram funds; (3) approve requests to defer or rescind funds; and (4)
oversee decisions regarding a government shutdown in the event of a failure to
reach a budget agreement.
a. Apportionment
Before agencies can spend the funds that Congress has appropriated, OMB
must apportion them by specifying how much may be expended, when it may
be expended, and even to some extent how it may be expended.9 8 The Anti-
Deficiency Act'99 requires agencies to spread out appropriated funds so that
they do not spend them too quickly and come back asking for more.2o Under
this authority, OMB limits how much agencies can spend either by time
period, project, or both."' It also reviews apportionments at least four times a
year," with the potential to reapportion funds under certain circumstances." 3
President's Budget vs. Congressional Budgeting: Institutionalizing the Adversarial Presidency?, in
RivALS FOR POWER: PRESIDENTIAL-CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS 229, 230 (James A. Thurber
ed., 4 th ed. 2009) (naming, as one of OMB's mechanisms for "assert[ing] presidential
power," its "influence over implementation (the extent to which bureaus do what legislators
expected them to do with the budget, or more what decision makers within the
administration prefer)").
197. SCHICK, supra note 7, at 276.
19g. Id. at 276-77 (describing OMB's basic apportionment power); TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 187
(describing "OMB's apportionment authorities as a tool to closely scrutinize agency
expenditures and policies").
19q. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 252, § 7, 16 Stat. 251, 251 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
31 U.S.C.).
zoo. 31 U.S.C. § 1512(a) (2012).
201. Id. S 1512(b)(i).
202. Id. § 15 12(d).
203. Id. 5 1512(a).
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The apportionment power gives OMB a regular opportunity to control how
agencies conduct their operations. The RMOs take the lead in this
responsibility. 4
"Although apportionment is largely a technical procedure," Allen Schick
explains, "it is the last point at which OMB formally controls agency
spending."" Therefore, "OMB sometimes uses apportionment to impose
conditions on agency spending or to demand changes in agency practices.", 6
For example, the RMO may include a footnote placing further limitations on a
particular apportionment amount, 1 7 such as requiring an agency to spend its
funds on particular activities."o The RMO may also require that an agency
take some action before it receives its apportionment.2o
The power of the footnote should not be understated: apportionment
footnotes are subject to the requirements of the Anti-Deficiency Act,21 o and
agency officials disregard them at their peril. Violations of the Act are
punishable by adverse employment actions (including suspension without pay
or removal from office)" and criminal penalties (including a fine of up to
$5,000 and up to two years imprisonment)." In addition to apportionment
itself, then, apportionment footnotes offer OMB an opportunity to specify how
agencies spend their money and thus the actions agencies take.
204. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-1i, supra note 116, S 120.15, 120.19, 120.29, 120.33, 120.61, at io, 12, 14,
16, 24 (instructing agencies to consult with their RMO examiner throughout the
apportionment process); TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 188 (describing interviews with various
OMB career staffers who suggested that the apportionment process increased the power of
the RMO civil servants vis-a-vis PADs or higher-level political appointees, in part, because
"apportionment forms normally only required the approval of the division chief, unless a
politically sensitive issue was involved," making apportionment "one area that allowed the
examiner added discretion and power").
205. SCHICK, supra note 7, at 277.
206. Id.
207. OMB CIRCuLAR No. A-11, supra note 116, S 120.12, 120.34, at 8, 16.
208. See, e.g., TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 187 (discussing the use of apportionment footnotes to
"direct[] how funds should be spent"); Forest Serv., B-31oio8, 2008 WL 341538 (Comp.
Gen. Feb. 6, 2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/39o/382138.pdf [http://perma.cc/W3DG
-GBVD] (discussing substantive limitation OMB placed via an apportionment footnote on
Forest Service's use of funds).
209. OMB CIRCuLAR No. A-xx, supra note 116, § 120.34, at 16; see also TOMKIN, supra note 18, at
187 (describing the use of apportionment footnotes to make "the release of an agency's
quarterly apportionments contingent upon whether the agency had provided OMB with
requested information [or] answers to lengthy questionnaires").
zio. OMB CucuLARNo. A-11, supra note 116, 5 120.15, 120.34, at io, 16.
211. 31 U.S.C. 5§ 1349(a), 1518 (2012).
212. Id. §5 1350, 1519.
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The effect of OMB's apportionment power increases when the government
operates under continuing resolutions. As a reporter recently wrote, the
number one "hidden cost[] of continuing resolutions" from an agency's
perspective is that "OMB gets in your face."" OMB directs agencies to
"operate at a minimal level until after your regular [fiscal year] appropriation is
enacted" and oversees their choices to implement that direction" to prevent a
situation where a subsequently enacted regular appropriation provides less
funding than the agency had expected.2s While the OMB Director provides a
formula that automatically apportions amounts provided under the continuing
resolution,n 6 the RMOs may further limit this amount," deploy footnotes to
specify additional restrictions on its use, 8 and grant requests for sums beyond
the automatic apportionment only in "extraordinary circumstances." '9 The
uncertainty about what will happen at the end of a continuing resolution thus
amplifies the RMOs' attention to agency spending.
213. Adam Mazmanian, 6 Hidden Costs of Continuing Resolutions, FCW (Aug. 19, 201S), http://
fcw.com/articles/2o15/o8/19/hidden-cost-resolutions.aspx [http://perma.cc/3FN 4 -BS7N]
(quoting a former agency chief financial officer's statement that "[r]elationships between
agencies and the Office of Management and Budget can be strained in the best of times,"
but that "during a continuing resolution. . . OMB can 'take on an aura of the trustees [sic]
role in a corporate bankruptcy'").
214. OMB CIRcuIAR, No. A-11, supra note 116, § 123.1, at i.
215. Id. 5 123.13, at 5 (telling agencies that "[y]ou must do everything possible to reduce the
amount of your existing obligations so that the agency's obligations do not exceed the
amounts provided in the full-year enacted appropriations" and directing them to "contact
your OMB examiner" to discuss how to address this problem).
216. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB Buu. No.
14-03, APPORTIONMENT OF THE CONTINUING RESOLUTION(S) FOR FIsCAL YEAR 2015,
at 4 (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/bulletins/2o14/b-14-03.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XH44-P3D8] [hereinafter OMB BULL. No. 14-03] (providing a formula for
the amount automatically apportioned based on the percentage of the year covered by the
continuing resolution); OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 116, § 123-13, at 6 (describing
the process of automatic apportionment).
217. OMB BULL. No. 14-03, supra note 216, at 2 (requiring a written apportionment instead of the
automatic apportionment whenever an RMO or an agency "seeks an amount for an account
that is more than the amount automatically apportioned" or determines "that an amount for
a program should be less than the amount automatically apportioned to ensure that an
agency does not impinge on the final funding prerogatives of the Congress and to encourage
prudent financial management and execution of mission").
218. Id. at 1-2 (noting that apportionment footnotes continue to apply during a continuing
resolution).
21g. Id. at 2; see also OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 116, 5 123.7, at 3 (outlining limited
reasons for which OMB would consider granting a written apportionment exception).
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b. Transfers and Reprogramming
Another tool of the specification lever allows 0MB to exert influence when
agencies seek to change an aspect of Congress's appropriation. For example,
agencies may seek to transfer funds from one account to another or to
reprogram funds from one purpose to another within the same account.o
0MB must approve the request before the agency can discuss transferring or
reprogramming funds with the relevant congressional committees."' This
process, too, gives the RMOs a way to influence where the agency directs its
funds.'
c. Deferral and Rescission
The specification lever is also at work in the less frequent instances when
the President proposes to defer or rescind the use of appropriated funds." The
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974," which
Congress passed after a showdown with President Nixon over the President's
efforts to impound funds for policy reasons, governs this process." The Act
220. SCHICK, supra note 7, at 281-82 (describing legal limitations on transferring and
reprogramming).
221. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 116, S 22.3, at 2-3.
222. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o4-577R, BUDGET ISSUEs: REPROGRAMMING OF
FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL SERVICE FUNDS IN FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 6 (2004), http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-GAO-o4-577R/pdf/GAOREPORTS-GAO-04-
57 7 R.pdf [http://perma.cc/FS9D-SEM6] (noting that while OMB cleared the
reprogramming in question, it declined to say whether the OMB director or simply lower-
level officials
were involved); Memorandum from Danny Werfel, Controller, Office of Mgmt. & Budget,
Exec. Office of the President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies, No. M-13-11,
Ongoing Implementation of the Joint Committee Sequestration 1-2 (Apr- 4, 2013), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-1l.pdf [http://perma
.cc/9QH6-LK6F] (directing agencies to consult with their RMOs if they wish to use their
transfer or reprogramming authority).
223. SCHICK, supra note 7, at 284-89 (describing this process generally and explaining that a
deferral "delays the use of funds" while "rescission cancels budget authority").
224. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
225. FISHER, supra note 7, at 147-48, 198-201 (explaining that historically, "impoundment" meant
that a President declined to spend appropriated funds for a wide variety of reasons, and
describing the controversy under President Nixon as resulting from the President's refusing
to spend funds for programs he disliked on policy grounds, rather than refusing for
purposes of efficient financial management outside substantive disagreements); SCHICK,
supra note 7, at 285-86 (explaining that today, impoundment means broadly "any action or
inaction that delays or withholds funds," although "in practice," the term is more "narrowly
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forbids unfettered policy impoundments and provides for more limited
deferrals and rescissions, which must be grounded in more than simply the
President's distaste for the program in question and which Congress must
approve.26
Given this history, deferral and rescission are most often seen as political
battles between Congress and the White House."' However, deferrals and
rescissions are also a way for the White House to control agencies, as an
individual agency must provide OMB with the material it requests in support
of the President's formal "special message" to Congress requesting deferral or
rescission.28 Because of the need for presidential involvement, policy-inflected
decisions around this tool are less within the province of the RMOs and more
clearly within White House itself,229 although the impetus for a particular
proposal may come from within OMB in the first instance.2o
d. Government Shutdowns
Finally, the specification lever is at work in the lead-up to a government
shutdown, and if efforts to reach a continuing resolution fail, during the
applied to actions whose purpose is to curtail spending," and noting that all contemporary
impoundments are either a deferral or a rescission (internal quotation marks omitted)).
226. FISHER, supra note 7, at 198-201; SCHICK, supra note 7, at 285-89. In 1987, the D.C. Circuit
struck down a provision in the 1974 Act that permitted one house of Congress to approve a
rescission as a violation of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). City of New Haven v.
United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Congress subsequently passed the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 1oo-119, 1o
Stat. 174, repealed by Balanced Budget Act of 19975 10210, Pub. L. No. 105-33, in Stat. 251,
711, to correct this problem and further limited the practice of rescission, providing only
limited administrative (and no policy) justifications for the practice.
227. SCHICK, supra note 7, at 285-89.
228. OMB CIRcuLAR No. A-n, supra note 116, 5 112.6, at 3; see also id. 5 112.5, at 3 (directing
agencies to "furnish requested materials expeditiously on a time schedule determined by
OMB" in furtherance of a deferral or rescission proposal).
229. See, e.g., Impoundment Control Act: Use and Impact ofRescission Procedures: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fed. Fin. Mgmt., Gov't Info., Fed. Servs., and Int'l Sec. of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, iuth Cong. 4-5 (2009) (statement of Susan A.
Poling, Managing Associate General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, Government
Accountability Office), http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123935.pdf [http://perma.cc/PH7C
-4CU3] (describing Presidents' use of special messages to propose deferral and rescission
from the Ford Administration through the Bush II Administration).
230. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-u, supra note 116, 5 112.5, at 5 (telling agencies what to do "[i]f OMB
suggests changes in or initiates rescission proposals or deferrals").
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shutdown itself." While a shutdown was historically an extraordinary event,
the possibility and reality of shutdowns have loomed large in recent years,232 so
this tool is more than merely hypothetical.
OMB requires agencies to develop shutdown plans and specifies what these
plans must contain, 3 with different OMB Directors providing different kinds
of instructions.`" At bottom, the plans must comply with the requirements of
the Anti-Deficiency Act and associated interpretations,23 which puts OMB in
the position of making decisions about which agency employees and activities
are "essential" and should continue to operate during a shutdown. 6 Because
of the discretion and judgment involved in making these decisions,3  approval
of agencies' shutdown plans can have substantive policy effect.'8 Decisions
231. See OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 116, § 124 (governing "agency operations in the
absence of appropriations").
232. CLINTON T. BRASS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34680, SHUTDOWN OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, PROCESSES, AND EFFECTS 3, 22 (2014) (describing the typical rarity of
shutdowns but outlining the Fiscal Year 1996 and Fiscal Year 2014 shutdowns and
discussing other "near-impasses").
233. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note 116, § 124.2, at 3.
234. BRAsS, supra note 232, at 23 (describing variations among different OMB Directors'
instructions across two different administrations).
235. Id. at 3-6, 9 (describing legal interpretations by the Office of Legal Counsel and OMB about
what the Anti-Deficiency Act permits during a shutdown); OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-11, supra
note 116, § 124.2, at 3 (requiring shutdown plans to include each "agency's legal basis for
each of its determinations to retain categories of employees, including a description of the
nature of the agency activities in which these employees will be engaged").
236. Stephen Barr, Official Is No Stranger to Crisis Management; OMB Deputy Director Coordinates
Shutdowns, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1995, at A13 (describing OMB Deputy Director for
Management John A. Koskinen as "Mr. Shutdown"); Neil Irwin, Alice Rivlin Was in
Charge of the Last Government Shutdown: This Is What She Saw, WASH. PosT (Sept.
27, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/o9/27/alice-rivlin-was-in
-charge-of-the-last-government-shutdown-this-is-what-she-saw [http://perma.cc/N6QS-
P4AP] (transcribing part of an interview with the Director of OMB during the 1995
government shutdown, in which she stated, "The main question that OMB has to solve is
who is essential and who isn't").
237. Lesley Clark & David Lightman, In Federal Shutdown, Deciding Who's Essential Is Essentially
a Guess, McCLATCHY DC (Oct. 1o, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.coni/news/politics
-government/article24756934.html [http://perma.cc/BY3S-DPEJ] ("If there's one thing
Republicans and Democrats can agree on, it's that the decision on who's essential often
comes down to a judgment call."); Irwin, supra note 236 (quoting the OMB Director as
saying, "It's really not obvious who's essential and who isn't" and that deciding what
activities to close is "a judgment call").
238. Government Shutdown I: What's Essential?: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil Serv. of the
H. Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 1o4th Cong. 35 (1995) (reviewing agencies'
experience in determining what was essential in the 1995 shutdown and including an agency
official's discussion of "policy choices" raised by that agency's shutdown plan).
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about the shutdown plans are also rooted in the political environment, which
includes sensitivity to ongoing congressional-White House budget
negotiations that could avert a shutdown."'
OMB talks with agencies as the plans are being prepared, reviews the plans
and any updates to them, and may require changes4o in advance of making the
plans public. " ' OMB "holds meeting[s] or teleconference [s] with agency
senior officials" to discuss "shutdown plans" both before and during a
shutdown.' OMB also maintains regular contact with agencies during a
shutdown, " in large part because OMB is the point of contact for agencies on
any aspect of a shutdown, including legal questions about the Anti-Deficiency
Act.2
Even in the absence of appropriations, then, OMB uses its responsibility to
execute the budget to control agency action through the specification lever.
OMB's senior political appointees make decisions regarding shutdown plans,
239. Clark & Lightman, supra note 237 (noting that it is difficult to determine who is essential
and quoting individuals arguing that the choice may be politically inflected); Irwin, supra
note 236 (noting the OMB Director's simultaneous role in budget negotiations with
Congress and in supervising agencies' shutdown plans); Robert Pear, Federal Departments
Lay Out Plans in the Event of a Government Shutdown, Apr. 7, 2011, N.Y. TIMES, at Ai6
(noting that shutdown plans have to take into account "legal requirements, political
imperatives and pressure from federal employee unions demanding more information").
24o. OMB CIRcuLARNo. A-n, supra note u6, § 124.2, at 3.
241. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Agency Contingency Plans, WHITE
HousE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/contingency-plans [http://perma.cc/WP6G
-ZB9D]. OMB also tells agencies whether, when, and how much agencies can disclose of
their shutdown plans. See Gregory Korte, Federal Agencies Guarded on Possible Shutdown
Plans, USA TODAY (Mar. 29, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington
/2011-03-29-shutdown29STN.htm [http://perma.cc/27Q9-9Z3B] (explaining that OMB
was closely controlling the information agencies could share with Congress and the public
about the possibility of a shutdown and their contingency plans); Sheryl Gay Stolberg &
Robert Pear, As Shutdown Looms, Agencies Brace for Its Impact, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6,2011, at Ai
(noting that OMB was not disclosing contingency plans and that the American Federation
of Government Employees had sued under the Freedom of Information Act in an effort to
obtain them).
a24. OMB CIRCULARNO. A-u, supra note n6, S 124.3, at 3.
243. Id. 5 124.2-3, at 3 (directing agencies to update OMB as the shutdown plans are
implemented); U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-86, 2013 GOVERNMENT
SHUTDOWN: THREE DEPARTMENTS REPORTED VARYING DEGREES OF IMPACTS ON
OPERATIONS, GRANTS, AND CONTRACTS 23 (Oct. 2014) (discussing the experience of three
agencies during the 2013 shutdown and discussing their daily communication with OMB,
along with the Office of Personnel Management).
244. OMB CIRCuLAR No. A-u, supra note n6, 5 124.1, at 1.
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because of their high-profile nature; however, the RMO staff plays a
supporting role in communicating with the agencies and evaluating plans."
2. The Monitoring Lever
The RMOs also become intimately involved with agencies' policy choices
using the monitoring lever, through which the RMOs oversee agencies'
implementation of their programs.' This lever is among the most ambiguous
because it is informal; it is not governed by any particular legal source but
exists in light of the RMOs' formal duties.
The monitoring lever can manifest itself in frequent communication
between agency policymaking officials and RMO program examiners."
Agency documents reflecting policy choices, such as grant criteria and other
allocative decisions, may be significantly revised by the RMOs and sent back to
the agency to incorporate changes.' Even when the program examiner does
not actively change documents, the program examiner may ask questions that
require agency policy officials to justify or modify their initial decisions." 9
Agency policy officials may also reach decisions in anticipation of the
RMOs' requests or collaboratively, as part of a regular phone call or meeting.so
As one analysis suggests, " [E]fficiency is gained by understanding and possibly
245. Barr, supra note 236 (describing the Deputy Director for Management's decisions during the
shutdown and explaining the supporting work of "OMB's budget and program
examiners").
246. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 74 (explaining that program examiners
"[m]onitor[] and evaluate[] progress made by departments and agencies in implementing
and executing the President's policy"); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 50 (explaining
that as part of this work, the RMOs "oversee implementation of policy options").
247. See HUDAK, supra note 7, at 171-73 (discussing agency officials' "contact with and the
influence of OMB in their daily working relationships because of the statutory and political
authority that OMB regularly asserts").
248. See id. at 172 (describing an agency career official's comments that OMB's influence
"included the ability to outline or detail the precise processes used to distribute funds so that
OMB has substantial influence on who gets what and when"); Berry et al., supra note 7, at
786-87 (noting the importance of presidential influence over grant criteria and allocation
decisions); see also STEVEN BRLL, CLASS WARFARE: INSIDE THE FIGHT To Fix AMERcA's
SCHOOLS 259 (2011) (describing the RMOs' work, along with the Domestic Policy Council,
on developing the Education Department's Race to the Top grant program).
249. See Martin, supra note i, at 72 (listing examples of questions that program examiners will
ask agencies in order to have them justify their programs); Memorandum from Leon E.
Panetta & Alice M. Rivlin to All OMB Staff, supra note 19, at 5 (same).
25o. See HUDAK, supra note 7, at 171-72. For an example, see BIUILL, supra note 248, at 259.
2235
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
preemptively incorporating OMB preferences and expectations into
outcomes."
Much is left to the discretion of the individual program examiner in this
relationship. 2  Of course, the civil servant branch chiefs, DADs, and the
political PADs play something of a unifying role. But not every issue will be
elevated, and agency officials may be reluctant to go over the heads of the
program examiners with whom they work on a regular basis. Similarly, while
DADs tend to have long tenures, PADs tend to change multiple times in an
administration.s" Different PADs may have different priorities; agencies
subject to significant PAD oversight under one PAD might receive less
attention when a new PAD takes over. Different agencies may also receive more
or less stringent RMO review depending on the status of the agency's head
within the White House.254 In addition, different RMOs have different
longstanding relationships with the agencies under their purview that may
transcend administrations.25
To be sure, the program examiner's job is to effectuate the President's
policy priorities, but it can be difficult to translate big-picture presidential
views into reality in each policy decision before an agency. As such, program
examiners necessarily use their own judgment. 6 Similarly, while PADs are
political appointees with views that are supposed to reflect those of the
President, the PADs do not get White House clearance for every decision they
make, so again, these officials must use their judgment. Again, this is not to
suggest that the RMO staff, whether civil servants or political appointees,
regularly implement their own policy priorities" but rather to note that
independent judgment calls may have substantive effect.5 8
251. HUDAK, supra note 7, at 171.
z5z. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 188 (describing examiners' "discretion in areas of little interest
to political appointees," and quoting an agency official as stating that examiners' "'micro-
management' extended to the '8o percent of issues at the margin [in] which the policy and
political people were not involved'"); Beryl A. Radin, Overhead Agencies and Permanent
Government: The Office ofManagement and Budget in the Obama Administration, 7 FoRUM, no.
4, at 7 (2009) ("[B]udget examiners have a significant amount of discretion and autonomy
and often differ in approach depending on their areas of responsibility.").
253. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 13 (noting that "[slince the introduction of the position in the
early 1970s, many areas have experienced a turnover of two or more PADs over any four-
year term" and that on average, a PAD remains at OMB for eighteen months).
254. See id. at 190.
255. See id. at 15.
256. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
as7. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 188-89 (stating that "OMB insiders thus generally maintain
that the overwhelming majority of the examiners using these [budget execution oversight
tools] were not pursuing independent agendas and practically always had the tacit approval
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As in the budget preparation process," other White House offices may
also get involved in different decisions related to budget execution. For
example, the relevant staff member on the Domestic Policy Council may weigh
in on particular matters of social policy as grant criteria are being developed,
communicating either directly with the agency or through the RMOs.26o But
the monitoring lever gives the RMOs the opportunity for the most regular
interaction with the agencies on policy decisions."
C. The Mechanisms of Control Through Management Initiatives
OMB has often been said to neglect management in favor of its work on the
budget.262 Over the last 25 years, however, management has become a more
integral part of OMB's work, "provid[ing] a way for the White House to
influence the implementation of its policy agenda."6' This expanded attention
to management is a result of several factors. First, Congress has increasingly
of their political-level supervisors," while still noting a "few cases where agency officials
believed that OMB civil servants with particularly authoritarian personalities had crossed
the line into pursuit of their own agendas"); see also supra notes 142-145 and accompanying
text.
a58. See Ross, supra note 141, at 132 (noting the "considerable amount of influence over the policy
and budgetary outcomes" held by the RMOs' career staff and stating that "[s]ome of the
decisions made by the unelected cadre have a significant impact" on OMB's decisions).
259. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
a6o. See generally GOVERNING AT HOME: THE WHITE HOUSE AND DOMESTIC POLICYMAKING
(Michael Nelson & Russell L. Riley eds., 2o1) (discussing the Domestic Policy Council's
authority over different administrations and its collaboration with OMB). For examples, see
BRILL, supra note 248, at 228, 237-38, 259, which discusses the Domestic Policy Council's
work with the RMOs on Race to the Top; and RON HASKINS & GREG MARGOLIS, SHOW ME
THE EVIDENCE: OBAMA'S FIGHT FOR RIGOR AND RESULTS IN SOCIAL POUCY 39-43, 45-47, 73-
78, 171-72, 214-15 (2015), which discusses the collaboration between OMB and the Domestic
Policy Council on evidence-based policymaking under the Obama Administration.
261. See JOHN H. KESSEL, PRESIDENTS, THE PRESIDENCY, AND THE POuTICAL ENVIRONMENT 18o-
83 (2001) (noting that White House and policy council staff "cannot monitor government
activity" thoroughly because of that staffs limited size, and that the job of monitoring
government activity instead falls to OMB, which because of its size "is much better able to
track governmental activities"). To be sure, while OMB's size is large compared to the
White House and policy councils' staff, it is small compared to agencies' own staff, and so
even the RMOs' ability to monitor every agency action "is at best incomplete." Id. at 183.
262. See, e.g., PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE
DIFFUSION OF ACCOUNTABILITY 121 (1995) ("By the end of 1994 the old OMB might best be
labeled just OB.").
263. Radin, supra note 252, at 5; see also BIGGS & HELMS, supra note 64, at 342 ("[Als the OMB
enters the twenty-first century, the 'M' for Management is beginning to emerge from the
shadows of the 'B' for Budget.").
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delegated particular management tasks to OMB." Second, there are an
increasing number of statutory offices devoted to particular management
issues, from financial management26s to e-government. 66 Third, internal
executive branch efforts have contributed, including the 1994 reorganization of
OMB to integrate management more thoroughly into the office's budget
work" as well as more recent Presidents' development and implementation of
their own management agendas.2 68 This Section focuses on these executive
branch efforts as providing particularly strong examples of the RMOs' ability
to influence agencies' policy choices through management initiatives.
Two such levers exist: the Presidential Management Agenda lever, which sets
forth presidential initiatives ostensibly designed to improve the administration
of government but that often have a substantive policy overlay, and the budget-
nexus lever, which connects these management initiatives to the budget process.
These levers are related: the budget-nexus lever provides the procedural hook
for the more substantive Presidential Management Agenda lever.
264. See Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-1o6, § s12(b), 110 Stat. 670, 680 (codified
as amended at 40 U.S.C. 5 11302 (2012)) (charging the Director of OMB with oversight over
the acquisition, use, and disposal of information technology in the service of federal
programs); Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat.
285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 31, and 39 U.S.C.) (creating a
performance management requirement for federal agencies and requiring OMB to engage
with the development of agencies' strategic plans); Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-576, §5 201-02, 104 Stat. 2838, 2839-41 (1990) (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. 55 502(c), 503 (2012)) (creating the position of Deputy Director for Management
and a broader authority to promulgate government-wide management policies); see also
CLINTON T. BRASS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42379, CHANGES TO THE GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT (GPRA): OVERVIEW OF THE NEW FRAMEWORK OF
PRODUCTS AND PROCESSES 4-11 (2012) (describing the 2010 amendments to the Government
Performance and Results Act).
265. See Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 5 102(b) (creating the Office of Federal Financial
Management). A separate, non-statutory office exists to coordinate agencies' compliance
with the Government Performance and Results Act. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec.
Office of the President, Performance and Personnel Management, WHITE HOUSE, http://www
.whitehouse.gov/omb/performance [http://perma.cc/6YQT-49ZF].
266. See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, S loi(a), 116 Stat. 2899, 2910 (codified
at 31 U.S.C. 5 507 (2012)) (creating the Office ofElectronic Government).
267. See Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta & Alice M. Rivlin to All OMB Staff, supra note 19,
at 3 (setting forth these goals); see also TOMIGN, supra note 18, at 217-50 (describing this
reorganization).




THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET AS A SOURCE OF AGENCY POLICY CONTROL
1. The Presidential Management Agenda Lever
Management initiatives are not simply neutral, technocratic procedures. As
political scientist Andrew Rudalevidge put it when describing the way
President Nixon's political advisors originally viewed the "M" in the new
OMB, management was not to be "boring public administration theory" but
rather "'management in the get-the-Secretary-to-do-what-the-President-
needs-and-wants-him-do-do-whether-he-likes-it-or-not sense.'"9 To that
end, management initiatives often either explicitly contemplate substantive
policy choices or implicitly lead to them. The Presidential Management Agenda
(PMA) exemplifies this dynamic.
Consider, for example, President George W. Bush's Faith-Based and
Community Initiative, which the Administration presented as a management
initiative to break down bureaucratic barriers limiting religiously-affiliated
organizations from engaging with government.`o But the initiative was not
simply bureaucratic; it attempted to weaken the wall between church and
state.2 7 1
Other initiatives sound more technocratic but end up driving agencies'
substantive choices. President Bush's Program Assessment Rating Tool's
(PART) stated goal was to integrate budget and performance evaluation to
allow for continuation and expansion of well-functioning programs and reform
or removal of poorly performing programs.27 One aspect of the PART process
asked program examiners to evaluate agencies' program purpose and design,
including the soundness of choices in the underlying legislation.' But statutes
often contain multiple purposes, and the PART process sometimes led agencies
269. RUDALEVIDGE, supra note 104, at 61 (describing "new emphasis on the 'M' in OMB" as being
"designed to facilitate Nixon's efforts to shape the way executive agencies created and
implemented policy"). This private view of President Nixon's advisors stands in contrast to
President Nixon's public statement that OMB would be concerned not with what "we [the
government] do" but rather "with how we do it, and how well we do it." See supra note 59
and accompanying text.
270. OFFIcE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S
MANAGEMENT AGENDA, FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 35-38 (2001), http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2OO2/mgmt.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q9UF-D3Z6]
[hereinafter BUSH PMA].
271. See, e.g., JOSEPH LOCONTE, GOD, GOVERNMENT AND THE GOOD SAMARITAN: THE PROMISE
AND THE PERIL OF THE PRESIDENT'S FAITH-BASED AGENDA (2001) (describing the
transformative potential of President Bush's initiative for American public life).
27z. BUSH PMA, supra note 270, at 27-30.
273. BERYL A. RADIN, BEYOND MACHIAVELLI: POLICYANALYSIS COMES OF AGE 48-49 (2d ed. 2013);
SCHICK, supra note 7, at 301.
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to emphasize one over another in an effort to secure program examiner
approval. 74
Likewise, some of President Obama's management initiatives sound
technocratic but have substantive effects. For example, the Evidence and
Evaluation Agenda seeks to move the federal government towards evidence-
based policymaking.7 This agenda directs investment of federal dollars into
programs that have proven effective on the ground and, once the money is
awarded, requires ongoing evaluation of the program's implementation and
outcomes.7 6 The initiative has affected agency policy choices in a number of
ways. It has pushed agencies to adopt some policy goals and approaches to
service delivery over others.' It has prioritized competitive grants over
formula grants,7 8 and transformed decades-old accountability systems." One
274. RADIN, supra note 98, at io8-ii (explaining that the PART process prized efficiency over
equity, even for programs that were designed with equity goals); BERYL A. RADIN, FEDERAL
MANAGEMENT REFORM IN A WORLD OF CONTRADICTIONS 16o-6i (2012) (explaining that
through the PART process OMB attempted to limit the goals of the Community
Development Block Grant); John B. Gilmour & David E. Lewis, Does Performance Budgeting
Work? An Examination of the Office of Management and Budget's PART Scores, PuB. ADMIN.
REv., Sept.-Oct. 20o6, at 744 (discussing how disputes between program examiners and
agencies under PART were handled through the "OMB hierarchy," only reaching the higher
levels "if necessary").
275. See HASIGNS & MARGOLIS, supra note 26o, at 26-30 (describing this agenda).
276. Id. at 218-19.
277. Id. at 176-77, 216 (discussing tension between OMB and the Department of Labor over what
kinds of programs would be funded); id. at 214-18, 222-24 (describing how OMB worked
with agencies to select outcome measures for agencies to include in their program funding
announcements).
278. Id. at 214, 216, 222-27, 253-54 app. C (describing OMB's prioritization of competitive grants
over formula grants, sometimes over agencies' objections).
279. See, e.g., New Accountability Framework Raises the Bar for State Special Education
Programs, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (June 24, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/new
-accountability-framework-raises-bar-state-special-education-programs [http://perma.cc
/D3ZT-CGG2] (announcing "a major shift in the way [the Department] oversees the
effectiveness of states' special education programs" and quoting the acting Assistant
Secretary for Special Education and Rehabilitative Services as stating that the Results-
Driven Accountability system "is about using the accountability framework to provide states
with incentives and support to implement evidence-based strategies to improve results and
outcomes for students with disabilities" (emphasis added)); see also Christina Samuels,
Special Education Sees Small Increases in White House Budget Proposal, EDUC. WEEK (Feb.
2, 2015), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2o15/o2/special-educationseessmalli
.html [http://perma.cc/BQ5U-TJV2] (noting that the President's Budget "sets aside $1o
million that the department could use to help states pay for evidence-based reforms under the
new 'results-driven accountability' model aimed at improving the academic performance of
students with disabilities" (emphasis added)).
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study of the Evidence and Evaluation Agenda goes so far as to call it a "vast
attempt to change the foundation of American social policy." 28o
These management initiatives are also intricately intertwined with political
decisions. For example, some have charged that President Obama's evidence-
based initiative relies more heavily on evidence that supports the
administration's preferred policy decisions. 8' Others suggested that President
Bush's PART program was politically motivated to cut the budgets of
disfavored programs8 and that the faith-based initiative was a political
maneuver without any meaningful policy analysis or apparatus." In earlier
administrations, President Nixon's management reforms were described as
intending at once to "improve governmental management,"` 8 ' "redistribute
power in the intergovernmental system," 8 s and ensure "political direction"
over agencies' activities.286 And a Reagan Administration official reportedly
joked after leaving office that the name for President Reagan's management
initiative was I-D-E-O-L-O-G-Y (riffing on the acronym-heavy tides of the
previous Presidents' management initiatives). 8
Management reforms are thus not always simply neutral technocratic
reforms; they reflect the substantive policy interests of different
administrations and are tied to political contexts as well. Implementing these
reforms through the budget process is another lever by which OMB can control
agency policymaking, with the RMOs playing an important role.
280. HASKINS & MARGOLIS, supra note 260, at io.
281. See id. at 161-62; cf Bruce Baker & Kevin G. Weiner, Evidence and Rigor: Scrutinizing the
Rhetorical Embrace of Evidence-Based Decision Making, 41 EDUC. RESEARCHER 98 (2012)
(criticizing the Education Department's reliance on sources that lack the rigorous empirical
research or analysis needed to guide policy recommendations).
282. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 98, at 97, io8-ni; cf Gilmour & Lewis, supra note 274, at 747
(reporting a correlation between 2004 PART scores and proposed budgets for programs
housed in traditionally Democratic agencies, but not other agencies, and suggesting that
other programs are "insulated from the influence" of PART scores).
283. See, e.g., Ex-Aide Insists White House Puts Politics Ahead of Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
2, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/o2/us/ex-aide-insists-white-house-puts-politics
-ahead-of-policy.html [http://perma.cc/JC7A-LR49] (discussing an interview with the
former head of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives).
284. TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 31-32 (1998).
285. Id. at 31.
286. TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 51.
287. RADIN, supra note 273, at 125.
288. See, e.g., Memorandum from Shaun Donovan, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office
of the President, to the Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies, No. M-15-i, Fiscal Year 2017 Budget
Guidance 3 (May 1, 2015), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda
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2. The Budget-Nexus Lever
Management initiatives also serve as a form of policymaking control
because they are directly tied to the RMOs' work on the budget, and the
budget has the levers for policymaking control described in Sections L.A and
I.B above.
PMA is tied to the budget in part because OMB's budget instructions direct
agencies to embed the initiatives set forth in the PMA in their budget requests.
For example, OMB Circular A-11 requires that agencies present budget
requests that "reflect [their] efforts and planned action to strengthen
management" in keeping with a series of stated "Administration's
commitment[s]."89 More specifically, the latest version of Circular A-11
explains that "[a]gency [budget] requests are more likely to be fully funded if
proposed funding increases and policy changes are grounded" in the Obama
Administration's Evidence and Evaluation Agenda.2 9 o Directors' budget
memoranda similarly provide specific instructions for agencies to take
particular actions to implement management initiatives.'
The PMA is also tied to the budget because of requirements set forth in the
PMA itself. For example, President George W. Bush's PMA required each
agency to incorporate its substantive policies in its budget requests. 9 One of
these initiatives, PART, was itself designed to transform agencies' budget
/2015/n-15-11.pdf [http://perma.cc/5872-YPKP] (stating that "OMB strongly encourages
agencies to engage with their RMOs early in the process of developing" their evidence and
evaluation proposals as part of their budget submissions); RADIN, supra note 274, at 48
("The OMB budget examiner for each program played the major role in evaluating the
assessments [under PART].").
28g. OMB CIRcuLAR No. A-i, supra note I16, § 31.8, at 4; see also id. 5 51.1, 51.7, 51.9, at 1-2, 4-6
(including similar directions).
290. Id. § 51.9, at 6.
z91. See, e.g., Memorandum from Brian C. Deese to the Heads of Dep'ts & Agencies, supra note
124, at 4 (telling agencies to submit budget requests that, among other things, "provide at
least two and up to five examples" of the agencies' "[m]ost significant accomplishments
over the past year" in complying with the evidence and evaluation initiative and their
"[h]ighest priorities in these areas for the coming year," along with descriptions of the
agencies' "[p]lan for embedding [the initiative] in new (or existing) programs," so that
OMB can "work[] closely with you in the coming months to develop a budget request that
supports the President's vision"); Memorandum from Brian C. Deese, Acting Dir., Office of
Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, to the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts & Agencies,
No. M-14 -12, Management Priorities for the FY 2016 Budget (July 18, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2014/m-14-12.pdf [http://
perma.cc/N8FJ-F6PK] (instructing agencies to present budget requests incorporating
certain aspects of the President's Management Agenda).
292. BUSH PMA, supra note 270, at 5, 13, 20.
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requests by connecting them to program evaluation."" President Obama
continued and perhaps even expanded this trend by setting forth his
management agendas directly in his budget."9
In practice, the link between the budget process and management
initiatives means that program examiners can play a large role in influencing
agencies' policy choices through executive management initiatives."s
III. ASSESSING OMB'S CONTROL OF AGENCY POLICYMAKING
THROUGH THE BUDGET PROCESS
This Part turns to a normative assessment of OMB's control of agency
policymaking through the budget process. Section III.A makes the case that
there are some salutary aspects of this power, including its firm legal basis (a
strength in comparison with OIRA's regulatory review) and its promotion of
coordination across the expansive administrative state. Section III.B
nonetheless argues that three aspects of the RMOs' work raise accountability
concerns: the RMOs' lack of transparency; the delegation of significant policy
responsibility to the RMOs' civil servants and non-Senate-confirmed officials;




Unlike the OIRA regulatory review process, the legality of which continues
to be debated,29 6 there is little doubt that the RMOs' work on budgets and
management is legal.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 272-273.
294. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 3, 9-10 (2009)
(setting forth the President's first-term management agenda); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 3, 9-10 (2014) [hereinafter OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES FY 2015] (setting forth the President's second-term management
agenda).
295. See Radin, supra note 252, at 4-5; Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 74 (describing
program examiners' influence on agency policy initiatives).
296. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 367 (noting that "as in 1981, there remains a significant
legal issue whether OIRA may exercise decision-making authority-not just oversight-
with respect to regulatory decisions lodged by statute in particular agencies" because "it is
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The RMOs' work is defensible under both major understandings of
executive power. Proponents of the unitary executive, focusing on the "pre-
ratification historical context" as an aid to understanding the original public
meaning of the Constitution, might point to Alexander Hamilton's listing with
"no distinction" the "command of foreign negotiations, preparation of a
budget, spending appropriations, direction of the army and navy, direction of a
war, 'and other matters of. a like nature"' as core to the executive power of
Article II.
The RMOs' work would likely pass muster with pluralists as well.
Focusing on the extent to which Congress has invested the President with
authority to "control the policy discretion of other administrators,a29 a
pluralist might point to the delegation to the President to "prepare budgets of
the United States Government,"" "prescribe the contents . . . in the
budget,"300 and "change agency appropriation requests."3o' The President has
statutory authority to delegate these tasks to the Director of OMB, as a Senate-
confirmed official, under the Presidential Subdelegation Act of 1950.302 OMB
has specific statutory authority both to work under the President's "direction"
to administer the office 3 and to promulgate and oversee management policies
not at all obvious that a delegation to a specific agency to make a specific decision delegates
authority to the President to make that decision himself; it is even less obvious that such a
delegation gives decision-making authority to OIRA career staff' and others involved in
OIRA's regulatory review); Strauss, supra note 2, at 703 ("[Als some (but not all) Attorneys
General have concluded, when Congress creates duties in others, that act creates in the
President constitutional obligations not only to oversee but also to respect their independent
exercise of those duties," and so just as the President "must respect a statutory framework
that assigns care for the national parks to the Department of the Interior, and care for the
national forests to the Department of Agriculture, on this view, he must respect a statutory
framework that assigns actual decision making about particular issues affecting air quality to
the EPA . . . .").
297. Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541, 603, 615 (1994); see also STEVEN G. CALABREsI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE
UNITARY ExEcuTIvE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 262 (2008)
(praising the establishment of the Bureau of the Budget as an "important step ... to bolster
the unitary executive").
298. SHANE, supra note 2, at 35; see also Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers To
Administer the Laws, 1o6 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006) (explaining that the President can
"bind the discretion of lower level officials . . . only when the statute expressly grants power
to the President in name").
299. 31 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2012).
300. Id. 5 11o4(b).
301. Id. 5 iio8(b)(i).
302. 3 U.S.C. 5 301 (2012).
303. 31 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2012).
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for the executive branch.o Even the authority to exert control over
independent agencies' budgets is calibrated by statute.305
One might nevertheless question whether the full extent of policymaking
control that OMB can exert through the budget process is within the scope of
this delegation. Critics might note that no statute determines OMB's role in
budget execution. The Anti-Deficiency Act requires OMB to apportion agency
spending but does not indicate that OMB may place additional conditions on
apportionment.30 6 Nor is the regular communication between RMO program
examiners and agency officials on their policy decisions and implementation set
forth anywhere.
The better argument, however, is that, the RMOs' work on budget,
management, and policy stands on firm legal footing. As a textual matter, the
expansive scope of authority otherwise given to the President and to OMB on
both budget preparation and management contemplates the RMOs' role in
budget execution. As a functional matter, it is hard to imagine a sensible
system that could permit OMB's annual assessments of agency activity in order
to devise a budget and strategic plan while not also ensuring appropriate
implementation. As a historical matter, the Brownlow Committee on
Administrative Management-whose 1937 recommendations resulted in a
reorganization of the executive branch and OMB's predecessor officeo7 - told
Congress: "[t]he execution, as well as the preparation, of the budget should be
supervised by the Bureau of the Budget and should be closely correlated with
fiscal programs and plans."zos That Congress explicitly rejected many of the
Brownlow Committee's recommendations 3 ' but not this one further supports
the idea that Congress did not mean to leave the President and OMB without
this authority.
304. Id. 5 503(b).
305. See sources cited supra notes 93, 162-163 (discussing a variety of ways statutes require
independent agencies to engage with OMB in the budget process).
3o6. 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
307. See CALABRESi & Yoo, supra note 297, at 291-95 (discussing the Brownlow Committee's
recommendations).
308. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (1937).
309. See CALABRESI & Yoo, supra note 297, at 295-99 (discussing Congress's debates over the
Brownlow Committee's recommendations).
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2. Coordination
OMB's control of agency policymaking through the budget process can also
be praised for its coordinating effects."o The administrative state is a sprawling
behemoth, employing millions of people in hundreds of agencies.3 ' It creates
and implements policies that affect every aspect of American daily life (and the
world beyond the United States as well). The RMOs' work usefully
coordinates this endeavor. At its best, this coordination provides value not only
to the President (whose duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed is
supported by this work) and to Congress (which benefits from this work to
such an extent that it continually increases OMB's statutory duties'), but also
to "We the People," in whose name the government operates in the first
place."3
Coordination is apparent in all aspects of the budget process. As to budget
preparation, for example, the form-and-content and approval levers give OMB
the opportunity to ensure that agencies are not working at odds with each
other, especially when the form-and-content lever directs a group of agencies
to share approaches to particular problems. The confidentiality lever supports
coordination by requiring agencies to trade their own goals for the broader
whole.
31o. See, e.g., BREssMAN ET AL., supra note io, at ii (explaining that because "coordination of
agency policies can allow . . . consistent and uniform regulatory regimes to develop ...
agencies are often judged in terms of their coordination (or lack thereof)"); Kate Andrias,
The President's Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1103-07 (2013) (discussing the
value of enhanced coordination, including through OMB, of agencies' enforcement
policies); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 19, at 1173-91 (discussing the value of executive
coordination, including through OMB, of agency activities in "shared regulatory space");
Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARv. L. REv. 805, 850-57,
881 (2015) (discussing the value of executive oversight, including through OMB, of
coordinated interagency adjudication).
311. ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 45, at 12-15.
312. See supra notes 36-37, 50, 264-266 and accompanying text (discussing OMB's creation as the
Bureau of the Budget to streamline agencies' budget requests to Congress, the creation of
statutory offices on various management-related tasks, and the expansion of the statutory
offices and the increase in OMB's statutory responsibilities).
313. Advocates of OIRA's work also proffer coordination of disparate agency policies throughout
the administrative state as a value of that office. See, e.g., DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 2,
at 1079-82 (describing the ways that OIRA coordinates agency proposals); Sunstein, supra
note 19, at 1840, 1845-46, 1850 (same). Some scholars who otherwise dislike OIRA's control
of regulatory policy nonetheless would be comfortable if its role were simply to coordinate
rather than (as they argue) to direct. See, e.g., SHANE, supra note 2, at 172-73 (explaining the
potential value of OIRA to coordinate disparate regulatory regimes and lamenting the fact
that "OIRA has never truly played" that role); Morrison, supra note 2, at 1o64
(acknowledging that 0[RA has a valuable role to play in coordinating related agency work).
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As to budget execution, the specification lever can support coordination if
the RMOs use tools like apportionment to ensure consistency across agencies.
But it is really the monitoring lever, in conjunction with the pyramid structure,
that has the greatest potential as a coordination tool. The RMOs' monitoring
permits regular assessment of where agencies might be drifting away from
their commitments, while the pyramid structure can ensure that the right
people are talking to each other about related matters.
As to management, presidential management initiatives can promote
coordination, whether through streamlining government-wide interactions
with faith-based organizations or requiring agencies to embed evidence-based
policymaking throughout their programs, while the budget-nexus lever helps
ensure the implementation of shared initiatives as part of the budget process.
To be sure, the RMOs' coordination is not perfect. The broad discretion of
individual program examiners leaves the potential for agencies to receive
disparate rather than unifying instructions, whether as to budget preparation,
budget execution, or management initiatives. Because the individual RMOs
are structured to reflect agency-by-agency oversight, they may suffer from the
same "stovepiping" problem as the rest of the executive branch, effectively
limiting "cross-agency perspectives and knowledge."15 The RMOs may also
fail to coordinate with other OMB offices, including the statutory offices that
are responsible for distinct management issues throughout the executive
branch. This lack of coordination could contribute to the dissemination of
conflicting instructions to agencies?
That said, the pyramid structure of the RMOs works to counter these
concerns by letting the officials at each higher level know what is going on
314. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 274, at 138, 142 (describing varying approaches taken by different
program examiners to evaluating agency programs under the PART).
3s. Adams, supra note 72, at 62 (describing this problem as "not unique to OMB").
316. See, e.g., Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta & Alice M. Rivlin to All OMB Staff, supra note
19, at 4 (discussing the potential for "unnecessary duplication between the management and
budget areas that may result in our giving conflicting signals to agencies on the same
issues"); see also RADIN, supra note 274, at 175 (asserting that the management staff "has
operated alone, often failing to draw on the program and policy expertise within the OMB
budget examiner staff"); cf Seth D. Harris, Managing for Social Change: Improving Labor
Department Performance in a Partisan Era, 117 W. VA. L. REv. 987, 1005-15, 1025-26 (2015)
(critiquing GPRA and its 2010 update and describing the efforts undertaken by the author, a
former Deputy Secretary and Chief Operating Officer of the Labor Department, to have his
agency's management work as required by GPRA taken seriously by congressional and
OMB overseers on the M-side and the RMO staff); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office
of the President, Performance & Personnel Management, WHITE HouSE, http://www
.whitehouse.gov/omb/performance [http://perma.cc/8MVG-ZP8L] (describing the work of
a separate M-side office rather than the RMOs in overseeing performance evaluation under
GPRA).
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below, allowing the officials to share information across program areas. The
goal of increasing OMB's coordination has long been a focus of OMB's internal
reform efforts."' And because the RMOs' coordination serves the President's
political interests-after all, Presidents can be judged by how well the
administrative state functions and how successfully they implement their
policies -there are strong forces supporting ongoing fortification of the RMOs'
coordinating efforts.
From the perspective of administrative law values, however, coordination
itself is not the final goal; coordination is useful to the extent it furthers other
goals supporting the legitimacy of the administrative state, such as efficiency,
effectiveness, and accountability. 9 Much of the RMOs' coordinating work
supports the first two of these values and to some extent the last one as well.
For example, some of the RMOs' coordinating work promotes efficiency,320
sometimes within OMB itself. The structure of the RMOs' budget preparation
review -with clear deadlines and hard decisions made behind closed doors -
"move[s] decisions along quickly" and permits "budget cuts that enable the
government to hit the bottom line," promoting both "micro- and macro-
efficiency."" The speed with which the RMOs can work to respond to
policymakers' questions, and the lack of ceremony involved in getting all levels
of the hierarchy together to make a decision, also further the efficiency of the
operation.-"
Other aspects of the RMOs' work promote efficiency in agency action. The
approval lever and form-and-content lever both signal to agencies what work
the White House and OMB will support as Congress begins the appropriations
process, reducing the need for agencies to engage in unproductive wish lists or
317. See, e.g., TOMIGN, supra note 18, at 188 (noting that program examiners' policy choices often
have the approval of officials higher in the pyramid). To be sure, the pyramid structure may
provide an effective counterweight only as to high-salience items that RMO staff members
are likely to elevate.
31. See, e.g., Memorandum from Leon E. Panetta & Alice M. Rivlin to All OMB Staff, supra note
19, at 4-6 (describing creation of RMOs as, in part, one designed to improve coordination
within OMB and throughout the administrative state).
319. See Andrias, supra note 310, at 1083-94 (discussing the way coordination of agency
enforcement policy can promote these values); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 19, at 1181-91
(discussing how coordination in "shared regulatory space" can promote these values).
320. Efficiency in this context encompasses issues such as "agency decision costs and transaction
costs," Freeman & Rossi, supra note 19, at 1181, rather than social welfare.
321. Ross, supra note 141, at 131.
322. See Adams, supra note 72, at 58.
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to try to read the "political tea leaves." 3 The pyramid structure promotes
efficiency by letting only the most contentious issues rise to the top. The
specification and monitoring levers encourage matters to be resolved before
they become problems, so an upfront investment of time can save time on the
back end.' Management initiatives focus on efficient conduct in agency action
overall.
The RMOs' coordinating work may also support the effectiveness of agency
action. The whole point of this work is to ensure that agencies have the
resources they need to do their jobs well and that they are managed and
monitored appropriately. The high caliber of the OMB staff- more than half
have master's degrees, more than ten percent have doctorates, and they are
often seen as among "the best and brightest" in government"s - helps further
this goal. The depth of program expertise, especially in the long-time RMO
employees that tend to hold the branch chief and DAD positions, provides
institutional memory and subject-matter expertise, both of which aid
sensible decision making.
323. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE
L.J. 2, 59 (2009) (describing the value of more direct presidential intervention instead of
leaving the agency "to read the political 'tea leaves' on its own").
324. Cf Freeman & Rossi, supra note 19, at 1182-83 (describing a similar cumulative time savings
when agencies sharing regulatory space consult with each other initially).
325. Ross, supra note 141, at 134; see also TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 23-24 ("OMB is currently able
to attract the best and the brightest graduates from prestigious graduate programs.");
Adams, supra note 72, at 61 ("OMB staff is highly trained.. . [and] highly experienced.").
326. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 13 (noting that DADs commonly stay in their roles across
several administrations while PADs turn over regularly); Adams, supra note 72, at 61
(describing value of long-time civil servants in OMB); Martha Joynt Kumar et al., Meeting
the Freight Train Head On: Planning for the Transition to Power, in THE WHITE HOUSE
WORLD, supra note 148, at 21 (describing the value of OMB career staff and noting that
"[w]hen in one administration a senior political staff member suggested that the deputy
associate directors be fired, an OMB veteran pointed out that this 'would be a
catastrophically dumb idea both from the point of view of ever having OMB as an
institution work very well but also from the point of view of all the institutional knowledge
and skill you lose'"). In contrast to the senior civil servant branch chiefs and DADs,
however, and more like the shorter-term political PADs, program examiners tend to stay
less long in the organization, perhaps burned out by the pace and intensity of the work. See
ToMKIN, supra note 18, at 13, 24 (reporting that "PADs remain in OMB an average of
eighteen months" while program examiners typically leave after three years); Adams, supra
note 72, at 58 (reporting that OMB staff work White House hours and days, with the
standard joke being "Thank God, it's Friday; only two more working days until Monday!");
Ross, supra note 141, at 136 (noting that in the 1970s, examiners used to stay at OMB for
about ten years, but currently most program examiners leave after three years). The relative
inexperience of program examiners and the short-term tenure of most PADs may work
against the effectiveness provided by the long-term civil servant supervisors. See, e.g.,
Forshey, supra note 139, at 428-29, 432 (acknowledging, from the perspective of the program
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Still other aspects of the RMOs' coordinating work support some form of
accountability." The President's budget is a public statement that represents a
coordinated synthesis of past activities and forward-looking goals, allowing the
President to take ownership of the activities of the administrative state. The
accompanying PMA furthers this goal. Agencies' budget justification materials
submitted to Congress and posted on their websites publicly state what the
agencies' goals are and justifies both why they are the right goals and the
amounts requested to support those goals. The RMOs are critical in both
putting these documents together and making the programs reflected in the
documents work, and to that extent can be said to support accountability.
However, the RMOs' coordinating work supports accountability only at a
high level of generality related to the published products that result. As the rest
of this Part argues, the RMOs' work raises significant accountability concerns
in terms of its process. Overall, these concerns undercut the general
accountability that might be associated with the budget, the PMA, and
agencies' congressional justifications.
B. Troublesome Aspects
There are three troublesome aspects of the RMOs' work, all related to the
issue of accountability, by which I mean "the ability of one actor to demand an
explanation or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or
punish that second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation."39
First, there is a lack of transparency in the way the RMOs' work is conducted
and the substance of what they discuss. Second, the RMOs' work can elevate
examiner author, that as "an examiner I am often younger, less credentialed, and less
experienced than those with whom I am working" in the two public health agencies she
oversees, and that before she took the position, her only previous "background in health
policy consisted of two graduate-level courses" as part of her master's program in public
policy).
327. See Andrias, supra note 310, at 1090-94; cf Freeman & Rossi, supra note 19, at 1182, 1187-91
(explaining how agency coordination instruments, including presidential management of
coordination, can improve accountability of agency decision making).
328. SCHICK, supra note 7, at 234-35, 270-71 (describing agency budget justification materials).
For an example of an agency justification, see ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note
136.
329. Edward Rubin, The Myth ofAccountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L.
REv. 2073, 2119 (2005); see also Mark Bovens et al., Public Accountability, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF PUBLiC ACcouNTABILITY 3-6 (Mark Bovens et al. eds., 2014) (summarizing
conceptions of accountability across different disciplines and suggesting that there is a
'minimal conceptual consensus" that accountability "is about answerability to others with a
legitimate claim to demand an account"; "is furthermore a retrospective- ex post- activity";
and is "a consequential activity").
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OiMB's civil servants and lower-level political appointees over Senate-
confirmed agency officials, and the ultimate lines of responsibility are ill-
defined. Third, the RMOs' seemingly technocratic work on the budget can
obscure value-driven or partisan decision making.
All three of these issues make it difficult for Congress and the American
public to hold agencies, OMB, and the White House more generally
accountable. It is hard "to demand an explanation or justification"33 when it is
not clear what to ask about, whom to ask, or when or why an explanation or
justification would be needed, or when it is impossible to ask the right person
or to get a straight answer. It is similarly hard "to reward or punish . . . on the
basis of . . . performance or . . . explanation"13  when it is not clear whose
performance is fundamentally at issue. The rest of this Section elaborates on
the accountability problems associated with each of these troublesome aspects
of the RMOs' work.
1. The Lack of Transparency
At first blush, it may seem strange to suggest that the RMOs' work suffers
from a lack of transparency. After all, 0MB posts much material online, from
directors' memoranda to OMB circulars; agencies post documents explaining
and justifying their congressional budget requests; and the budget itself is a
voluminous public document that details the policy choices embedded therein.
But as suggested by the earlier discussion of the confidentiality lever,332 the
RMOs' work does exhibit a lack of transparency.3 3 While the details of the
budget process are known in broad brush strokes, there are nevertheless many
parts that remain hidden. We do not know, for example, when, which kind,
330. Rubin, supra note 329, at 2119.
331. Id.
332. See supra notes 174-175 and accompanying text.
333. Cf ADRIAN VERMEULE, MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN WRIT SMALL
188 (2007) ("Some of the least transparent stages of the budget process are those that occur
entirely within the executive branch. Most opaque are policy discussions that take place
wholly within the executive branch among administrators . . . ."); Ross, supra note 141, at
130 ("[T]he public is not privy to the questions or answers exchanged during the OMB
hearing period, and no OMB decision sees the light of day before it is published in the
president's budget. In fact, even after Congress passes the final budget, all details about the
agency's budget request, OMB's recommendation, and the dialogue that took place between
OMB and the agencies is embargoed."). As the literature critiquing OIRA frequently
laments, OIRA's work is also not transparent. See, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra
note 3, at 78-79, 92-93; Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 326, 361-64; Steinzor, supra note 2, at
251, 264, 272-73. As I will argue, however, OIRA's work is in some ways more transparent
than the work of the RMOs. See infra notes 366-367, 439-465 and accompanying text.
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and how many meetings between the RMOs and the agencies occur over the
course of the budget preparation season and throughout budget execution;
what interest groups or other administration officials meet with the RMOs,
what the meetings are about, and who is present during such meetings; what
kinds of agency policy work interest the RMOs, and what kinds do not; how
often apportionment footnotes are used and the kinds of demands that are
made therein; and how all of the above might vary by administration, by OMB
Director, by PAD, by program examiner, or by agency.
Much of the substance of these interactions remains hidden, too. For
example, only the agency and its RMO see the contents of the agency's original
budget request to OMB, which includes the amount requested, the agency's
proposed allocation among different programs, its assessment of its own
capacities, and its own priorities. PADs offer no public statement of their
different priorities when they step into their roles. Additionally, there is no
public documentation or acknowledgment when agency policies change in
response to the RMOs' encouragement or requirement.
OMB offers two rationales for the confidentiality it requires of agencies.
First, it contends that "[p]olicy consistency" is necessary within the executive
branch, particularly when speaking or giving documents to Congress and the
media.' Second, it suggests that the "institutional interests ... implicated by
[the] disclosure" of confidential budget documents militate in favor of
confidentiality."'s Such institutional interests include protecting "the
deliberative process of the government" by permitting government officials "to
express their opinions freely . . . without fear of publicity [that might] . . .
inhibit frank discussion of policy matters and likely impair the quality of
decisions." ' To that end, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exempts
from disclosure documents that are deliberative and predecisional, like agency-
OMB budget discussions.
However, while each of these rationales has some validity, neither can
actually justify the extent of opacity in the budget process, as the next two
Subsections argue. In addition, neither rationale appropriately distinguishes
the substance of predecisional deliberation from information about the
334. OMB CIRCULARNO. A-11, supra note 116, 5 22.3, at 2.
335. Id. 5 22.5, at 3.
336. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 742 F.2d 1484, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(quoting Ryan v. Dep't of Justice, 617 F.2d 781, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(s) (2012) (describing the "deliberative process privilege" FOIA exemption).
337. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 742 F.2d 1484 at 1498 (holding that the Environmental Protection
Agency's budgetary recommendations to OMB could be withheld from public disclosure,
under FOIA's deliberative process exemption).
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procedural aspects of deliberation and the final post-deliberation decisions, as
the third Subsection below explains.
a. Protecting Policy Consistency
First, "policy consistency" does not require a pretense that an agency and
OMB never diverged over the appropriate agency budget and policy request.
Currently, OMB directs agency witnesses testifying before Congress, if asked
about their interest in appropriations beyond the scope of the President's
request, to explain that such interest is "not appropriate," since "witnesses are
responsible for one or a few programs, whereas the President is responsible for
all the needs of the Federal Government.""8 This explanation could also
disclose the backstory of the agency's budget request, without sacrificing policy
consistency. Witnesses could disclose prior views while avowing conversion to
the President's proposals. Such disclosure need not undercut OMB's goal of
policy consistency because agency officials could explain why they came to
believe the final decision was the right one.
In some cases, though, such masking of disagreements about the
implications of different budgetary choices might place agency officials in the
position of speaking untruths to Congress. Officials do not always come to
believe that the final decision was the right one. 39 On the one hand, OMB's
reminder to agency witnesses testifying before Congress that the President has
responsibility for the whole government while agency witnesses have
responsibility for a limited number of programs is surely right and surely
justifies the President's ultimate decision-making authority. But agency
officials could say that they understand the President's request for their agency
in light of the entire federal government's needs -acknowledging that the
President and Congress alike face hard choices in the budgetary process-
without having to claim that the President's request for their agency will
33s. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-11, supra note n16, § 22.2, at 2.
33g. See, e.g., Walsh & Culliton, supra note 119, at 294 ("It is not uncommon for someone to find
himself publicly saying the opposite of what he thinks because he lost a battle with OMB.");
supra note 184 and accompanying text (describing budget disagreements between agencies
and OMB); see also David C. Vladeck, Unreasonable Delay, Unreasonable Intervention: The
Battle To Force Regulation of Ethylene Oxide, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 191, 217 &
nn.69-7o (Peter L. Strauss ed., 20o6) (describing OMB's power over agencies' budgets,
regulations, and testimony before Congress generally, and stating that "OMB holds too
much power over agencies for an agency head to disregard OMB's objections. . . . As then-
OMB Director James Miller, put it [in 1981], '[i]f you're the toughest kid on the block, most
kids won't pick a fight with you'" (second alteration in original) (citing Deregulation HQAn
Interview on the New Executive Order with Murray L. Weidenbaum and James C. Miller III,
REGULATION, Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 14, 19)).
2253
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
accomplish what they believe that it will not.o OMB's current confidentiality
requirements discourage this kind of honesty.
To be sure, such honesty might present several dangers. First, agency
officials might simply push for more funding, rather than carefully discussing
the nuances of policy tradeoffs. Second, despite agency officials' best efforts,
Congress and the media might focus on the fact of intra-executive squabbles
instead of the substance of the discussion. Rather than a thoughtful discussion
of policy tradeoffs, we might be left with politicized soundbites for ideological
spin. It is hard enough for the President to move anything through Congress as
it is, without permitting the exploitation of a history of internal executive
disagreement.
This concern is valid enough. But, at the same time, Congress has
mandated by statute that agencies do a particular job. In all likelihood, it wants
that job done. So, presumably, do the people for whose benefit the job is
undertaken. The confidentiality requirements rooted in the goal of policy
consistency make it hard for agency officials to say anything meaningful about
the extent to which the agency is up for the task, the tradeoff among different
priorities, or the real resource constraints that agencies face.4' These
requirements therefore make it hard for Congress, much less the public, to
know and understand what is actually happening.
Permitting such a disclosure, either where agency officials are asked directly
or where they think in particular instances that disclosure is valuable, would
accordingly help promote accountability- one of the primary values a well-
designed transparency regime can serve.3" It could help give Congress
information that it needs in order to set overall funding levels for individual
34o. Cf Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 104, at 1760 (describing institutional pressure to
"reassure the agency's overseers that [the agency is] doing fine," in lieu of "a frank
discussion" about the practical implications of insufficient budgets). Shapiro and Steinzor
critique the budget information that agencies present to Congress pursuant to the
Government Performance and Results Act, see supra note 264, but this institutional pressure
also functions in the context of the confidentiality requirements more generally, see Shapiro
& Steinzor, supra note 104, at 1778-79.
341. Cf Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 104, at 1763-69 (discussing the way the EPA's and FDA's
respective strategic plans and performance reports failed to disclose "funding challenges" or
to make plain the implications of allocating agency budgets between different kinds of
oversight activities, in ways that undercut public health and safety).
342. SHANE, supra note 2, at 160 ("[T]he openness of agency decision making to public
scrutiny-the relative transparency in terms of process-is itself a guarantee of public
accountability."); VERMEULE, supra note 333, at 6 ("Transparency is necessary, at least to
some degree, to any conception of accountability . . . ." (emphasis omitted)); Mendelson,
supra note 3, at 1161 ("[S]ubmerging presidential preferences undermines electoral
accountability for agency decisions. . . .").
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agencies and allocate across competing priorities within each agency, thereby
improving Congress's ability to hold agencies accountable. It could also help
give the public information that would make concrete the policy choices that
are reflected in the budget, as such choices are often best understood within the
context of the alternatives that were rejected.'
It is true that disclosure of the final decisions permits some level of post-
hoc accountability.3" But the budget is so many thousands of pages and
requires so much analysis and translation that the cost of finding, much less
understanding, alternatives that were rejected along the way is extremely high.
Individual agency and sub-agency budget justifications to Congress can
themselves reach hundreds or thousands of pages. A clear articulation of points
of difference, and why they were resolved as they were, can help citizens and
civil society organizations better identify specific decisions for which to hold
officials accountable.s This is especially so because voters often need concrete
disputes to crystallize their own views about policy choices.46
Nor is it enough to say that interest groups will provide sufficient
information about the implications of different budgetary decisions to
Congress and the public throughout the appropriations process. Interest
groups will not have all of the inside information that agencies do; they are
unlikely to capture the full scope of issues that may be important; they may be
biased; and agencies may be forced to deny their accuracy? Similarly, back
channels between agency officials and Hill staffers may get some information
across, but inconsistently, given the formal limits the confidentiality
343. See Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the
United States, 31 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 79, 104 (2012) (noting the importance of context for
disclosure of funding information, including the salience of such factors as "why a certain
decision to allocate funds was made" and possible "alternatives" to the decision). See
generally JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC PoLCIES (2d ed. 1995)
(describing an alternative-driven policymaking model).
344. Cf Katzen, supra note 22, at 1503 ("[1It is the product of the decision-making, not the process
of the decision-making, that is the key to accountability . . . ."). But see Heclo, supra note 21,
at 131 ("[W]e must judge public organizations not only by what they do, but by how they do
it...." .
345. RUBIN, supra note 5, at 282 ("Analyzing what is not in the budget is often as revealing as
examining what is included."); SHANE, supra note 2, at 166 ("[A]ccountability requires ...
widespread access to information about the nature of the decisions at issue.").
346. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1163 ("It may take an event, a government action, or a public
discussion to engage an individual voter with specifics so that she can form preferences.").
347. Cf THOMAS T. HOLYOKE, INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYING 170-73 (2014) (describing ways
in which interest groups' knowledge and goals may differ from those of agencies).
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requirements place on these back channels."8 Moreover, back channels do little
for the public's ability to hold anyone in either branch accountable.
A second reason that greater disclosure of the intra-executive budget
process may promote accountability, regardless of OMB's interest in policy
consistency, is that such disclosure could deter self-dealing or one-sided
dealing, which is no less a danger in the budget context than in the regulatory
context.349 For example, recent political science scholarship has shown a
correlation between the President's political interests and the distribution of
federal funds. One study found that swing states receive more grants and a
greater dollar amount in grants than non-swing states;"so this result was more
pronounced in the two years leading up to a presidential election than in the
two years after one.3s' As the author of this study concludes, "[P]residents
engage in pork barrel politics." 52 Another group of political scientists found
that districts receive more federal funding when they are represented in
Congress by members of the President's own party. 5 ' These authors explain,
"For an artful president intent upon redirecting federal outlays to a preferred
constituency, 'the opportunity for mischief is substantial."'
3 5 4
These studies do not directly tie OMB to changing expenditure levels, but
researchers have found evidence suggestive of such a link. For example, in a
related study, agency officials whose job involved decisions about procurement
awards, licenses or loans, or grants - identified as "distributors"s55 - reported
more levels of "policy influence" from OMB than did nondistributors.356 A
348. See, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 7, at 236 (discussing "[i]nformal contacts with appropriations
committee members and [agency] staff'); supra text accompanying notes 192, 194
(discussing OMB's ability to monitor and punish agencies that attempt to go around
confidentiality requirements).
349. VERMEULE, supra note 333, at 181 (noting that "transparency deters officials from engaging in
self-interested bargaining").
350. HUDAK, supra note 7, at 46.
351. Id. at so.
352. Id. at 3.
353. Berry et al., supra note 7, at 783-
354. Id. at 786 (quoting FISHER, supra note 7, at 88).
355. HUDAK, supra note 7, at 138-39.
356. Id. at 145 & tbl.6-2. Distributors report "significantly more policy influence from each
category [the White House, OMB, political appointees, Congressional committees,
Republicans in Congress, and Democrats in Congress] than do nondistributors." Id. at 145.
The lone exception was senior civil servants, where the difference was not statistically
significant. Id. Interestingly, of these categories, "policy influence" from OMB ranked
higher (on a scale of i to 5, 4.15 for distributors and 3.94 for nondistributors) than did policy
influence from the White House (3-87 for distributors and 3-74 for nondistributors). Id. at
tbl.6-2. The study did not attempt to determine where the policy influence originated
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related set of interviews provided some anecdotal evidence that "after the peer
review process produces a ranking of grant applications by quality scores,
OMB can change the order in which proposals are funded in many programs,
thereby influencing the timing, location, and likelihood of funding.""s' In these
ways, the conductor of these interviews suggests, OMB "facilitates presidential
control of federal agencies, thereby enhancing the ability of the White House to
affect micro-level public policy decision making."s,8
While these studies do not disaggregate which office in OMB is at issue,
the RMOs are a likely candidate, given the direct ongoing interactions about
the budget and related policy matters between the RMOs and the agencies they
oversee.3 59 Moreover, the extent of interest group lobbying of, or even
informational meetings with, the RMOs is unknown.3 60 Recent research on
OIRA shows that lobbying that office can affect regulatory policy. 6 ' The lack
of transparency around who is meeting with RMO officials, when, and about
what limits our understanding of the factors and actors that influence budget
and related policy decisions.3a
from-for example, whether OMB was actually a conduit for influence from the White
House-but its results underscore the importance of understanding the way OMB's budget
levers operate. "[A]s the budgetary arm of the White House," the author of this study
explains, "OMB affects distributive outcomes in direct and formal, yet politically strategic
ways." Id. at 171.
357. Id. at 173; see also id. at 154-57 (describing the system of "elite interviewing" employed and its
benefits and limitations).
358. Id. at 174.
359. Of course, even if the RMOs are involved in making these changes, that does not mean that
the RMOs' involvement comes at their own initiative given the way the RMOs can serve as
a conduit for instructions from other, more obviously political, White House offices. See
supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
36o. Clearly, these meetings do happen at least sometimes. See, e.g., HASKINS & MARGOLIS, supra
note 26o, at 32-33 (describing an RMO's meeting with an organization seeking support in
the budget).
361. See Simon F. Haeder & Susan Webb Yackee, Infuence and the Administrative Process:
Lobbying the U.S. President's Office ofManagement and Budget, 109 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 507, 507
(2015) (finding that lobbying during OIRA review of government regulations is associated
with policy change).
362. There have been some efforts to unpack these factors in the context of OIRA's work. See,
e.g., SHANE, supra note 2, at 162, 172 (discussing organizational factors that make industry
groups more powerful in general in the administrative process, both inside OIRA and inside
agencies); Haeder & Yackee, supra note 361, at 518 (finding that unopposed lobbying by
industry groups in OIRA is likely to end in rule change, but that the same is not true for
public interest groups); Shapiro & Steinzor, supra note 104, at 1751-56 (summarizing
literature showing that "business interests have a significant resource advantage when it
comes to lobbying agencies and filing rulemaking comments"). Note that any skew in
decision making need not be intentional; even good-government civil servants can be
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b. Protecting the Deliberative Process
OMB's second rationale for requiring secrecy in the intra-executive budget
context- protecting the integrity of the government's decision-making
process -similarly does not justify the full extent of secrecy employed though
it, too, is rooted in valid and important concerns.
Preliminarily, the mere existence of a FOIA exemption for documents that
reveal the government's deliberative process - Exemption 5363 - is no reason to
require withholding of those documents. As Attorney General Holder
explained in a memorandum sent to agency heads early in the Obama
Administration, "an agency should not withhold information simply because it
may do so legally."3 6 4 OMB has thus disclosed material protected by
Exemption 5 because "disclosure would not create a harm protected by that
exemption., 6 s Similarly, the executive order that governs regulatory review
requires agencies to disclose both their original regulatory proposals and the
substantive changes OIRA requested and to explain to the public "in a
complete, clear, and simple manner" the differences between the two, 6 6 even
affected by "epistemic capture" or take actions rooted in unintentional bias. See, e.g.,
Sunstein, supra note 19, at 186o-63 (considering, although ultimately downplaying, the
possibility that OIRA's meetings with a skewed set of outsiders result in "epistemic
capture," in which "a view might develop, at OIRA or within the EOP, because of the
distinctive set of people who have provided relevant information"); see also infra notes 428-
429 and accompanying text (discussing unintentional bias in decision making).
363. Exemption 5 protects "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." s
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012).
364. Memorandum from Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Heads of Exec.
Dep'ts & Agencies, The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 1 (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www
.Justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2oo9/o6/24/foia-memo-march2oo9.pdf [http://
perma.cc/GUP4-D9KJ].
365. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CHIEF FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) OFFICER's REPORT 1 (Mar. 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/sites/default/files/omb/assets/foia/Chief%2oFOIA%2oReport%202014.pdf [http://perma
.cc/L4R2-V84U]. But see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
ANNUAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA) REPORT FOR FY 2014, at io (2014), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/foia/annual-reports/foia annualreportfy20
14.pdf [http://perma.cc/W8QG-6CLA] (showing that OMB applied Exemption 5 thirty-one
times in refusals to disclose during the 2013-14 fiscal year); Shkabatur, supra note 343, at 9o
(critiquing the Obama Administration for failing to live up to the openness policy in
practice).
366. Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 92, § 6(a)(3); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563 § i(b), 3
C.F.R. 215 (2012) (reaffirming principles of Exec. Order No. 12,866).
Whether agencies are actually permitted to comply with this requirement and whether
the requirement is relevant at all are separate matters. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 2, at
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though OMB during the Reagan Administration had successfully used
Exemption 5 to block disclosure of much more information about the agency-
OIRA regulatory process.
The real question, therefore, is whether it would help or hinder
deliberation to disclose predecisional budget documents that reveal the
development of OMB's and agencies' thinking,68 in keeping with the purpose
of Exemption 5. 69 The deliberative costs associated with too much
transparency often include entrenching positions rather than letting parties
develop more nuanced ideas through conversation; 7 o silencing good ideas for
fear of being publicly rejected or pilloried; 7' and driving deliberation
underground, further out of sight, through mechanisms developed to avoid
whatever transparency regime is imposed on unwilling participants. 72 These
interests may be heightened in politically polarized times, when interest groups
monitor their own party for orthodoxy and the other party for everything, and
when Congress and the executive are at war with each other.
These are serious concerns that we should not dismiss lightly. However,
there are costs to the current system of opacity with respect to accountability.
As Lisa Heinzerling has noted in the context of OIRA's lack of transparency,
opacity in government limits "people from understanding the way their
government operates, how they can intervene and at what points, what the
government is up to, who is making important decisions, [and] why the
government has made those decisions."'
361 ("OIRA follows, and allows the agencies to follow, almost none of the disclosure
requirements of EO 12,866."); infra notes 443-465 and accompanying text (discussing the
relevance of the transparency requirement).
367. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 775-76 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(preserving the Department of Health and Human Services's ability to withhold
predecisional recommendations under Exemption 5).
368. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1166-68 (discussing potential trade-offs between
transparency and effective decision making); Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three
Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1339, 1352 ("Transparency may well prevent bad officials
from engaging in corrupt or otherwise bad acts, but ... transparency can also make it more
difficult for good officials to engage in good acts.").
369. See, e.g., Wolfe, 839 F.2d at 773 ("Congress adopted Exemption 5 because it recognized that
the quality of administrative decision-making would be seriously undermined if agencies
were forced to operate in a fishbowl." (citations omitted)).
370. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 333, at 11-12, 181-82; Mark Fenster, The Opacity of
Transparency, 91 IOWAL. REV. 885, 908 (20o6).
371. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 333, at 11-12, 181-82.
372. See, e.g., id. at 212; Fenster, supra note 370, at 922-24; Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1168.
373. Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 364-65 (describing reasons why "opacity in government in
general is a problem").
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Moreover, the problems associated with too much transparency may
already be present under the current non-transparent system. We just do not
know about it. For example, agency officials and the RMOs may already find
themselves in entrenched positions simply by virtue of the structure of their
relationship.' Agency officials may already silence good, creative ideas if they
constrict their proposals based on what they think their program examiner
wants to see.37s And the pyramid structure of OMB's operation may drive
deliberation underground. That is, program examiners may reach agreements
with agency officials on certain matters on the condition that agency officials
take certain actions; subsequently, those agreed-upon actions may not become
an issue as the agency's budget request moves up the chain of command within
OMB.
These costs suggest that some recalibration of the current regime is
worthwhile. In another context, the D.C. Circuit has rejected the contention
that "the congressional goal of centralized budget formulation cannot be
achieved without secrecy," reasoning that the requirement that "the President
submit a single, unified executive branch budget proposal to Congress for
consideration" does not "require that the President's proposals be the only
budgetary information available to the public. ", 6 While formally discussing
the public-meeting requirement for multi-member agencies, the D.C. Circuit
used language about good public policy that could apply more generally:
"disclosure of budget deliberations would ... inform the public 'what facts and
policy considerations the agency found important in reaching its decision, and
what alternatives it considered and rejected,' and thereby. . . permit 'wider and
more informed public debate of the agency's policies. '"I
Indeed, in this same litigation, OMB attempted to justify secret
deliberations about the budget without distinguishing between multi-member
374. See, e.g., SCHICK, supra note 7, at 99 (calling program examiners and agency officials
"budgetary adversaries": "Agencies want more than OMB gives them, and their priorities
and program assessments often differ from OMB's"). See generally ROGER FISHER &
WILIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WrrHouT GIVING IN 3 (Bruce
Patton ed., 3d ed. 2011) (explaining that the default position in most negotiations is
positional bargaining, in which positions become easily entrenched).
37s. See, e.g., HuDAK, supra note 7, at 171 (describing the preemptive incorporation of OMB's
views during the budget execution process); cf Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 352 (describing
how the anticipation of OIRA review can suppress agencies' ideas).
376. Common Cause v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 674 F.2d 921, 931-32 (D.C. Cir. 1982). This
case considered and rejected the possibility that the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5
U.S.C. S 552b (1976), which requires that meetings of multi-member agencies be open to
the public, contained a statutory exception for agency budget deliberations. 674 F.2d at 932-
35.
377. Common Cause, 674 F.2d at 934 (quoting S. REP. No. 94-354, at 5-6 (1975)).
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and executive agencies. Its arguments relied on the general "importance of the
budget process" and the fact that internal "budget discussions lead to
presidential recommendations reflecting the President's 'best judgment of how
the nation's fiscal resources should be allocated to meet its future economic and
social needs"' with respect to "'vital policies and billions of dollars . . . at issue
every year.'""8 The D.C. Circuit roundly rejected this argument and demanded
disclosure: "The public can reasonably be expected to have an interest in
matters of such importance. "79
The question then is how to design a more nuanced approach to
transparency that would accommodate the public interest while still taking
seriously the need to protect the deliberative process.
c. Disclosing Procedural Aspects of the Budget Process and Post-
Deliberative Decisions
At the very least, it should be clear that OMB's reliance on the interests
implicated by the deliberative process applies only to the content of
documents.3"o It does not apply to the confidentiality that exists around the
RMOs' interactions with agencies and with outside interest groups or to other
procedural aspects of the intra-executive budget process that remain hidden.
OMB's interest in protecting policy consistency by forbidding the disclosure of
predecisional budget material also does not extend to these procedural aspects.
More disclosure of this procedural information could be a valuable source of
accountability because it would permit better monitoring of who is
participating in the process and when.
In addition, OMB's confidentiality rationales do not extend to the various
post-deliberative decisions that are nonetheless not routinely disclosed, such as
its budget execution decisions. For example, while apportionment requests and
decisions are formal documents made on a standardized government form and
transmitted via a standardized web-based portal,38 ' there is no public collection
378. Id. at 937 (quoting Joint Appendix at 118, Common Cause, 674 F.2d 921 (Nos. 81-1975 & 81-
2147) (Affidavit of Carey P. Modlin, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the
President)).
379. Id. at 937-38.
38o. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)( 5) (2012) (exempting "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters," not facts or processes, from disclosure).
381. See OMB CIRCULAR No. A-1u, supra note 116, § 185-37, at 64-66 (including sample SF 132
Apportionment and Reapportionment Schedules); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
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of apportionment decisions, much less apportionment footnotes, which makes
it difficult for the public to track OMB's directions to agencies. Similarly, there
is no centralized compendium of OMB's approved requests to Congress to
transfer or reprogram sums, making it difficult for the public to track how
agencies' spending diverges from Congress's original appropriations decisions
or the extent of Congress's approval and disapproval of these requests. "' Here,
too, more disclosure would improve accountability.
2. The Role of Civil Servants and Political Officials
A second concern about OMB's control of agency policymaking through
the budget process involves the players engaged in effectuating that control.
Contrary to the usual understanding of power in the administrative state,
where higher-level political officials have authority over both lower-level
political officials and the civil service, 8 , civil servants and lower-level political
appointees in OMB can supersede the policy goals of Senate-confirmed agency
officials. This reversal of expectations impedes accountability and is
exacerbated by the lack of transparency discussed above.sas
One conventional concern about White House control over agency
policymaking is that high-level political advisors close to the President may
direct agency officials, whether political appointees or civil servants, to take
actions that are illegitimate. For example, these advisors may direct officials to
382. As Allen Schick explains, it can be difficult for the public to track reprogrammings "because
they do not change the volume of resources in the affected account." SCHICK, supra note 7, at
281. In principle, transfers provide an opportunity to monitor "in the program and financing
schedules published in the president's budget," but understanding such transfers requires
some parsing through which accounts have lost resources and which have gained. Id.
(citation omitted); see OMB CIRCULAR No. A-n, supra note u16, 5§ 82.6, 82.14-15, at 5-9, 18-
19 (telling agencies how to present transfers for publication in the budget).
383. Cf Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal
Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REv. 737, 767-72 (2014) (critiquing federal
regulations that incorporate private standards by reference without making the standards
"readily, publicly accessible" to the public as hindering accountability).
384. See, e.g., FRANCIS E. ROURKE, BURFAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 127 ( 3d ed. 1984)(discussing "the interaction between political executives at the top of the administrative
pyramid and career officials subordinate to them").
385. This concern, like the previous one, echoes some concerns voiced about OIRA's staff. See,
e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 3, at 73-74, 98-99; Heinzerling, supra note 2, at
362-63, 367-68; see also Morrison, supra note 2, at 1o64, 1066-67 (discussing similar
concerns with OMB staff generally). These concerns in the RMO context are heightened
because of the RMOs' even broader portfolio, see supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text,
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take actions going beyond the agency's legal authority, or beyond the facts, in
the service of a pre-ordained position driven by private political interests.
More generally, these advisors may direct officials to act on the basis of "pure
partisanship or raw politics" instead of some notion of the public interest. 8 ,
Another view is that the White House achieves some of these same goals by
nominating ideologically partisan political appointees to head the agencies-
appointees who will loyally align their policies with the President's goals
without being swayed by "civil-service-led resistance to their preferred
policies." ,,
Relatedly, the value of civil servants in agencies is thought to be their
ability to "resist and redirect agency leaders intent on shortchanging
procedures, ignoring or downplaying congressional directives or scientific
findings, or championing unvarnished partisan causes."'8' "[U]nlike the
political leadership beholden to a particular presidential agenda," this view
holds, "the civil servants are ... generally understood to be animated by
professional norms and legal commitments to fair administration and
enforcement of the laws."39 0
The structure and work of the RMOs complicate this view. On the one
hand, it is civil servants, not political appointees, who take a front-line position
in directing agency action. 91 To be sure, these civil servants are also bound by
professional norms,3, with loyalty to the institution of the presidency rather
386. Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1141-46 (calling these methods of presidential control
illegitimate while leaving room for "appropriate," "value-laden" methods of control).
387. Watts, supra note 323, at 56 (calling these methods illegitimate while leaving room for
political influence where "policy considerations or value judgments" are implemented).
388. David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age ofAgency
Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1127, 1121-33 (2oo8) (describing the politicization
of agency officials through an increase in the number of political appointees overall and
through more presidential control over the nomination process); see also Moe, supra note 21,
at 244-45 (discussing the increased centralization and politicization of the institutional
presidency).
389. Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 515, 544
(2015).
390. Id. at 546.
391. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 72, at 61 ("The best OMB staffers learn how to . . . restrain
agency independence and resistance and to encourage agency responsiveness to the White
House agenda."); Walsh & Culliton, supra note 119, at 288 ("Department and agency heads
resent the fact that they frequently are relegated to dealing with young budget examiners
who rank relatively low in the federal hierarchy, rather than with OMB directors. They
resent the fact that these often inexperienced examiners make the decisions that count.").
392. See Adams, supra note 72, at 61 (describing "the professional ethos of the OMB culture").
2263
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
than to any political party.393 And most of the time, RMO staff work with
agency staff, rather than directly with Senate-confirmed agency officials. But
RMO staff hardly serve a checking function over political or politicized
activity; to the contrary, their very job is to ensure that agency policy is
consistent with presidential priorities."' Their portfolio is vast and full of
discretion, and they play an unusual role for civil servants in high-level policy
decisions,3 95 especially with respect to their power over activities taking place
elsewhere in the government.39' There is accordingly a danger, more than
theoretical, that their role will be co-opted in the service of partisan action.3 9 7
Moreover, while senior RMO civil servants like branch chiefs and DADs often
have deep policy expertise in the areas they oversee, that is not always the case
for the more junior program examiners who tend to have front-line
interactions with agency staff."9'
393. See id. at 57, 60 (describing OMB's role as "impartial advisor" serving Democratic and
Republican administrations equally loyally); Heclo, supra note 21 (promoting the value of
OMB's "neutral competence").
394. See, e.g., TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 14 ("[E]xaminers must be proficient as translators of
broad presidential priorities into specific programmatic applications in order to be able to
explain presidential policies to the agencies . . . ."); Adams, supra note 72, at 56-58 (finding
that OMB "civil service staff" have the knowledge and skills "that a president needs to shape
and implement policy, ensure that resources support that policy, and control, to the extent
possible, executive branch operations"); Moe, supra note 21, at 239, 266 (describing OMB's
value to presidents as providing "responsive competence" rather than "neutral
competence").
395. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 72, at 62 (describing how RMO civil servants have "unusual
access across a range of policies and processes not available to other agency staff, sometimes
including policy staff," such as, for example, "participat[ing] in senior-level meetings in the
Cabinet Room, the Situation Room, and interagency deliberations covering virtually every
aspect of government operations").
396. It is true that, in general, throughout the administrative state, "[c]ivil servants exercise
discretion over a host of major and minor decisions." Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing:
Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 611
(2003). For the most part, however, these discretionary decisions govern only actions taken
within the civil servant's own agency, rather than some other agency the civil servant
supervises, as is the case with the RMOs. Id. (giving as standard examples of civil servant
discretion the fact that "the individual forest supervisor at the United States Forest Service
may have considerable discretion to grant (or deny) access to particular forest lands, while a
line attorney at the Department of Justice will have responsibility for developing and
framing legal arguments in a brief").
397. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 72, at 57 ("[A]s OMB's functions have expanded to include
shaping program and congressional and public advocacy, these more politicized roles have
conflicted with the agency's neutral and more technical image."); Radin, supra note 252, at 4
("Program officials have sometimes found career OMB staff to be more like members of the
administration than some of the political appointees within their program agency.").
398. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, while there are political appointees at the top of the
RMOs, they are not Senate-confirmed."' The PADs work at the "middle level
of management,"oo between Senate-confirmed officials and civil servants. The
PADs are even less transparent and more powerful than the so-called "czars"
that received so much attention, much of it negative, in the early Obama
Administration.4o' They are less transparent because their appointment is
routine, so their existence and portfolio is not scrutinized. Their work remains
shrouded in secrecy because of the confidentiality lever. They are more
powerful because they have clear responsibilities and duties that operate under
statutory- and OMB-driven deadlines through all of the budget preparation,
budget execution, and management levers discussed above. They do not fall
under either category of political official presented in the conventional
view4o 2- they are neither senior White House political advisors nor Senate-
confirmed agency officials.
One potential answer to this conundrum is that RMO officials are merely
an extension of the President. 40 3 It would thus not matter that middle-
management political appointees and civil servants were playing a major role in
controlling agency policy choices. This answer seems unlikely, however, both
as a descriptive matter and as a legal matter.
As a descriptive matter, the hundreds of program examiners and their civil
servant supervisors do not sit in the White House and have no regular contact
with the President; 4 4 their instructions to agency officials most often come
from channeling the President's expected views, sometimes as conveyed by the
PADs.4os Given the politicization of agency officials documented by others,40 6
3gg. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
4oo. ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 45, at 84; see also id. at 83-87 (describing categories of
political appointees).
401. See, e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, Obama's "Czars" for Domestic Policy and the Law of the White House
Staff, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2577, 2577-79, 2583-95 (2011) (cataloguing critiques and design
features of President Obana's czar system).
4o2. See supra notes 386-388 and accompanying text.
403. Cf Kagan, supra note 2, at 2338 ("[O]ften when I refer to 'the President' in this Article, I am
really speaking of a more nearly institutional actor -the President and his immediate policy
advisors in OMB and the White House.").
404. TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 11.
405. See, e.g., Forshey, supra note 139, at 430 (describing the two-hour Director's Review meeting
where budget decisions are made as the examiner's "one guaranteed moment to work
collaboratively with the Administration's leadership").
406. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 388, at 1121-33 (noting the increasing number of agency political
appointments since World War II and the growing extent of Presidential control over
selection processes).
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there is no particular reason to think that these civil servants better represent
the President's actual views than these agency officials.
The descriptive case for the five PADs as an extension of the President fares
only slightly better. While the PADs are politically appointed and sit near the
White House in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building,4 o7 their access to
the President is sporadic,4os and they do not have the same intimate advisory
connection enjoyed by other executive officials sometimes viewed as speaking
for the President. To be sure, PADs do have more regular conversations with
White House advisors than agency officials do,4o 9 but that does not ensure that
PADs are actually speaking for the President. 40 Given the information flow
from the RMOs up to White House advisors and the President,41' it is possible
that decisions made by White House advisors are actually just what the PADs
(or even the RMO civil servant staff) advised them to decide. And some subset
of decisions made by PADs does not get further elevated.4 12
As a legal matter, the fact that OMB is considered an "agency" under FOIA
means that it is considered "substantially independent" rather than meant
"solely to advise and assist" in a manner akin to "the President's immediate
personal staff.""' Further, while the boundaries of the presidential
communications privilege remain unsettled,' one might see its narrow scope
as related to the question of who speaks for the President. The D.C. Circuit has
held that the privilege "should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with
ensuring that the confidentiality of the President's decision-making process is
adequately protected," and so it should be available only to "those members of
an immediate White House adviser's staff who have broad and significant
407. TOMKIN, supra note 18, at ii.
408. Cf ACUS 2012 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 45, at 31 n.85 (discussing evidence that "even the
highest-level officials in the White House speak to the President substantively barely once a
month").
409. KESSEL, supra note 261, at 182 (describing the White House staff's more limited ability to
monitor agencies than OMB's); Martin, supra note i, at 70 (discussing regular
communication between OMB staff and the policy councils).
41o. See, e.g., KESSEL, supra note 261, at 187-88 ("On many occasions, issues are decided [by
White House staff] without the president's involvement.").
411. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
412. See supra notes 146-149, 259-261 and accompanying text.
413. Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also id. at 1292 (noting that FOIA's
definition of "agency," while generally encompassing the EOP, does not include "the
President's immediate personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is
to advise and assist the President" (citations omitted)).
414. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1170 n.21o (discussing recent disagreements between
the White House and Congress over the scope of the privilege); Saiger, supra note 401, at
2594 n.89 (collecting sources on disputes over the scope of the privilege).
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responsibility for investigating and formulating the advice to be given the
President . . . ."' The few cases to have considered the question have
concluded that OMB as a whole is too far removed from the President's inner
circle for its officials to receive the privilege.*'* Even if the privilege were to
apply to OMB in some instances, it seems unlikely that the RMO staff,
whether civil servants or the PADs, are high level enough to qualify as
"immediate White House adviser[s]" and their staff.417
The implausibility of regarding PADs and program examiners as
extensions of the President has troubling implications for accountability,
especially in light of the transparency problems discussed above. One way to
secure accountability is through "the complex structure of the administrative
hierarchies that constitute our basic mechanism for governing ourselves." ' 8
The structure of the RMOs and the RMOs' interactions with agencies pose
challenges for accountability at each level of the hierarchy.
At the agency level, one "[k]ey element[] of accountability" is "the
requirement[] that administrators appear annually before Congress in order to
justify their budget requests and respond to periodic demands from
congressional oversight committees to explain and justify their decision
making in public testimony." 4 19 But if all agency officials can offer is what
OMB has told or permitted them to say, any reward or punishment the agency
receives will not be fully grounded in reality. To hold agency officials
accountable requires understanding what they wanted to do and what OMB
told them to do.2o
415. In re Sealed Case, 121 F. 3 d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
416. See Wolfe v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 815 F.2d 1527, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
("[E]xtension of the presidential privilege to the OMB is unprecedented and
unwarranted."), rev'd on other grounds, 839 F.2d 768, 773 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that
the government abandoned the argument that the executive privilege protected
communications between the Department of Health and Human Services and OMB); Ctr.
for Biological Diversity v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 625 F. Supp. 2d 885, 891-92 (N.D. Cal.
2oo9) (noting that "[t]he privilege only protects immediate White House advisers and their
staff' and declining to extend it to "intra-OMB discussions").
417. Mendelson has suggested that even the Senate-confirmed OIRA Administrator probably
would not qualify under the privilege, at least for communications with an agency.
Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1170-71 n.210.
418. Rubin, supra note 329, at 2120.
419. SHANE, supra note 2, at 159-60.
42o. Cf Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control ofRegulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U.
L. REV. 443, 451 (1987) ("[S]ecret interactions between the agencies and the White House or
OMB staff in no way increase overall governmental accountability, because the electorate
cannot distinguish those policies attributable to the agencies from those attributable to the
President and his aides.").
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Accountability is also compromised within OMB itself, in large part
because the public and Congress have no way of knowing what the PADs and
RMO staff are doing behind the scenes. Like OIRA review, the RMO process
"offers the tantalizing possibility of influence without fingerprints."" It is no
answer to say that accountability is satisfied because the RMOs report through
the Senate-confirmed OMB Director to the President, given the limited
number of RMO actions that reach the Director, much less the President.
At the top of the hierarchy, the President can use the RMO process to avoid
accountability. As Richard Neustadt observed almost sixty years ago, when
"[t]he voice that speaks is not the President's . . . [but] the Budget Bureau's[,]
... when need be, the Budget serves as whipping-boy."' Instead of claiming
the RMOs' decisions, the President can distance himself from the RMOs,
"blaming 'a nameless OMB bureaucrat five levels down from the top.""
3. The Policy and Political Implications of Technocratic Decisions
These critiques would matter much less if RMOs simply applied neutral
expertise, if the budget were simply a dry document about numbers, and if
program examiners were simply bean counters. But, of course, none of that is
the case. "[B]udgeting is a political decision influenced by the political content
421. Lisa Heinzerling, Classical Administrative Law in an Era ofPresidential Administration, 92 TEx.
L.REv. SEE ALSO 171, 177 (2014) (describing the OIRA process).
422. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidency and Legislation: The Growth of Central Clearance, 48 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 641, 671 (1954).
423. Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1772 (2009) (quoting
MARK BOWEN, CENSORING SCIENCE: INSIDE THE PERSONAL ATTACK ON DR. JAMES HANSEN
AND THE TRUTH OF GLOBAL WARMING 228 (2007)). The quotation comes from Marlin
Fitzwater, then serving as Press Secretary for the first President Bush, after NASA official
Dr. James Hansen disavowed his own congressional testimony and alleged that OMB had
erroneously changed its substance for political reasons. Instead of acknowledging the OMB
policies that required such review, the Press Secretary was able to deflect the criticism onto
the individual program examiner. See id. at 1771-74; see also TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 188
("[The RMOs'] agency oversight activities also sometimes played useful roles for the
Reagan administration as protective cover for unpleasant directives of political origin. As
one observer commented, 'examiners were not acting independently and were not given a
free hand to do what they wanted. It was easier to not have the political levels do these
things so that the career staff could be blamed."' (internal citation omitted)). For a more
recent example of the RMO hierarchy permitting presidential distancing, consider the
official statements made in response to public disclosure of a program examiner's threats to
"make life miserable" for an inspector general who wanted to share with Congress his view
that his agency's budget would not let him do his job. The OMB Director, rather than the
President, issued a statement, and the statement focused only on narrow training of
program examiners about their statutory obligations to inspectors general, rather than on
anything broader about OMB's interactions with other kinds of agencies. See supra note 192.
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of programs themselves and the political predispositions of key actors in the
budgeting process."' Even if every decision is not a political one, neither is it a
technical application of objective principles. It involves complex, value-laden
decisions about how to "confront tradeoffs and project them into an uncertain
future."'s This reality underscores a third problem with the RMOs' work: its
complexity allows a technocratic appearance to obscure underlying substantive
choices, thereby reducing accountability.*
Some substantive choices, such as tradeoffs among competing interests,
might be appropriate for a budget because it is a public statement of national
priorities. At the same time, it is not clear that those who are making the
decisions are the right people to make those decisions, especially given the
broad scope of authority held by the RMOs' civil servants." Alternatively,
even if making these decisions is a valid part of their job, it might not always be
clear, even to them, that the decisions they are making are actually policy
choices.42 Both of these problems reflect what Wendy Wagner in another
context has called "the unintentional science charade" - the false belief that
science alone can answer all of the questions related to scientific policy
decisions, accompanied by the unintentional substitute of technocrats' own
unarticulated value choices at those junctures where science cannot provide an
answer.4 9
424. John B. Gilmour & David E. Lewis, Assessing Performance Budgeting at OMB: The Influence of
Politics, Performance, and Program Size, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 169, 171 (20o6).
425. Eugene Bardach, Report from the Trenches: The Life of the Apprentice Budget Analyst, 24 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 419, 419 (zoos) (explaining that "[any respectable budget shop
employs people whose raison d'etre is to do just this").
426. This concern, too, echoes concerns raised in the OIRA literature. Cf FRANK ACKERMAN &
LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF
NOTHING 128-29 (2004) (arguing generally that cost-benefit analysis, OIRA's lead analytic
tool, provides a technocratic cover that obscures ideology and values-based decision
making); Watts, supra note 323, at 33 (arguing that instead of letting agencies hide behind
"technocratic fagades" in the rulemaking context, "political influences [should be permitted]
to come out into the open, thereby enabling greater political accountability, monitoring, and
transparency").
427. For a classic statement of this problem, see V.0. Key, The Lack of a Budgetary Theory, 34 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1137, 1144 (1940) (arguing that because budgeting is a political question, "the
question occurs whether almost sole reliance on persons trained primarily in accounting and
fiscal procedure is wise. The thousands of little decisions made in budgetary agencies grow
by accretion into formidable budgetary documents which from their sheer mass are apt
often to overwhelm those with the power of final decision").
428. See id. (noting that budget officials make decisions about alternatives all the time, "but not
always consciously").
429. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613,
1631-32 (1995).
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Sometimes, however, substantive choices made in the budget are more
problematic, such as those based on "pure partisanship"430 or political pressure
beyond the public interest, at least when made by the RMOs and couched in
the language of technocracy.3 Such decisions would be examples of what
Wagner calls the "intentional" or even "premeditated science charade" -when
"bureaucrats consciously disguise policy choices as science" or first make a
decision and only then selectively introduce scientific evidence to justify it."
To illustrate how substantive policy choices underlie technocratic-sounding
budgetary decisions, consider, for example, a decision to cut back on NIH
training grants, making them available only in fields with a shortage of
researchers.3 This approach may seem like a neutral way to decide how to
allocate a limited sum of money. But the program examiners asked NIH to
justify its proposal by explaining the different scientific accomplishments it
expected from training people in different fields.4' Making decisions on the
basis of answers to these questions is necessarily a value-laden choice about the
relative merits of different scientific outcomes. It could also lead to a more
partisan decision about what kinds of outcomes would be acceptable.
The same set of circumstances can exist in the budget execution context.
For example, grant competition priorities can appear neutral while in fact
privileging certain sets of applicants, whether those whose work is favored on
substantive policy grounds35 or those who are politically important. And
examples of both value-laden policy decisions and the possibility of partisan
430. Cf Watts, supra note 323, at 54 (arguing that courts should be wary of relying on partisan
politics in the rulemaking process as the justification for a rule).
431. Cf Mendelson, supra note 3, at 1144 (rejecting such influence in the rulemaking context).
432. Wagner, supra note 429, at 1640-50.
433. Walsh & Culliton, supra note 119, at 293-94.
434. Id.
435. See, e.g., BRILL, supra note 248, at 152, 228, 237-38, 259 (describing RMOs' work with the.
Education Department, along with staff members in the Domestic Policy Council, to
prioritize longstanding policy goals of the PAD in designing the Race to the Top priorities);
Michael Grunwald, Billions for an Inside Game on Reading, WASH. PosT (Oct. 1, 2oo6),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpyn/content/article/2oo6/o9/29/AR2oo6o92901333.ht
ml [http://perma.cc/9TK5-J8TQJ (describing the Bush II Administration's privileging of
phonics over whole-language methods of reading in the Reading First grant priorities
process).
436. See, e.g., HASKINS & MARGOLIS, supra note 260, at 161-62 (describing controversy about
whether grants awarded under the Obama Administration's Social Innovation Fund "might
have reflected favoritism more than merit"); Grunwald, supra note 435 (describing the Bush
II Administration's privileging of politically connected program providers in the Reading
First grant awards process); supra notes 349-354 and accompanying text (describing research
showing an alignment between grant allocations and the President's political interests).
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decision making through the RMOs' implementation of management
initiatives abound, as I explained earlier."
To be clear, value-laden decisions are perfectly appropriate in preparing
and executing a budget, as well as in designing and overseeing management
initiatives. Indeed, value judgments are inseparable from those activities. The
problem arises when the language of technocracy obscures value choices,
whether intentionally or unintentionally. Such technocratic cover hides the fact
that people are making choices, conceals who is making them, and opens the
door to partisan decision making. Under any of these scenarios, accountability
suffers.
IV. RESPONDING TO OMB'S CONTROL OF AGENCY POLICYMAKING
THROUGH THE BUDGET PROCESS
Any response to OMB's control of agency policymaking through the
budget process must be nuanced, mitigating the system's problematic lack of
accountability while protecting its valuable coordinating work. Section IV.A
offers two variations on this effort from inside the executive branch, mapping
out ways that the President and OMB itself could reform OMB's work. Section
IV.B sets forth potential responses from outside the executive branch,
suggesting ways for Congress and civil society organizations to better
engage with the RMOs' work. Finally, Section IV.C broadens the lens to
OIRA reform, explaining that the RMOs' authority should be considered in
any discussion of reforming OIRA, since the work of those offices is
complementary and could involve spillover.
A. Inside the Executive Branch
To increase accountability of the RMOs, the President could issue an
executive order that both sets forth how he or she intends to use the RMOs to
work with agencies on setting and implementing policy and establishes various
transparency requirements. At a smaller scale, 0MB could also usefully take
steps to increase its own transparency and engagement with the public.
1. The President
An executive order governing the RMOs' work and making it more
transparent would enhance accountability in two ways. First, the mere fact of
437. See supra Section I.C.i (describing how the President's Management Agenda can drive both
policy decisions and partisan decision making).
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its existence would provide an opportunity for Presidents to claim the RMOs'
work as their own. Second, the executive order's substantive transparency
requirements would provide opportunities for the public to better monitor the
RMOs' work.
As to presidential claiming, an explanatory executive order would enhance
accountability by requiring the President to take ownership of the RMOs'
actions. New Presidents could put their own stamp on the process, furthering
accountability. The executive order would parallel Presidents' other executive
orders detailing how they intend to use OIRA for regulatory review, 4 a
process that itself developed out of originally uncodified practices on the
budget side of OMB."
For all of the criticisms of its substance and implementation,4o the
executive order governing OIRA's regulatory review at least provides a
sequence and scope of activities that the public can expect. The absence of such
a document on the RMO side means that a set of offices more than four times
as large as OIRA, with oversight over more of the federal executive
establishment, operates with more opacity. Such a document would also set
clear guidelines for the RMOs and for agencies beyond what Circular A-n
already requires, to the extent that it would set forth a high-level vision of
budgetary policymaking and of the relationship between the RMOs and
agencies. In a similar way, while various OMB circulars govern the details of
OIRA's work,"' the executive orders nonetheless provide an overall
presidential vision of that office's scope.
The substantive details of the executive order would also seek to increase
the RMOs' transparency." Several options for how to do so exist. The rest of
this Section considers three possibilities, in order of their likely level of
controversy: (a) transparency of procedural aspects of the budget process; (b)
438. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,563, supra note 366 (setting forth President Obama's agenda for
OIRA and "reaffirm[ing] the principles, structures, and definitions governing contemporary
regulatory review that were established in Executive Order 12866"); Exec. Order No.
12,866, supra note 92 (setting forth President Clinton's agenda for OIRA); Exec. Order No.
12,291, supra note 80 (setting forth President Reagan's regulatory review in the new OIRA).
439. See Tozzi, supra note 8o, at 45, 48.
44o. See Heinzerling, supra note 2; Steinzor, supra note 2.
441. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR No. A-4,
REGULATORY ANALYSIS (2003); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR No. A-94 REVISED, GUIDELINES AND DIscouNT RATES FOR BENEFIT-
COST ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS (1992).
442. Cf Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 329-35, 358-61 (discussing OIRA's increased focus on
transparency, at least in writing, from 1986 onwards, including some practices introduced
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transparency of final budget execution decisions; and (c) transparency of
predecisional budget preparation information.
a. Transparency ofProcedural Aspects of the Budget Process
The least controversial option would require transparency as to procedural
aspects of the RMOs' work alone. The executive order could, for example,
explain what the interactions between the RMOs and the agencies should
involve over the course of the year, with a rough timeline of when the different
steps will take place." It could clarify which kinds of policy decisions the
RMOs will get involved with and which kinds they will not." It could clarify
appropriate rationales for decisions." And it could require both logging and
disclosure of meetings the RMOs have with entities outside the executive
branch and preparation of summaries of their agendas." 6
Requiring disclosure of the RMOs' processes would do some work to
increase accountability." 7 Much of what we know about OIRA comes from the
443. Cf Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 92, SS 4, 6 (outlining schedule requirements in
OIRA's process).
444. Cf id. § 3(f) (defining types of regulatory actions on which OIRA will focus).
445, Cf id. 5 6 (setting forth standards for OIRA's regulatory review).
446. Cf id. § 6(b)( 4 ) (setting forth disclosure requirements).
447. Some information about RMO meetings with outside entities might be available through
other means, including through White House Visitor Logs or FOIA requests (since the
deliberative process privilege would not apply to these meetings, see supra note 380 and
accompanying text). However, routine disclosure would be a superior option. White House
Visitor Logs do not make plain with whom or on what subject visitors are meeting, and in
any event, they would not capture meetings that take place offsite. See, e.g., Philip Bump,
Want To Know Who Has Visited the White House? Here's How, WASH. POST (Mar.
27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fLx/wp/2015/o3/27/want-to-know
-who-has-visited-the-white-house-heres-how [http://perma.cc/NU7G-EGPP] (noting that
visitor logs "can be hard to navigate; [the information is] presented on the site as a long
list of visitors with inscrutable codes identifying where they were headed and the people
with whom they met," and offering a newspaper-modified version that is easier to
understand). Further, the Logs are not always complete or accurate. See, e.g., Fred Schulte &
Viveca Novak, White House Visitor Logs Riddled with Holes, CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY (Apr.
13, 2011), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2otl/o4/3/4115/white-house-visitor-logs-riddled
-holes [http://permacc/J7DH-B77T]. For its part, FOIA is requester-driven, and the results
of FOIA requests are not always made available to the general public, making disclosure of
RMO meetings through this path much more limited. See, e.g., Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA,
Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361 (2016) (detailing prominence of commercial users, as opposed to
public interest organizations or journalists, in FOIA requests, and noting that commercial
interests sell some of the information they received from FOIA requests back to the public);
David C. Vladeck, Information Access-Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-
To-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1787, 1789 (20o8) (cataloguing flaws of FOIA). Unlike an
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disclosure requirements about its procedures." 8 Disclosing who meets with
OIRA and when provides important facts about who influences the office and
the scope of its power." Even where OIRA's process disclosure is incomplete
or misleading, the expectation of disclosure gives the public a metric against
which to measure compliance, permitting the public to track discrepancies
between OIRA's promises and its reality.4so An executive order requiring
similar process-based disclosure for the RMOs would therefore add value.
b. Transparency ofFinal Budget Execution Decisions
A second option would require increased transparency about budget
execution decisions under formal mechanisms such as apportionment and
requests to Congress about transfers or reprogramming. These are final
decisions, so nothing predecisional would be released. Apportionment
decisions are legal requirements and are subject to the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Requests to transfer or reprogram have legal effect on agency action once
Congress approves them. These requirements thus govern agency spending
just as appropriations acts do, and their regular disclosure would serve similar
values as publication of appropriations acts themselves. Disclosure would be
especially valuable if the information is presented to the public in a way that
permits targeted review by affected interests: in searchable formats, organized
by agency and by subject-matter.4 s1
This option might be more controversial than mere disclosure of the
RMOs' general process, in large part because it would reveal some substantive
decisions made by the RMOs, potentially unsettling any claim that the RMOs
executive order, disclosure via these alternate paths would only demonstrate that RMO
meetings occurred and would not provide information about the other procedural aspects of
the RMOs' work. See supra notes 443-446 and accompanying text.
448. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1860-61 (noting that "one reason for the attention" to
the question of whether OIRA is captured by regulated industry "is that OIRA has a high
degree of transparency" in the first place).
449. See, e.g., Haeder & Yackee, supra note 361 (uncovering the effect of lobbying organizations
from OIRA's meeting logs and disclosure of rule changes based on OIRA's input).
450. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 363-64 (noting that information disclosed on OIRA's
Regulatory Dashboard is "spiffy and informative, but woefully incomplete" because of
discrepancies in what appears on the dashboard and when); White House Safeguard Tracker,
PUB. CrIZEN, http://safeguardsdelayed.org [http://perma.cc/XEA6-9UCK] (tracking
delays in rules beyond the deadlines promised in the executive order, with data drawn from
OIRA's Regulatory Dashboard).
451. Cf Harris, supra note 316, at 1040-45 (discussing the value to the public of all data on agency
performance plans and evaluations, especially where stakeholders across interest groups can
search for data and information relevant to those groups).
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do not make policy."5 On the other hand, the majority of these decisions are
likely to be fairly straightforward, so disclosure might on balance support the
RMOs' contention that the bulk of their work is not policy-oriented. Either
way, this information would be useful information to the public. Moreover, in
the context of a presidential executive order asserting ownership of the RMOs'
work, this disclosure would frame budget execution decisions as the
President's decisions rather than the RMOs' decisions, just as the budget itself
is. In so doing, disclosure might support presidential claiming, one of the goals
of the executive order in general.
c. Transparency ofPredecisional Budget Preparation Information
A third, even more controversial, option would increase transparency about
the substance of interactions between the RMOs and agencies as to
predecisional budget and policy deliberations.
A mandatory version of this transparency option would require disclosure
of RMO-agency communications about budget and policy. For example, after
the President's budget is submitted to Congress and appropriations decisions
are made, RMOs and agencies would have to make available, perhaps by
posting online, the agencies' original requests, any related documents from the
RMOs, and a summary of what changes OMB made during the approval
process. This mandatory disclosure would parallel what the OIRA executive
order currently requires as to regulations, 4s even though two of OIRA's early
administrators originally dismissed calls to make that information routinely
public because of the possible harm to the deliberative process.454
A permissive version of this transparency option would simply allow
disclosure of this substantive information. Agency heads would be permitted to
disclose the original requests, related documents, and summary of changes to
discuss the evolution of their thinking, their understanding of the implications
of various funding levels and policy alternatives, and the policy directions they
received during the execution process. The executive order could provide some
guidance setting forth circumstances when disclosure would be permitted,
such as the standard Congress has given to Inspectors General. Under that
standard, Inspectors General must provide independent comments to Congress
when they perceive that the President's Budget request "would substantially
452. See supra notes 424-437 and accompanying text (suggesting that some RMO staff members
view their work as neutral and technocratic rather than policy-laden).
453. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, supra note 92, §5 6(a)(3)(E), (b)( 4 )(D).
454. DeMuth & Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1075 n.1-2, 1085-86; see also supra note 367 and
accompanying text.
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inhibit the Inspector General from performing the duties of the office."45s Or
the executive order could give the agency head discretion in deciding when to
disclose, providing broader opportunities to discuss policy differences.
Requiring the disclosure of the substance of RMO-agency interactions is
likely to be more controversial, and ironically might not even accomplish its
goal of improving transparency and accountability. For one thing, the
equivalent mandatory disclosure in the OIRA process has little compliance.456
Moreover, full compliance might result in a data dump that would not be
useful for the public.4 s" Mandatory disclosure might also push conversations
between the agencies and the RMOs underground, resulting in fewer
documents available for disclosure.458 Or it might lead agencies to use their
initial budget requests to posture for their clientele rather than to make hard
decisions themselves. This behavior might in turn give more power to the
RMOs to construct workable realistic budgets. It might also lead Congress to
exploit differences between agency goals and administration preferences for
political gain, rather than for meaningful accountability.
Permissive disclosure might get around some of these concerns, especially
because agency officials and the RMOs would not know ex ante what internal
conclusions will be reached. Thus, there might be less opportunity to game the
system and less danger of a data dump. At the same time, permissive disclosure
could pose its own problems. Agency heads loyal to the President may not wish
to disclose any policy differences at all,4 s9 limiting the value of this intervention
in terms of accountability.46 o Alternately, agency heads may wish instead to use
455. 5 U.S.C. § 6(f)( 3 )(E) (2012); see supra note 189 and accompanying text.
456. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 361-63 (describing the failure of both OIRA and
agencies, sometimes at the direction of OIRA, to disclose what the executive order would
seem to require).
457. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 447, at 1832 ("No one would benefit if an undifferentiated mass
of information were posted on the Web; the cost of sifting through it would overwhelm its
value.").
458. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 370, at 921 ("[O]penness is the keystone of democratic politics,
but proposals to achieve it are likely to prove insufficient when they take no account of the
pressures causing secretiveness in the first place." (quoting DAVID BEETHAM, BUREAUCRACY
101 (2d ed. 1996))); Shkabatur, supra note 343, at 122 (discussing the way transparency
requirements under sunshine acts have simply led agencies to "adopt[] alternative methods
of confidential communication" and advocating for process transparency instead).
459. See Barron, supra note 388, at lo96 (noting that Presidents have increasingly politicized
agencies so that "agencies increasingly want to align their own judgments with the White
House view-even if top agency officials are not ordered to do so by the political aides
working at 16oo Pennsylvania Avenue").
460. See Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 365 (suggesting that promising transparency and then not
delivering can sometimes be worse than not promising it in the first place, because people
2276
125:2182 2016
THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET AS A SOURCE OF AGENCY POLICY CONTROL
the potential for disclosure as a threat to gain leverage in the budget process,
leading to worse decision making inside OMB and the White House in hopes
of avoiding a public intra-executive dispute.
Because these potential issues point in opposite directions, a permissive
disclosure regime might not be clearly problematic. Indeed, the same pressures
that might dissuade agency heads from disclosing policy differences might also
keep them from threatening disclosure as leverage; the removal power (for
executive branch officials)4* and the power of relationships (for all appointees,
whether in independent or executive agencies)4 62 might further limit the
leverage problem. Moreover, the structural forces that might dissuade
disclosure could make the disclosure that happens that much more useful to
the public-less boy-who-cries-wolf and more watchdog. Even loyal agency
officials sometimes find themselves wanting to share information that they
believe would be useful to Congress and the public.,6 3 A permissive regime
could allow them to do so in a way that would appropriately calibrate the
interests of transparency with the interests of the deliberative process.
At this preliminary stage of sketching what an executive order governing
the RMOs' work might look like, an acknowledgment that different
administrations would likely take different positions on these various
transparency options is more useful than a delineation of the ideal transparency
regime. The choice among various options would itself give the public valuable
information about the administration's priorities.
can be "lull[ed] ... into thinking they have all the information they might need or want
about this process").
461. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
462. See Strauss, supra note 93, at 590-91 (noting the potential for close relationships between the
President and administrators of independent agencies).
463. In the budget context, consider, for example, efforts undertaken by the second President
Bush's head of the Army Corps of Engineers to disclose to Congress his belief in the dangers
of his budget shortfall, which resulted in his firing, several years before the disasters some
believe were attributable to the Army Corps of Engineers during Hurricane Katrina. See
Caruso, supra note 184 (describing testimony and subsequent firing); see also Jason Vest &
Justin Rood, Ex-Army Corps Officials Say Budget Cuts Imperiled Flood Mitigation Efforts,
Gov'T ExEcuTIvE (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.govexec.com/defense/2005/09/ex-army
-corps-officials-say-budget-cuts-imperiled-flood-mitigation-efforts/zo033 [http://perma.cc
/6FGW-M 5HX]. Or, for an example of agency disclosure of disagreements within the
administration outside the budget context, consider President Obama's Food and Drug
Administration Commissioner disclosing her belief that she had been directed to take action
that ran counter to reasonable scientific judgment. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The FDA's
Plan B Fiasco: Lessons for Administrative Law, 1o2 GEo. L.J. 927, 947-48 (2014) (describing
this disclosure).
464. To be sure, an administration could decide not to change the executive order much but
nevertheless modify how it operates in practice, which would provide useful information to
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Overall, the lesson from the expansion of OIRA's transparency obligations
alongside its transparency problems is not that promoting transparency in the
RMOs' work is doomed to failure but rather that transparency is a goal worth
pursuing, with the devil in the details.46 s An executive order would provide a
good opportunity to work these details out in a manner that would promote
accountability.
2. OMB
Another set of reform possibilities lies within OMB's own control. OMB
itself can improve its transparency and increase its accountability, even in the
absence of presidential claiming. 66
First, OMB could provide more and better information online. Despite
valid charges that OIRA's dashboard is incomplete, the dashboard is
nonetheless valuable for capturing at least some important information about
what OIRA is reviewing from which agencies and how long draft regulations
have been under review.*** This information both informs the public and
allows for better public critique and engagement.46 9 In a similar capacity, OMB
could present in visually helpful ways where the budget process is-for
example, the steps being taken to execute last year's budget, prepare this year's
budget, and plan for next year's budget in addition to the status of
congressional action. Instead, the website is largely a compendium of
the public about that administration's priorities only to the extent the modifications become
known. Cf Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 334-36 (describing President George W. Bush's two
executive orders governing the OIRA process as making "relatively minor" changes and
detailing how the "intellectually forceful and politically shrewd OIRA administrator" made
other, informal modifications to the regulatory review process that nevertheless had a
significant effect).
465. See id. at 369 ("If OIRA followed EO 12,866's requirements for transparency, a good
number of the issues surrounding OIRA's opacity would disappear.").
466. OMB could also take steps to improve its coordination between the management offices and
the RMOs, see supra notes 314-316 and accompanying text, as well as to try to improve the
programmatic and subject-matter policy knowledge that more junior RMO staff members
have, see supra notes 325-326, 398 and accompanying text. In this Section, however, I focus
on OMB's external relationship with the public as a key factor in the accountability of the
office.
467. See Heinzerling, supra note 2, at 363-64.
468. See Regulatory Review Dashboard, OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov
/public/jsp/EO/eoDashboard.jsp [http://perma.cc/9UZ4-8X 4 7].
46g. See White House Safeguard Tracker, supra note 450 (critiquing OIRA's delays by using
information from OIRA's dashboard).
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documents, 47o making OMB's work appear static and leaving out the
important interactions OMB has with agencies throughout the year. OMB
would not have to disclose everything about the substance of the RMOs' work
with agencies to make such a dashboard valuable; information about process
and scope alone would be a big improvement.47
Second, OMB could solicit input from the public on its major policy
choices, targeting underrepresented voices." The challenges of both engaging
the public and gleaning information that is likely to be useful for government
decision making are well documented." But OMB could do more than it
currently does, particularly with respect to policies that are government-wide
and not likely to be the subject of large-scale notice-and-comment rulemaking
anywhere.
47o. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Management, WHITE
HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/management [http://perma.cc/HB4N-7HNB]
(describing the management offices and linking to their documents); Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Exec. Office of the President, The President's Budget for Fiscal Year 2o16,
WarrE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget [http://perma.cc/JP69-NAYM]
(describing the current budget and providing links to supporting and historical documents).
471. New for the 2016 Budget, the White House released what it called an "interactive budget,"
which presents the amounts in the overall budget as a series of rectangles of different sizes
and colors, to show proportional amounts for different categories of spending, and permits
a user to click on any rectangle to see a brief text-based summary of new initiatives proposed
in that category. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Interactive
Budget, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/interactive-budget [http://perma.cc
/8MY9-YF4H]; see also Lindsay Holst & Tanya Somanader, 5 New Things About the Fiscal
Year 2016 Budget, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 2, 2015 1:47 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov
/blog/2ox5/02/o2/five-new-things-about-the-fy2o16-budget [http://perma.cc/FV7B-X5F5]
(describing this budget as the "nation's first open-sourced budget," with underlying data
released so that "anyone who wants to create their own visualizations or products from the
data is free to do so"; explaining that "[f] or the first time ever, we've also made the full text
of the budget available on a blogging platform," so that "anyone can weigh in and give their
feedback by adding a comment to a given section"; and noting that visualization of the
budget as a series of color-coded rectangles will permit anyone to "take a look at where
taxpayer dollars are going, why, and who those initiatives will impact"). This "interactive
budget" is an improvement, but still does not come close to the process-based information
reflected on the OIRA dashboard. Instead, it is more akin to what OIRA's dashboard would
look like if the dashboard merely provided a year-end visual summary of each agency's
number of rulemaking documents published in the Federal Register.
472. See Cynthia R. Farina et al., Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public
Participation that Counts, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 123, 145-47 (2012) (describing
the value of hearing these voices); Michael Hertz, Using Social Media in
Rulemaking: Possibilities and Barriers, ADMIN. CONF. U.S. 22-23 (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Herz%2oSocial%2oMedia%2oFinal%20
Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/W34M-NBE6] (same).
473. See Farina et al., supra note 472; Nina A. Mendelson, Foreword, Rulemaking, Democracy, and
Torrents ofE-Mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1343 (2011); Hertz, supra note 472.
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For example, in the new Evidence and Evaluation Agenda, which is having
a substantial effect on domestic social policy,474 MB has not publicly engaged
with critiques of evidence-based policymaking that characterize the approach
as unreasonable and misleading. 4 s It is possible that OMB is aware of the
critiques and has simply discounted them,,'6 but the public has no way of
knowing that OMB has done so and no mechanism to engage with or suggest
improvements to the policy. Public comment on individual agencies' proposed
regulations that incorporate OMB's evidence-based policymaking
requirements is no substitute, as there is little chance that OMB will shift the
direction of the government-wide initiative based on an objection raised in a
particular rulemaking. Soliciting early feedback on large-scale government-
wide policy choices could both improve the quality of OMB's decision making
and enhance OMB's accountability.
474. See supra notes 275-280 and accompanying text. This initiative is now firmly embedded as a
presidential management priority, but when it began, it was OMB that took the lead in
publicly driving it forward. See HASKINS & MARGOLIS, supra note 260, at 9-10 (identifying
Peter Orzag as "the first head of Obama's OMB and one of the primary early movers in the
administration's evidence-based strategy"); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES FY 2015, supra note 294, at 51 ("The President has made it clear that policy
decisions should be based upon evidence."); id. at 65 (noting that the administration's
"widespread commitment to an evidence culture" is reflected in and builds upon OMB's
May 2012 budget directions and a 2013 memo co-signed by OMB along with the Domestic
Policy Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Council of Economic
Advisers); Peter Orzag, Building Rigorous Evidence To Drive Policy, OMBLoG (June 8, 2009
8:39 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/o9/o6/o8/BuildingRigorousEvidenceto
DrivePolicy [http://perma.cc/39UZ-7D541.
475. See, e.g., Trisha Greenhalgh & Jill Russell, Evidence-Based Policymaking: A Critique, 52 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. 304, 308 (2009) (arguing that "the ethical and moral questions inherent
to the policymaking process cannot be reduced to issues of evidence; that deficiencies in
research evidence are not generally resolvable by undertaking more or bigger studies; that
the policymaking process does not consist of a series of technical 'stages'; that the evidence
considered in policymaking goes far beyond conventional research evidence; and that policy
decisions do not usually occur as clearly defined 'decision points'"); Edward J. Mullen &
David L. Streiner, The Evidence For and Against Evidence-Based Practice, 4 BRIEF TREATMENT
& CRIsIS INTERVENTION 111, 111 (2004) (explaining that evidence-based policymaking has
been both "heralded as one of the major advances in health care, education, criminal justice,
and the human services, promising to revolutionize both policymaking and practice" and
"excoriated as a development that will reduce professionals to mindlessly (and soullessly)
following recipe books for the betterment of insurance companies").
476. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 5) (on file with author) (explaining, in reference to substantive
objections to agency decisions raised by lawyers and accepted by judges, that "in all
likelihood, every one of those objections will have been carefully considered within the
executive branch, and often for many hours of substantive discussion by many people").
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B. Outside the Executive Branch
Structural reforms from within the executive branch are not the only
potential responses to the accountability concerns related to the scope and
extent of OMB's ability to control policy through the budget process. Both
Congress and civil society have an important role to play as well.'
i. Congress
Congress took a more active role in attempting to oversee the work of OMB
in the 1970s*'8 and of OIRA in the 198os479 as the scope of those offices grew
and as Congress grew concerned about reports of their politicization. That is
not to suggest that the RMOs are currently particularly politicized, either in the
abstract or in reference to any particular administration. But the scope of the
RMOs' policymaking effect is large, and the potential for politicization is
present. As such, Congress should increase its monitoring and oversight across
administrations and do so in a public forum that permits citizen review. It
could do so by attempting to get more information about the extent of the
RMOs' work either from agencies or directly from the PADs themselves.
If Congress were to focus on agencies, it might request agencies to provide
information about policy alternatives or designs that were considered and
rejected in addition to the congressional justifications submitted to Congress
along with the President's overall budget. Congress might also ask this
question of officials testifying during appropriations hearings. Given the
confidentiality lever, however, these requests are not likely to produce much
information-unless the executive branch has committed to the disclosure of
predeliberative budget information discussed above4o - as agency officials'
responses would be cleared by OMB.
Congress might instead turn to the PADs, seeking to learn through their
testimony how the RMOs influenced agency policy goals. The PADs are not
currently among the OMB officials who testify before Congress.48 ' Typically,
477. See Michaels, supra note 389, at 547-51 (explaining the importance of civil society to the
separation of powers in the contemporary administrative state).
478. See FISHER, supra note 7, at 51-55; LIGHT, supra note 262, at 153-55; Walsh & Culliton, supra
note 119, at 282.
479. See Copeland, supra note 19, at 111; Wendy L. Gramm, Regulatory Review Issues, October
1985-February 1988, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 27, 29-30 (2011).
480. See supra notes 453-463 and accompanying text.
481. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Testimony, WHITE
HousE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ombAegislative-testimony-default [http://perma.cc
/R 9 55 -CW8M] (listing testimony from executive officials who appeared before Congress;
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as is the case with White House staff members in general, congressional
testimony is reserved for, or at least standard for, those officials who are
confirmed by the Senate,42 which the PADs are not. Occasionally, though,
Congress has created an OMB position that is subject only to presidential
appointment, and yet the official in that position is still expected to testify, as is
the case for the Chief Information Officer, who runs the Office of E-
Government. 4 Accordingly, Congress could choose to require PADs to testify
before Congress when asked.48 This requirement would speak to two of the
three accountability concerns discussed above: it would make the scope of the
RMOs' work more transparent by bringing to light the work that these offices
do, and it would help make more perceptible the values-based decisions
underlying seemingly technocratic budget work.
Alternatively, Congress could also require Senate confirmation for the
PADs, which would additionally address the third accountability concern: it
would limit the elevation of a low-level political appointee over Senate-
confirmed officials in agencies. Beyond securing the PADs' testimony, the extra
no PADs are on the list); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Testimony
of Prior OMB Officials, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative
testimony-defaultprioraoo9 [http://perma.cc/BU4J-A6CP] (same).
482. See, e.g., Jack Moore, Republican Lawmakers Want More Accountability for US
CTO Role, NEXrGOv (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2015/04
/republican-lawmakers-want-overhaul-us-cto-role/10539 [http://perma.cc/LMU2-D7BM]
("Longstanding White House policy-across both Republican and Democratic
administrations -is to permit only Senate-confirmed appointees to testify before
lawmakers."). But see Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will
and Leverage, 52 DUKE L.J. 323, 394 (2002) ("When White House officials are asked to testify
before congressional committees, administrations frequently advise Congress that under
'long-established' precedents the immediate staff of a president do not appear before
committees. In fact - given the right political conditions - they do appear, and they appear
in great numbers.").
483. 44 U.S.C. 5 3602(a)-(b) (2012) (establishing in OMB the Office of Electronic Government
and providing for its administrator to be subject only to presidential appointment);
Testimony of Prior OMB Officials, supra note 481 (listing testimony from that office's
administrator during the Bush II Administration); OPM: Data Breach: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, u1 4 th Cong. (2015) (statement of Tony Scott, U.S. Chief
Information Officer), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2o15/o6/Scott-CIO
-OMB-Statement-6-i6-Data-Breach.pdf [http://perma.cc/KY9C-WFL8]; Office of Mgmt.
& Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Office of E-Government & Information Technology,
WHTE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/e-gov [http://perma.cc/3SAB-Y62J]
(noting that the office is currently headed by the Chief Information Officer).
484. For the same reasons that the PADs are not likely to be able to claim the presidential
communications privilege, see supra notes 413-417, this requirement would likely pose no
constitutional problem. See also Saiger, supra note 401, at 2603-09 (arguing that, while
"[t]he separation of powers is sometimes thought to . . . require~e] the law to leave the
President's staff alone," "separation of powers imposes no such requirement").
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requirement of Senate confirmation would provide an opportunity to probe the
PADs' different policy commitments and goals. In so doing, it would increase
both the transparency and the accountability of the RMOs' work.48s
Nevertheless, this proposal for Senate confirmation is not a perfect
solution. For one thing, it runs counter to trend. The Presidential Appointment
Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011 removed the requirement of Senate
confirmation for 163 positions in the executive branch.** This Act was in
keeping with a growing body of scholarship critiquing the appointment
process as cumbersome and full of delays 4 and as leading to too much
politicization of the executive branch.435
But the positions recently removed from advice-and-consent were generally
those with "little or no policy role" or "lower-level or administrative
positions.""39 Assistant secretaries for public affairs, directors and deputy
directors of single-issue bureaus, and members of various boards and advisory
councils are among those no longer subject to Senate confirmation. 4 9 o The
PADs exercise significantly more policy authority than these positions do. To
be sure, also eliminated from Senate confirmation were a number of assistant
secretaries in low-level management,9 which arguably bear some parallel to
485. See, e.g., BARBARA L. SCHWEMLE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4o856, THE DEBATE OVER
SELECTED PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANTS AND ADVISORS: APPOINTMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 6-8, 46-47 (2014) (discussing the view that transparency and
accountability are served well by the process of Senate confirmation for high-level executive
branch officials); Bruce Ackerman, Opinion, Restoring the Cabinet's Role, WASH. POST
(Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dynVcontent/article/zoo9/o3/io
/AR2oo9031oo2839.htnl [http://perma.cc/VU28-43AL] (arguing that Congress ought to
confirm White House "czars" to hold these officials accountable).
486. Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-166, 126
Stat. 1283 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
487. See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delays in the
Agencies, 64 DUKE L.J. 1571, 1574-76 (2015); Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and
the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1624-27 (2015); Anne Joseph O'Connell,
Shortening Agency and Judicial Vacancies Through Filibuster Reform? An Examination of
Confirmation Rates and Delays from 1981 to 2014, 64 DUKE L.J. 1645, 1669-76 (2015)
[hereinafter O'Connell, Shortening Vacancies]; Anne Joseph O'Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays
in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913, 966-68 (2009) [hereinafter
O'Connell, Vacant Offices].
488. See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL
AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 202-11 (2008); LIGHT, supra note 262, at 45-46.
489. MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41872, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, THE
SENATE'S CONFIRMATION PROCESS, AND CHANGES MADE IN THE 112TH CONGRESS 13-14
(2012).
490. See id. at 19-20.
491. See id.
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the PAD positions. But other management and budget positions still require
Senate confirmation, 4 92 as do most policy positions with which the PADs
interface. 93 The recent reduction in Senate-confirmed positions does not,
then, suggest that it is implausible to imagine Senate confirmation for the
PADs. Similarly, while Congress might not wish to highlight the importance of
the PADs through the confirmation process, in an effort to downplay the
importance of the President's budget as compared to its own appropriations
authority, Congress might nonetheless value the enhanced oversight that
comes with the ability to question directly.
Of course, this enhanced oversight is exactly why presidentialists, not to
mention the President, would likely resist this proposal. And that reaction
would have some substantive merit. The delays associated with the
appointment process,494 one of Congress's concerns in passing the 20 Act,49 s
could hamper OMB's ability to meet the deadlines associated with putting the
President's budget together, especially when a new President takes office. It
might result in submission of less careful, less vetted proposals to Congress.
These delays could result in vacancies at the head of the RMOs and, therefore,
decreased accountability,496 since there would be no one answering to the
President at the helm of the RMOs other than the OMB Director and Deputy
Director. Further, these two leaders could be so overloaded with PAD-level
decisions that higher-level work would suffer or they could simply ignore the
PAD-level decisions and delegate them to the civil servant DADs and branch
chiefs; neither result would provide any accountability benefit.
492. For example, the Assistant Secretary for Planning, Evaluation and Policy Development in
ED, which frequently interacts with the PAD overseeing that Department, remains a Senate-
confirmed position. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAvIS &JERRY W. MANSFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL30959, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION
AND COMMITTEES HANDLING NOMINATIONS 30 (2013).
493. Note that all of the unit heads within the Departments of Health and Human Services and
Labor who must justify their units' budgets remain Senate-confirmed, for example. See id. at
30-31.
494. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 487, at 1574-76 (arguing that confirmation delays are a
bigger problem with lower levels of management than higher ones); Metzger, supra note
487, at 1624-27 (arguing that "delays in staffing agencies are not a new phenomenon," but
have gotten worse); O'Connell, Shortening Vacancies, supra note 487, at 1692-93 (discussing
the "deleterious effects" of "delays in staffing agencies"); O'Connell, Vacant Offices, supra
note 487, at 937-43 (discussing the effect of leadership vacancies on agency confusion and
inaction).
495. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 112-24, at 3-6 (2011) (discussing the problem of delays associated with
Senate confirmation).
496. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 487, at 1580-81, 1598 (discussing agencies' "electoral
accountability"); O'Connell, Vacant Offices, supra note 487, at 943-46 (discussing how
agency vacancies undermine accountability).
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Similarly, the cumbersome nature of the confirmation process could deter
high-quality applicants from pursuing the PAD position as opposed to other
policymaking positions in the EOP that require no confirmation, such as the
policy councils. The process of confirmation could itself enhance the
politicization of the positions rather than cabin it," leading PADs to make
decisions that are rooted more in politics than in the merits.
At the same time, these problems are not sure to arise with any consistency,
and when they do, there might be workarounds. For example, on the issue of
delay, the Senate has often confirmed OMB Directors efficiently,495 and it
might extend the same courtesy to the PADs in light of Congress's own interest
in the budget process. Presidents could also request that candidates for the
PAD positions commit to staying in place for a significant length of time if
confirmed, thus reducing frequent turnover and associated delays.4 9 Review
of agency budget requests among the civil servants in the RMOs would be less
affected by delays in the Senate, and some short-term slippage in
accountability (due to branch chiefs and DADs making more of the decisions)
might be tempered by the increased systemic accountability a confirmation
requirement would bring.
Although the increased burden associated with Senate confirmation might
deter qualified candidates, it might also expand the pool, given the prestige
associated with Senate confirmation. Nor would Senate confirmation
necessarily increase politicization; the PADs are already political appointees
who serve at the pleasure of the President. Requiring their confirmation would
arguably make the fact of their work more public without increasing their
politicization.
Thus, despite some justifiable skepticism, there are good reasons to think
that Senate confirmation for the PADs would be valuable. At the very least, the
possibility is worth further discussion, especially in light of precedent for
turning OMB's high-level policy positions into Senate-confirmed ones. The
Director and Deputy Director of OMB were not originally subject to Senate
confirmation, but Congress turned them into Senate-confirmed positions as
497. See generally LEwis, supra note 488, at 202-19 (discussing the effects of politicizing the
bureaucracy).
498. See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 487, at 1575 n.12 (reporting that Obama's first OMB Director
was confirmed on January 20, 2009); Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the
President, Former Directors of OMB and BOB, WHITE HousE, http://www.whitehouse.gov
/omb/organization former-directors [http://perma.cc/QWSA-D3BX] (demonstrating that
the first OMB Directors for Presidents George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George H.W.
Bush were confirmed shortly after each President took office).
499. See O'Connell, Vacant Offices, supra note 487, at 988-90 (making such a recommendation for
nominees more generally).
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the scope of their policymaking authority grew and as the President started to
use OMB more politically.soo Congress similarly turned the Administrator of
OIRA into a Senate-confirmed position out of concern that the position's vast
authority required more congressional oversight.s' The analogy is not perfect
because these positions all began as congressionally created positions, unlike
the PADs, but the history reflects congressional interest in expanding oversight
of OMB. Indeed, two other Senate-confirmed positions in OMB oversee offices
that are much smaller than the RMOs and have a narrower purview.502 Against
this backdrop, making the PAD positions Senate-confirmed in an effort to
enhance transparency and accountability could be a natural evolution.
2. Civil Society Organizations
Civil society organizations could also take steps both to monitor and
influence OMB in an effort to improve the system's accountability.
As to monitoring, civil society organizations could expand their oversight
of what is already public about OMB's actions through the budget process. For
example, it is typically a major news story when the President releases the
budget, but the OMB directors' release of budget or other memoranda is not
often a story, at least not outside the Beltway. It should be.
Civil society organizations should call for more transparency in the RMOs'
process overall, including on the budget execution side. Civil society groups
might even play a role in bringing about the kind of pro-transparency executive
order proposed above.so' Because a President once in office might find it
difficult to resist the status quo of the non-transparent RMO process, open-
government groups might work to secure a campaign promise to commit to
such a reform.
Moreover, if the RMOs are making policy, it is important to ensure the
RMOs are hearing from a broad base of interests.so4 OMB budget review is an
500. See supra note 478 and accompanying text.
501. See supra note 479 and accompanying text.
S02. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 17, at ii (demonstrating that in FY 2014, each of
the five RMOs contained between twenty-seven and fifty-one full-time employee
equivalents, while the Office of Federal Financial Management contained thirteen and the
Office of Federal Procurement Policy contained fourteen); see also Davis & Mansfield, supra
note 492, at 36 (listing heads of these offices as among the six positions in OMB requiring
Senate confirmation).
503. See supra Section IV.A.i.
504. At times, OMB itself has encouraged such an effort, although the effort has waxed and
waned over time and has also varied by RMO branch. See TOMKIN, supra note 18, at 183-84,
2286
125:218 2 2016
THE PRESIDENT S BUDGET AS A SOURCE OF AGENCY POLICY CONTROL
insider's game.so5 There is a small group of D.C. lobbyists with specialties in
OMB, who serve a client base that is likely dominated by well-heeled corporate
clients.5o 6 While less is known about the RMOs' meetings with outsiders
because there is no requirement to document them, there is no reason to
believe that the imbalance is any less present with the RMOs than it is with
OIRA.50 7
Civil society organizations could help redress this likely imbalance.
Publicizing the importance of what the RMOs do and how to engage with
them would be one small step towards encouraging greater participation. More
broadly, civil society organizations that already meet with agency officials and
congressional staff members on policy matters could ensure they have the
RMIOs in their sights as well. Former OMB officials could take on pro bono
projects with civil society organizations seeking to influence the RMOs or run
training sessions on how to incorporate the RMOs into a federal lobbying
strategy. The goal would be not to politicize the RMOs but rather to ensure the
RMOs are hearing from a broad base of affected interests. This strategy would
ultimately increase accountability to the public as a whole, rather than to the
segment of the public that knows how to gain access.
C. A Cautionary Note
Critics of OIRA, concerned that it has become too powerful, have
sometimes suggested returning final rulemaking authority to agencies.5o
Understanding the broader scope of OMB's work through the RMOs should
give these critics pause in suggesting the elimination of OIRA's review of
regulations as a cure for its ills.
186 (describing variation in use of interest groups within OMB and among different
branches throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and 199os).
505. See T.R. Goldman, Lobbying the 0MB: The Inside Game, INFLUENCE (Aug. 22, 2001), www
.thecre.com/pdf/2004o927_1obbying.pdf (http://perma.cc/SQE2-XB8L].
5o6. See id. (describing one OMB lobbyist who declined to disclose the identities of his clients
but is on record as having received thousands of dollars in fees from companies like
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. and Aventis).
507. See Haeder & Yackee, supra note 361 (finding that rule change is more likely when only
business groups lobby than when public interest groups lobby).
508. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 2, at 1071-72 (recommending that Congress bar OMB
participation in agency rulemaking beyond on-the-record comments or, alternatively, the
President should amend the executive orders to clarify OMB's advisory role); Steinzor, supra
note 2, at 277 ("White House staff should stop reviewing individual rules and rule proposals
on a routine basis, instead delegating this responsibility to the political appointees who lead
the agencies and are already accountable for making wise and balanced decisions," while
retaining "responsibility for dealing with cross-cutting issues.").
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Much of the effect OIRA currently has on agencies' regulations could be
implemented through the RMOs' work on budget preparation, budget
execution, and management.so' The approval lever and form-and-content lever
could direct which regulations agencies should and should not prioritize, while
the pyramid structure of the RMOs could let political officials maintain
plausible deniability. The monitoring lever could ensure that agencies take the
steps OMB directs. The Presidential Management Agenda lever could demand
that particular regulations receive more attention than others. And the
confidentiality lever could keep much of this secret. Affecting agencies'
regulations through these other means instead of through OIRA would simply
drive OMB's policy control even further underground.
To be sure, a President hoping to rescind the practice of OIRA's regulatory
review would be unlikely to shift the work to the RMOs. At the same time, a
President might wish to capitalize on public praise for returning authority to
the agencies while nonetheless gaining from the RMOs' less public ability to
effect control. A subsequent President might then wish to keep the whole
process of influence secret. Alternatively, the RMOs themselves might fill the
gap of their own accord.
Discussions about reforming OIRA should thus incorporate analysis of the
RMOs' authority to avoid the "'whack-a-mole' effect," where a restriction on
agency practice simply leads to experimentation to get around the restriction.s1 o
Attention to the RMOs' work more generally is critical for understanding
OMB's capacity to control the administrative state.s"'
Sog. See RADIN, supra note 98, at 116 (discussing pressure put on the director of EPA's Office of
Research and Development to "focus on program outcomes in a manner that was acceptable
to the OMB budget examiners"). Recall also that centralized review of regulations began as
a practice on the budget side long before OIRA was even created. See supra note 8o.
Moreover, when Congress proposed placing certain transparency requirements on OIRA in
1990, the Bush I Administration suggested in response that it could just as well perform
OIRA's regulatory review functions from "other White House offices." Vanessa Jo Grimm &
Kevin Power, White House to Hill: Let's Abolish OIRA, 9 Gov'T COMPUTER NEWS, May 14,
1990, 1990 WLNR 4439229.
Sio. Stuart Shapiro, Agency Oversight as "Whac-a-Mole": The Challenge ofRestricting Agency Use of
Nonlegislative Rules, 37 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523, 526 (2014) (describing the challenges of
policing agencies that shift their policymaking form in response to efforts to limit that form
because "agencies are likely to react to a restriction on one type of policymaking activity (to
the extent that the restriction works at all) by moving to even more difficult-to-monitor
methods of setting policy").
s1. For example, an emerging body of scholarship considers the possibility that agencies try to
avoid OIRA review by changing the form of their policymaking and discusses what OIRA's
response should be to this potential phenomenon. See, e.g., Mendelson & Weiner, supra note
79, at 481-507 (creating a typology of OIRA review avoidance tactics and suggesting that
"the problem of agency avoidance and response measures [is] . . . a problem of optimal
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CONCLUSION
This Article began with the observation from Paul O'Neill, former deputy
director of OMB, that policy debates are "reflected, recorded, and battled over"
in budget numbers and that "the numbers are the keys to the doors of
everything.""' By identifying and elucidating the levers OMB has at its
disposal to control agency policymaking through the President's budget
process, I have sought to show that this observation is correct. It is through the
budget that OMB finds itself "in the stream of every policy decision made by
the federal government.""'3 While OIRA's control of agency policymaking
through regulatory review is important, it is only one mechanism through
which OMB may exercise policymaking authority over federal agencies.
Beyond this descriptive analysis, the Article sketched the various ways in
which OMB's budget work is simultaneously salutary and concerning. This
work appears to go no further than is legally authorized, and it plays a valuable
role in coordinating the expansive administrative state. But at the same time,
by operating non-transparently, by giving so much discretion to lower-level
political appointees and civil servants, and by making it possible for values-
based decision making to be obscured by technocratic-sounding analysis,
OMB's Resource Management Offices present troubling challenges to
accountability.
The Article therefore offered a series of potential reforms that would
improve accountability while still maintaining OMB's beneficial coordinating
role: an executive order governing the RMOs' process and requiring more
transparency; increased OMB efforts to make its budget work more
transparent and to engage the public on its government-wide policy decisions;
regulation"); Nou, supra note 19 (discussing agency incentives to avoid presidential review).
While the literature on OIRA avoidance has not yet incorporated consideration of the
RMOs' authority over agency policymaking, the RMOs' work greatly increases the capacity
of OMB to oversee agency action of all varieties. Future work on OIRA avoidance should
thus include analysis of the RMOs' collaboration with OIRA and overall oversight. Compare
Mendelson & Weiner, supra note 79, at 470 n.86 (noting in passing that "it is unclear how
often the budget side of OMB acts to assist the regulatory side of OMB and OIRA"), and
Tozzi, supra note So, at 67 (recommending that "primary jurisdiction for the review of select
rules [be assigned] to budget examiners"), with Copeland, supra note 19, at 120 (suggesting
that program examiners already need to "sign off" on OIRA's review of rules for the
program examiners' agencies), Sunstein, supra note 19, at 1845 (noting close collaboration
between RMOs and OIRA on rules of shared interest), and Program Examiner, supra note 74
(explaining that program examiners "perform ... regulatory analyses").
92. Martin, supra note i, at 72.
S13. Id.
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greater congressional monitoring and oversight of the RMOs' budget work;
and expanded attention and engagement from civil society organizations.
In the end, however, the Article is not intended to provide the last word,
but rather to open a conversation, on the President's budget as a source of
agency policy control.
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